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STUDIES 
Péter Miskolczi-
Bodnár 
One-Man Company 
in Hungarian Law 
/ . Historical Background 
The one-man company is one of the latest institutions of Hungarian law. 
1. For our internal private law, grounded as it is in Roman law, it is self-evident that 
a society (societas) must consist of several members [as is also expressed in the 
Hungarian equivalent of the term "associate" (társ)]. The idea of the one-man company 
did not arise in the legislative process started by the National Assembly of 1779 nor in 
Act XVII of 1792 or in Act XVIII of 1810. Quite the contrary, the notion of an associa-
tion, which is conveyed by the very name "company" was underlined in the Act of 1810 
on the "Legal Relationship of Companies Formed for Unlimited Partnership". No mention 
of the one-man company was made in Act XXXVII of 1875 on Trade, a law of a 
European standard reflecting a strong German influence.1 
Since Part One thereof is entitled "Merchants and Trading Companies", thus 
conceptually distinguishing merchants, or one-man commercial forms from companies. 
Nevertheless, it was possible to have a one-man operation in the form of a joint stock 
company; a type of a company2 covered by the act which did not refer to all shares 
being held by one man as a ground for terminating a joint stock company. 
Permitting the operation of a joint stock company even in the case of a single 
shareholder was hardly a reason for the "silence" of the Act Such intention of the 
1 NOVOTNI, Z.: Társulási formák a magyar gazdaságban "német úton" (Forms of Association in the 
Hungarian Economy on "the German Way"), Élet és Tudomány, 5/1989. pp. 138-139. 
2 In the case of companies possessing no juristic personality any change in the number of members 
automatically entailed termination of the company, the one-man company thus being conceptually impossible. 
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legislature cannot be inferred from the motivation to the Act, nor was any observation 
made to that effect during the drafting of the Bill, or at the conference on codification3 
which adopted the draft article on the dissolution of joint stock companies. Rather the 
text seems to reflect the German influence. 
In its commentaries on and interpretation of the statutory text, jurisprudence 
recognized that the acquisition of shares by a single person created a new situation in 
contrast to he classical concept of a company. At that time, however, a contingency in 
which, on the one hand, a company "could not be regarded as dissolved eo ipso" and, on 
the other, "acquisition of shares by a single person interrupts the lawful operation of a 
company for the duration of the contingency, and the company itself is a conceptual 
impossibility" presented legal literature with a knotty problem.4 "In an abstract sense, this 
fact causes a joint stock company to extinguish a fortiori, since the term 'company' pre-
supposes the existence of at least two participants. This notwithstanding, absorption of 
all shares in one hand will not in practice lead to the dissolution of a company unless it 
occurs at a time when the existence of several shareholders is a condition sine qua non 
for the continuing operation of a company along a specific line of activity, particularly 
at the time of the general meeting or the election of officers, and when that condition is 
not fulfilled even a posteriori—i.e. in order to allow, where necessary, the transfer of 
shares to others—or unless dissolution is desired by the shareholder himself'.5 To cover 
such an eventuality, the law sought to devise an arrangement for creditors' protection,6 
namely to enable creditors to demand "the shareholder either to distribute his shares in 
order to restore the company status ... or to dissolve the joint stock company".7 Judicial 
practice, however, clearly rejected the notion of the company, spelling out a year after 
the Act had entered into force that "a joint stock company must not exist if ah shares are 
3 The 33rd meeting on 29 January 1874 of the conference of 31 participants designated in April 1873 found 
that the Article (then Art. 239) on the Dissolution of Joint Stock Companies "give no cause for comment". 
Quoted by Hugó Kilényi in: Kereskedelmi Törvényjavaslat és a tárgyalására egybehívott értekezlet 
jegyzőkönyvei (The Trade Bill and the Records of the Conference convened to Consider It), Budapest, 
Löwinger, 1875. p. 201. 
4 NEUMANN, Á.: A Kereskedelmi Törvény magyarázata (An Exegesis of the Trade Act), 2nd completely 
revised edition, Budapest, Athenaeum, 1892. p. 575. 
5 NAGY, F.: A Magyar Kereskedelmi Jog Kézikönyve, különös tekintettel a bírói gyakorlatra és a külföldi 
törvényhozásokra (A Handbook of Hungarian Trade Law, with Particular Emphasis on Judicial Practice and 
Foreign Legislation), Budapest, Athenaeum, Seventh edition, 1909. p. 125. 
6 Hungarian legal literature was evidently influenced by contemporary legislation abroad when favouring 
creditors' entitlement to initiate termination of a company. Under the British Companies Act of 1862 and the 
French Act of 1867 on Sociétés, creditors were free to exercise this right one year (six months, under the 
Belgian Company Act of 1873) after the date when the number of shareholders fell below seven. 
7 NEUMANN, Á.: op. cit., p. 576. 
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held by one person, even though juristic".8 That view was upheld by several judgements 
until the turn of the century. A contemporary jurist was right in stating that "under 
Hungarian judicial practice, a joint stock company is regarded as non-existent in case of 
such a share cumulation".' After the turn of the century, however, there occurred a 
radical change in the attitude towards shares being held by a single person. In a 1904 
case it was stated that "if all shares of a joint stock company are held by a sole owner, 
any decision of the members' meeting held in such a contingency shall be cancelled ex 
officio, but the registry court shall still not order the liquidation of the joint stock 
company because, although the organic operation of the company is interrupted during 
such a contingency, the legal personality of the joint stock company is not thereby 
extinguished and the company may resume its organic operation as soon as the shares 
have been transferred to others".10 
This judgement became a guide for future action to the point that it was cited as 
authoritative in related commentaries and explanations11 and was used as an argument 
for the introduction of the "one-man company". 
It should be mentioned that later draft laws on joint stock companies deliberately 
excluded, application to cases in which all shares were held by a single person as giving 
cause for liquidation of the company. (The reservations about a company consisting of 
one shareholder continued to exist is a different matter.) "The Draft does not regard 
acquisition of all shares by one person as a cause ipso iure for liquidation nor does it fix 
a minimum number of members for the continuance of a joint stock company... Consider-
ing the constant change of members of a joint stock company as a general rule under 
which the person holding all the shares may easily transfer his shares to others as well 
as the little practical relevance of the matter, the Draft leaves it to the court to decide, 
8 Judgement 2549/76 Dt. r. f. XXVIII. 258 of the Budapest Royal Court of Appeal is cited by Ignác Barna 
in: Kereskedelmi Törvény a Magyar Királyi Curia, a fennállott Legfőbb ítélőszék és Semmitőszék, a királyi 
ítélőtáblák elvi jelentőségű határozataival (The Trade Act, with Authoritative Rulings by the Royal Hungarian 
Supreme Court, the Former Supreme Court of Justice and Court of Cassation, and the Royal County Courts), 
Budapest, Révai, 1894. 
9 NEUMANN, Á.: (in op. cit., p. 676) refers to additional judgements, i.e. Royal Supreme Court Judgements 
529/87 Dt.r.n.f. XIX. 6. s.k.1. and I220/90/J. 1891. évf. 33. 1. in the case of the Savings Bank at Hajdú-
böszörmény. 
10 Budapest, T. 2731/1901. 
11 Among the explanations relying on that judgement, see Hiteltörvények (Credit Laws), documented with 
judicial practice and provided with notes and references by Dávid Papp, Third Edition, Budapest, Grill, 1906. 
SZENDE, Péter Pál: A kereskedelmi törvény és a reá vonatkozó joganyag kézikönyve (The Trade Act and a 
Handbook of Related Legal Materials), Budapest, Grill, 1927. Magyar Hiteljog, 1. kötet, Kereskedelmi törvény 
és a reá vonatkozó joganyag kézikönyve (Hungarian Credit Law, Vol. I, The Trade Act and a Handbook of 
Related Legal Materials), compiled by Jenő László and Péter Pál Szende, Budapest, Grill, 1929. A kereskedelmi 
törvény és gyakorlata (The Trade Act and Its Practice), compiled by Péter Pál Szende, Ödön Kuncz and Endre 
Nizsalovszky, Budapest, Grill, 1937. KUNCZ, Ödön-NIZSALOVSZKY, Endre: A kereskedelmi törvény és jog-
gyakorlata (The Trade Act and Legal Practice), Budapest, Grill, 1942. 
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at its discretion, the cases in which a joint stock company should be declared terminated 
on the ground that it lacks the elementary constituent aspect of 'company'".12 
A subsequent draft law recognized the continuance of a company with a single 
shareholder not only at the level of commentary, but, after enumerating the causes 
leading to the dissolution of a company, provided expressis verbis that "acquisition of all 
shares by a single person shall not by itself entail dissolution of the company".13 
However, this draft never became law, so it "only" serves to reflect the development 
of the debate which moved from original rejection to acceptance of the existence of a 
company owned by a single shareholder. 
2. The concept of the one-man company first appeared in Hungary during the 
preparation of Act V of 1930 on the Joint Stock Company and Silent Partnerships. 
(a) The first publications14 discussing in detail the German Law of 1892 did not yet 
emphasize the possibility of a one-man operation. The proposal to establish one-man 
companies was presented during the preparatory debates on the regulation of limited 
liability companies in Hungary.15 The opponents of this institution argued that an 
arrangement under which individual merchants and craftsmen would not be liable after 
all their property, but their liability would be limited to a certain part of their assets, 
namely the shares contributed to the company, would serve to encourage people to. 
(b) The one-man company was finally not included in the Bill, submitted in 1925, but 
the Bill allowed the continuance, in the case of joint stock companies, of limited liability 
where the company was originally established with several members, but eventually 
became a one-man company. "The number of members shall not be less than two, but 
shall not exceed thirty...; the fact that a company has but one member shall not be 
sufficient cause for its dissolution. In that case, however, the court may, at the request 
of any creditor seeing his interest jeopardized, order the compulsory liquidation of the 
company".16 In the preamble to the Bill reference is made to debates on the subject in 
other countries. "In Germany, Austria and Switzerland there is much controversy about 
whether it is possible to tolerate the continuance of a limited Lability company with a 
sole member. The view is rather common that reduction of the number of members to 
one is a cause ipso iure for the termination of a company, since one may only speak of 
a 'company' where are least two members. The Draft is of the view that the acquisition 
12 KUNCZ, Ö.: Törvénytervezet a részvénytársaságokról, a szövetkezetekről és a korlátolt felelősségű 
társaságokról (Draft Law on Joint Stock Companies), Budapest, Grill, 1926. 
13 KUNCZ, Ö: Törvénytervezet a részvénytársaságokról (Draft Law on Joint Stock Companies), A Magyar 
Jogászegylet Kiadása, 195. § (Art. 195 in the Edition by the Hungarian Lawyers' Society). 
14 NEUMANN, Á.: A korlátolt felelősségre alakult társaságokról szóló 1892. évi Német Birodalmi törvényről 
(On the German Imperial Law of 1892 Concerning Limited Liability Companies), Budapest, Franklin, 1893. 
GRÓSZ, Mór: A korlátolt felelősségű társaság (The Limited Liability Company), A jog, 42/1907. p. 304. 
15 In 1905 Dávid Papp elaborated a draft on the mandate of the Hungarian Federation of Manufacturers and 
in 1917 Lajos Thirring prepared the Trade Bill, which covered the Limited Liability Company as well. 
16 See fn. 12 for draft article 335. 
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of all shares by a single person is not by itself a cause for the dissolution and termination 
of a joint stock company, since such a situation may change at any moment and that, 
similarly reduction in the number of members shall not result in the dissolution of a 
limited liability company. True, a one-man limited company (Ltd) would virtually create, 
in a roundabout way, a 'limited liability firm of one man', an institution which is not 
desirable at all. However, the Draft takes into account the fact that, on the one hand, such 
a situation may at any moment change with the entry of new members and that, on the 
other, a one-man Ltd affects mainly the interest of the company's creditors. Therefore 
the problem at hand is resolved by providing that the court shall be authorized to order 
the dissolution of a one-man Ltd only when so requested by a creditor whose interest is 
in jeopardy".17 
(c) Act V of 1930 ultimately opted for the least radical solution. 
— In the course of the debates the idea of introducing the one-man company was 
discarded as being unripe and untimely. The general motivation to the Act similarly 
raised the question of "whether it is necessary to fix a minimum number of members and 
what approach should be taken in general to the so-called one-man Ltd (Einmanngesell-
schaft). The one-man Ltd is permissible under the law of Liechtenstein as well as under 
the judicial practice of Germany and Austria, whereas the English, French, Polish, Italian 
and Swiss laws require a minimum number of members". 
"Without entering into a discussion of the extensive debates, both at home and 
abroad, about the one-man company, it will suffice to call attention to one consideration, 
namely the need to wait and see how a company requirement of several members will 
function in Hungary and to them decide, in the light of experience, whether the time has 
come to allow one-man function companies, which are 'one-man limited liability 
companies' pure and simple. And even then, the problem will not be setded by the 
one-man Ltd, but perhaps rather by allowing a merchant to limit his liability to a 
specified separate share of his property". 
Despite the non-committal attitude to one-man companies the 1930 Act allowed a 
company to operate with a single member on a temporary basis (as is permitted by the 
current law and as will be discussed in detail in Section IE3 infra). Art 16 of a Act V 
of 1930, provides, "The number of members shall not be less than two. If the number of 
members falls to one, the court shall invite that member to report a new member within 
three months or to apply for registration of his company as a one-man firm. Should he 
fail to do so the court shall ex officio terminate the company in extra-judicial proceed-
17 See fn. for the Draft Law, pp. 437-438. 
18 "In such cases the consequence must be dissolution under para 1, subparagraph (3), of Art. 82 and 
liquidation under Art. 88", in: SÁNDORFI, Kamill: A korlátolt felelősségű társaságokról és a csendes-
társaságokról szóló 1930. V. tc. (Act V of 1930 on Limited Liability Companies and Silent Partnerships), 
Budapest, Franklin, 1930. p. 78. 
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It may be said that the 1930 Act holds a more conservative view of companies whose 
members are reduced to one than does the 1905 draft, which permitted a company whose 
members shrunk to one as a result of the transfer of shares to continue to exist as a 
limited liability company (Ark 3). Some Hungarian jurists would have accepted this more 
radical formula, although they were aware of its dangers. Assessing the German practice, 
they pointed out that "the commercial world, quickly realizing the enormous practical 
relevance of this principle, soon came to use that permissive rule to continue even 
one-man businesses under the cloak of limited liability, and to do so exclusively for the 
sole purpose of allowing merchants to limit... their liability... to a certain predetermined 
amount".19 
3. The legislation of 1875 and 1930 have proved to be time-honoured elements of 
Hungarian law. Until 1945 there were no amendments, since between 1945-48 it met 
economic needs, while during the period 1949-1960 the socialist planned economy, the 
mechanism of direct plan breakdowns, had no need for the operation of "companies", so 
the laws, having lost their practical functions, were not revised. What remained in force 
were only the provisions of Act XXXVII of 1875 governing joint stock companies and 
those of Act V of 1930 relating to limited liability companies. However the companies 
operating under the terms of these legislative provisions were only to be found at the 
periphery of economic life. 
Despite the ideological reservations about company law, the institution of "the 
company" assumed a growing significance in agriculture from the early 1960s onward, 
and it needed and received separate legislative coverage. However, the methods of 
corporate formations open to cooperatives20 consisted, as a matter of course, of several 
members, as did those which, rather diverse in both name and regulation, were called into 
being by the 1968 reform of economic management in other sectors of the national 
economy. Companies were still a marginal phenomenon at that time. Compared with 
1,749 cooperative and state farms, in 1975 there was a total of 72 companies established 
by cooperatives.21 Along with the figures, the "weightlessness" of these organizations 
is indicated by the fact in spite of their spectacular numerical growth22 from 1982 the 
19 BOZÓKY, G .: A korlátolt felelősségű társaság a külföldi és de lege ferenda a magyar jogban (The Limited 
Liability Company in Foreign Laws and de lege ferenda in Hungarian Legislation), Pozsony, István Éder 
Könyvnyomdája, 1914. p. 36. 
20 See, inter alie, DOMÉ Györgyné: Gazdasági társulások a mezőgazdaságban (Economic Associations in 
Agriculture). A Népgazdasági Jogi Kutatóhálózat végtanulmánya, Budapest, 1985. 
21 Statisztikai Évkönyv (Statistical Year-Book) 1987. Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, 1987. p. 136. 
22 By 1987 there were 846 industrial and service cooperative groups, 12,487 intra-enterprise business 
partnerships and 3,590 business partnerships of private persons along with 1,043 industrial state enterprises and 
1,392 industrial cooperatives. Source: op. cit. in fn. 21. p. 90. 
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companies without legal personality accounted for less than 1 % of the value of industrial 
output.23 
Law-Decree No. 16 of 1985 on the Registration of Firms, repealed the first and 
second sentences in Art. 16 of Act V of 1930, thereby ruling out the possibility of the 
one-man operation on a temporary basis. This implied no restriction in practice, but was 
a retreat of interest to our subject. 
4. The subject of the one-man company was virtually absent from Hungarian legal 
literature following World War Two, the reason being "companies" had been displaced 
from economic life. The company as an effective form of organization for the pooling 
of assets and the cooperation of members came to receive attention again in scientific 
analyses of organizational systems of the economy during the 1980s. The relevant studies 
touched on the problem of the one-man company. "The general view in Hungarian law 
is that it does not recognize the one-man company even as a transitory phenomenon. A 
conceptual approach does not, however, solve every question, for reduction of the number 
of members to one does not constitute an objective situation which would concurrently 
justify the complete termination of company operation as well... In reality, where the 
number of members with proprietary rights falls to one, company operation can only be 
terminated by the will of members when they so agree in the case of withdrawal".24 In 
cases where the interest of a member (or the national economy) requires the continuation 
of operations, the right to terminate the company is vested in the member as successor 
in title to the company, or eventually in a subsidiary company established by him, and 
it is equally conceivable that the member continues the company's activity without 
becoming a successor in title.25 As can be seen, disregard of the one-man company 
gives rise to another legal problem, which was ultimately solved just as the Gordian knot 
had been cut. 
5. Along with a series of highly important changes, Act VI of 1988 introduced the 
institution of the one-man company without any particular preliminary debate of the topic 
in legal literature. As is the case with anything new, there were reservations voiced about 
the one-man company as a "self-contradiction", but the one-man company received only 
secondary attention compared with the much more important questions covered by the 
Act26 
23 The industrial and service groups and the intra-enterprise business partnerships together accounted for 
0.6%, and the business partnerships of private persons for 0.3%, of the value of industrial output. Source: op. 
cit. in fn. 22. 
24 NOVOTNI, Z.: A gazdasági társulások (társaságok) jogviszonyainak kérdései az ipar és kereskedelem 
területén (Questions concerning the Legal Relationships of Economic Associations (Partnerships) in the Fields 
of Industry and Commerce), Népgazdasági Jogi Kutatóhálózat Végtanulmánya, Budapest, 1985. p. 177. 
25 For more detail on variants, see op. cit. in fn. 24, pp. 177 et seq. 
26 "In substance, the concept has not changed much, but in what it has... there is not much to be gained by 
it. Such a change is ... the introduction of the nonsense institution of the one-man company", in: PETRIK, F: 
A siker sodrában (Drafted by Success), Valóság, 7/1989. p. 107. 
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6. This brief presentation of the development of company law in Hungary has been 
intended to show that the one-man company has practically no past in Hungary and that 
the relevant law is so recent that this author is not in a position to cite any particular 
experience and theoretical debates of note. For these reasons, in Hungary there is as yet 
no articulate position regarding this issue still in dispute in Western Europe. (We have 
not even come to raising the question of de facto one-man companies.) Therefore this 
paper will concentrate on presenting and discussing the relevant Hungarian legislation in 
force (Section II) and will give only incidental consideration to the theoretical aspects 
which are yet to be addressed by Hungarian jurisprudence (Section III). 
II. The Hungarian Law Regarding the One-Man Company 
1. The One-Man Company as Covered by Act VI of 1988 
In Hungarian law the company is, as a general rule, a legal form of economic 
cooperation among several members. 
The one-man company is an exceptional phenomenon and is regulated by law in two 
different situations. It may function: 
(a) as a transitory phenomenon for the purpose and in the hope of involving another 
person in the company's activity during the grace period, thus reestablishing the company 
in its original form of operation with more than one member (see para 2). 
(b) as a recognized form of company without any purpose or hope of terminating the 
company's one-man character. In this sense the one-man company is covered by 
regulations on the limited liability company and the joint stock company in cases where 
a one-man company was either established a priori as such, or a company originally 
established as one with several members but then becomes a one-man company without 
being required to cease to exist upon the expiry of a certain period of time (see para 3/a-f). 
2. The Transitory One-Man Company 
The one-man company existing as a transitory phenomenon is not actually covered 
by the 1988 Act. It is not regarded by the Hungarian legislation as a separate form of 
company and is not governed by special rules. This form of the one-man company is 
In his works Zoltán Novotni objected to the one-man company on the added ground that foundation of 
such a company fails to satisfy a classical postulate of civil law, the coordinate status of partners. "In the legal 
relationship between the founders and the company the latter, as a subject at law, has a subordinate role 
compared to the determinant position of associated members. In the exceptional cases where, under the rules 
of the new Act, one founding member established by himself a company (a Ltd or a joint stock company) the 
legal relationship is actually bipolar, but the coordinate status of the subjects is absent in view of the above 
consideration", in: NOVOTNI, Z.: A kodifikált társasági jog mint a magyar polgári jog megújulásának eszköze 
(The Codified Law of Association as an Instrument of Renewing Hungarian Civil Law), Jogtudományi Közlöny, 
2/1989. pp. 68-69. 
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none other than an intermediate phase of existence of an original company and the 
subsequent company with several members, or, what is worse, it represents the 
agonization of the company. Article 46. (1) of the Act enumerates the cases in which a 
company must cease to exist, but in dealing with one such case it introduces a new 
desideratum into the earlier rule: "The company shall cease to exist when ... the number 
of members has fallen to one (with the exception of the limited liability company and the 
joint stock company) and no new member has been added to the registry court within six 
months". As can be seen, the new law defers the date of the company's termination by 
six months. At the moment the penultimate member terminates his membership the 
company may continue to operate without any special legal transformation. The company 
is to cease to exist six months later, but may continue to exist if at least one new member 
is added to the registry court within the required time-limit. Accordingly, all forms of 
corporate formation—with the exception of the limited liability company and the joint 
stock company-are recognized by law as one-man companies operating on a temporary 
basis. In actual fact, a transitory one-man company can also be imagined in the case of 
a limited liability company, since-as will be discussed in detail in para. 3 (b) infra—the 
legislation refers only once to a "one-man Ltd" (in our usage, a lasting one-man Ltd), 
namely when the number of the company's members falls to one and no new member 
is added to the count registry within six months. It will be noted that in practice there is 
a very small difference between a company operating with one member during the grace 
period of six months and the company tenned by law as a (lasting) one-man Ltd 
operating during the subsequent period. Although the law considers only the latter to be 
a one-man company and hence the rules on one-man company do not apply in principle 
to a company operating with one member during the grace period, the conditions 
enumerated in para. 3 (c) infra automatically occur in respect to such a company as well. 
(The reader is reminded that in regulating the joint stock company the legislature has 
opted for the simpler formula, namely it refers to a one-man joint stock company from 
the moment that the ownership of all shares has been acquired by a sole shareholder.) 
The permissive rule for the transitory, one-man company is based on the below 
rationale. 
It is economically justified to allow the continuance of a company with efficient 
operations whose members have been reduced to one for some reason like the death of 
a natural person, a partner, or the bankruptcy of a juristic person (i.e. often facts external 
to the company and not influencing its future efficient operation), but which is able to 
continue its economic activity with the entry of a new member.27 
This principle is partly restricted in the case of the joint stock company. If the sole 
shareholder is a natural person, a joint stock company is not granted the period of grace 
enjoyed by the other forms of company to enable it to continue its operation with the 
entry of a new member. 
27 Also, A társasági törvény, magyarázatokkal és iratmintákkal (The Associations Act, with Explanations and 
Specimens of Documents), ed. KUN, T., Budapest, Láng Kk., 1988. p. 140. 
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3. Lasting One-Man Company 
Under Hungarian law, the limited liability company and the joint stock company in the 
form of a "lasting one-man company", is the typical instance in which the one-man Ltd 
is established. The joint stock company appears to be subject to more restrictions, and 
even the liability rules applicable to the one-man joint stock company differ from those 
governing the (limited) liability of the general joint stock company. The differences 
between the one-man forms of the limited liability company and the joint stock company 
warrant a separate discussion of the regulations on these forms of company formation. 
The lasting one-man company can be classified both by type of company and by the 
mode of formation. A distinction by mode of formation can be made between a one-man 
company established as such and one established with several members but becoming a 
company with one member by reason of a decrease in the number of its members. In 
Hungarian law, these two forms of joint stock company are covered by different 
regulations. 
It is also a specific feature of the regulations on the joint stock company that the 
founder(s) does not necessarily become a shareholder, so establishment of a joint stock 
company either as a one-man company or as one with several members may be initiated 
even by a single founder. This case should be distinguished from the proper one-man 
company, but the permissive rule on the establishment by a single founder signals a 
change in company law as does the introduction of institution of the one-man company. 
So what we have here are institutions of the same stamp. 
(a) The company Ltd established as a one-man company. The general rule, namely 
the requirement of at least two persons for the establishment of a company, applies to the 
limited liability company (Ltd) as well. By an express provision, however, the law allows 
a company to be formed by a single member. A one-man Ltd, company may be 
established by the State, juristic persons, natural persons and, under the general rule 
contained in Art. 4 (1) of the Associations Act, even an economic association with no 
juristic personality. 
Since there is no essential difference between an original one-man company and one 
becoming a one-man Ltd company during its operation, the rules on one-man limited 
liability companies will be discussed together in subparagraph (c). However, the special 
rules on the establishment of the one-man company should be dealt with at this juncture. 
For a one-man company to be established, a foundation document rather than a 
contract of association is required. Considering that no one can make a contract with 
himself, this rule is self-evident, but represents a departure from the general norms 
governing the Ltd company. Some kind of a written form, especially a document 
countersigned by a lawyer or a company solicitor is needed both as a special requirement 
under Art. 19 of the Act and for reasons of creditors'protection. 
The rules governing contracts of association are applicable, mutatis mutandis, to the 
contents of the foundation document as there may arise obvious differences (e.g. no 
stipulation is required of the original contributions by members, and it would make no 
sense to regulate the voting rights and the procedure to be followed in case of an equal 
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number of votes, or to determine the due-time of contributions not yet paid in full). In 
other aspects the foundation document has the same function as the contract of 
association. This is why the law provides that regulations on the contract of association 
must be understood to apply to the foundation document as well. 
Article 198 of the Associations Act provides that in the case of a one-man company, 
where the founder is a natural person, the foundation document may also stipulate that 
the founder is entitled to administer and represent the company. In that case the founder 
must be deemed to be the managing director. This rule does not, in fact, give larger 
freedom to one-man companies than to those with several members, although it would 
seem to follow from the wording, for under the general role on the managing director of 
an Ltd company (Ark 197), the managing director (s) may be elected from among the 
members (representatives) or natural persons external to the company. Obviously, the 
founder could, without being elected, attend to business administration under this role, 
but the general role is that election must be for a definite period (of not more than five 
years). There is no such limitation in respect to the one-man company. 
It should be noted thak according to the view of one legal sholar,28 the law should 
not refer to a managing director in the case of one-man companies, for the founder 
automatically takes charge of business administration. In our view, the wording of the 
Act does not admit such a conclusion, and Ark 157 (1) similarly requires designation of 
the first managing director as a necessary condition. Considering that the business 
administration of the one-man company may also be entrusted to another person (e.g. the 
founder may hire the services of a qualified manager), it would not be prudent to make 
it an automatic duty of the founding member to be in charge of business administration). 
The foundation of a company must be recorded in the registry court. In the case of 
the one-man company it must also be recorded that the company has but one founder. 
An important difference of substance in comparison with the general roles on 
companies is that registration at the registry court cannot take place until after the full 
amount of financial contribution has been paid. (The general role only requires payment 
of at least one-half of the pledged money capital. The regulation is uniform in thak in the 
case of all limited liability companies, capital other than money deposits must be made 
available in full to the company.) The stricter role on one-man companies is warranted 
for the protection of creditors. The founder is not allowed to pay only one-half of the 
money deposit requirement at the time of the foundation and to get a respite of one year 
for payment of the resk This roles out the possibility for unpaid (fictitious) contributed 
capital to be stated and for the company's partners to be misled regarding the real size 
of primary capital. 
(b) The company Ltd becoming a one-man company. A one-man Ltd company may 
also come into being in such a way that the number of members of a company 
28 KOLBEN, Gy.: Új elemek a korlátolt felelősségű társaság szabályozásában (New Elements in the 
Regulations on the Limited Liability Company), Külgazdaság, 2/1989. p. 22. 
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established in accordance with the general rules falls to one and no new member has 
been added to the court registry within six months (Art. 231). 
A company normally ceases to exist upon the occurrence of these conditions except 
that, in the case of a Ltd company (and the joint stock company), such conditions create 
a one-man company. This solution follows automatically from the permissive rule of our 
law under which an Ltd company may be founded even by a single person. So, in the 
case of our example, it would be unnecessary complicated to first state the termination 
of a company and then to authorize the last member to found a one-man company for the 
same line of activity under unchanged conditons. 
The "transformation" of a company into a one-man company takes place automati-
cally, without any declaration and any procedure being required. The managing 
director(s) has but one duty, namely to record the fact of transformation (and the 
occurrence of the conditions leading thereto) to the registry court for the purpose of 
notice and publication. 
Though this question is neither covered by the Act nor treated in the legal literature, 
it should be pointed out that the rules discussed above do not imply the duty of the last 
member of a company to continue the activity concerned. Under the general rules (Art. 
46. 1/b), the company may decide its termination without a successor in title. For such 
a decision, in the case of Ltd, Company Art. 227 requires a three-fourths majority vote 
at the members' meeting. In the case of a company where the number of members fall 
to one, the remaining member may take the decision to terminate the company. 
(c) Special Rules, governing Ltd companies "established" as a one-man company" 
and "becoming" a one-man company. The one-man Ltd company is not regulated by the 
Act in a separate chapter or under a separate title. The general rules are applicable except 
to certain aspects that are subject to different rules as expressly stated. Such different 
rules must be gathered together from various provisions of law. The differences in 
comparison with the general rules on Ltd companies may be classed as formal and 
substantive.29 
Among the formal differences it may be mentioned that: the requisites include a 
foundation document (not a contract of association)30; there is no members' meeting 
(Art. 184), so the mandatory convening of the members' meeting is supplanted with the 
founder's decision (Art. 189; the founder's decisions are not required to be entered in the 
book of decisions (Art. 191), and they cannot be authenticated as provided for in Art. 
29 Our classification is somewhat different from that in György Kolben's work (see op. cit. in fn. 28, pp. 21-
22), but the main attributes are naturally identical. 
30 This basically formal difference naturally has substantive aspects as well, namely the foundation 
document—as is rightly pointed out by Zoltán Novotni in his work cited in fn. 26, p. 70—"can only be regarded 
as one of a company to be established if the latter's name and line of activity are actually indicated therein". 
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194. (1), because there is no other member to do it;3' and, finally, the founder himself 
is entitled to undertake the administration and representation in certain cases. 
The regulations on one-man companies show a few differences of substance 
compared with the general rules on Ltd, companies which are motivated in part by the 
need to protect creditors, and in part by the simplification of the organizational pattern. 
— The full amount of subscribed capital is payable at the time of foundation (Art. 
161). 
For reasons of creditors' protection, the founder of a one-man Ltd company is not 
permitted to pay only one half of the contributed capital at the time of the registration 
of the company. 
— A one-man company must neither acquire nor withdraw any business share for its 
own purpose (Art 181). 
The motivation to the Act explains this prohibition by stating that acquisition of one's 
own business share for the company is liable to be abused. In respect to withdrawing a 
business share, the added argument is adduced that exclusion of a partner is not possible 
in the case of a one-man company, so the most frequent instance of withdrawal does not 
occur. Withdrawal is similarly impossible in the event of the member's death or 
termination of his membership, because the transfer of the business share to the successor 
in title is prohibited by the contract of association, but none of the members acquires the 
business share for himself. 
— Election of a supervisory board is not mandatory in general (Art. 208). As a simple 
solution, the legislation provides for the mandatory employment of an auditor. Since, 
however, the sole owner of a relatively large Ltd company (with more than 200 full-time 
employees) is unable to have a full view of the company's activity, it is mandatory to set 
up a supervisory board in this case. This provision is probably related to the desire for 
workers' participation. It cannot be accidental that Art. 13 (1) specifies precisely the 
aforementioned minimum workforce in order for employees to participate, through the 
supervisory board, in controlling the company's operation. 
— The appointment of an auditor is mandatory (Art. 215). His task is to control the 
administration in order to ensure the company's operation in accordance with the law. 
The formal and substantive differences having been presented, we should note that, 
under the special rules, a company may operate as long as it really has but one member. 
If, owing to division of the business shares by reason of inheritance or other method of 
succession in title or an increase in the primary capital stock, it admits a new mem-
ber/members, it must continue its activity under the general rules, i.e. transform itself into 
an Ltd company (Art 223), elect its organs, conclude a contract of association and record 
the transformation to the registry court for the purpose of registration and publication, 
such notification is to be made by the managing directors. 
31 A similar position is reflected in the publication entitled A Társasági törvény a gyakorlatban II (The 
Associations Act in Practice), NOVORG Kereskedelmi Szervezési Intézet Munkaszervező Leányvállalata, 
Budapest, 1989. p. 339. 
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This procedure is much more complicated than in case of a transformation vice versa, 
inasmuch as no separate procedure and action—other than the obligation to notify the 
registry court is required in the case of an original Ltd company with several members 
becoming a one-man company. 
(d) Joint stock company "established" as a one-man company. Hungarian law permits 
a joint stock company to be established by a sole shareholder. Such companies were 
subject to essential statutory restrictions in comparison with one-man limited liability 
companies. A sole shareholder could be just anyone, but only a budget-dependent state 
organ or a banking institution [Art. 198 (l)].32 But these restrictions are no longer in 
force (Act LV of 1992). 
(e) Joint stock company becoming a one-man company. A one-man joint stock 
company comes into being when the ownership of all shares is acquired by a sole 
shareholder [Art. 298 (2)]. Given the easy and quick transferability shares, a probably 
more frequent—though, according to the motivation to the Act, equivalent instance of 
establishing a one-man joint stock company is the transformation of an original joint 
stock company with several shareholders into a one-man company. 
The two types of one-man joint stock companies are different. The difference 
between the two types of one-man joint stock companies lies in that the sole shareholder 
of a joint stock company becoming a one-man company has unlimited liability for the 
obligations of the joint stock company, if he fails in his duty to notify the registry court 
of such a transformation. The non-extension of the benefit of limited liability as an 
element of the joint stock company is a sanciton imposed for the breach of this duty. 
Unlimited liability occurs upon the acquisition of all shares. 
(f) Rules common to joint stock companies "established" as one-man and "becoming" 
one-man companies. One-man joint stock companies are subject to very few common 
rules. 
The common rules include a remitting norm stating that the provisions of the Act on 
joint stock companies must be applied, mutatis mutandis, to one-man joint stock 
companies. One exception being the provision concerning those entitled to exercise the 
powers of the members' meeting. Accordingly, such powers may be exercised by the 
founder in the case of a one-man joint stock company and by the shareholder in the case 
of a joint stock company transformed into a one-man company. 
The provision on the application mutatis mutandis of the general rules means, inter 
alia, that the applicable rules will be those governing the foundation to the exclusion of 
outside subscribers. 
32 "Other economic associations and citizens do not have this possibility as the Act intends to lay the 
foundation exclusively for the operation of the so-called holdings". (Duty of holdings is the management of 
state property. The holding fulfils its duty thereby it has majority of the shares in other companies—The author.) 
in: SÁRKÖZY, T .: Ezt kell tudni a Társasági Törvényről (What You Should Know about the Associations Act), 
Magyar Média Reklám és Propaganda Szolgáltató Vállalat, Budapest, 1988. p. 19. 
One-Mai) Company in Hungarian Law 17 
111. Theoretical Questions Arising in Connection with One-Man Companies 
Having reviewed the Hungarian legislation in force we have to deal in some detail with 
theoretical questions which have long been a concern of company law in Western Europe. 
1. Reasons for the Legal Recognition of the One-Man Company 
(a) In presenting the historical background we have mentioned that—apart from the 
debate during 1925-1930, the lessons of which were not acted upon by the legislation of 
1988—the one-man company made its appearance in Hungarian law with no particular 
antecendents in local legal literature. This new institution of law was not introduced in 
response to critiques of previous arrangements or out of some specific dogmatic-
theoretical considerations. The West European arguments which made a decisive 
contribution to the recognition of one-man companies were not emphatically stated in 
Hungary. With some simplification, the following factors may be stressed on the basis 
of the legal literature in Western Europe. 
— The contradiction became increasingly evident between the prohibition of one-man 
companies and the permission of companies which have nominally several members, but 
with the decisive majority of assets actually held by a single person. 
— The legal prohibition of the one-man company can be easily evaded in such a way 
that the actual founding member relies on the services of one or more persons formally 
undertaking some role in the company. 
— Members involved in the company for the purpose of evading the prohibition but 
having no concrete function tend to become a source of later problems (e.g. their liability 
for company debts or the appraisal of contracts under which the member, having a 
symbolic share, undertakes to vote as indicated by the majority owner or to transfer his 
share of property at someone else's wish). 
— A de facto one-man company functions like a company with one member, with the 
single member possessing the majority of assets or votes and asserting his will in 
important matters. 
— The existence of de facto one-man companies has raised a series of problems which 
the legislature could not avoid addressing by the prohibition of the one-man company. 
— The one-man company has a great advantage in presenting no need for regulation 
on minority protection, which it is rather diffiucult to cover in all aspects in a way 
meeting every requirement 
(b) Among the aforementioned arguments a certain—not too significant—role may have 
been reserved in Hungary for the fact that companies with several members were rather 
widespread, but their foundation and operation were determined mainly by only one of 
the owners. Still, what induced change in Hungary was not the strain caused by the 
contradiction between the law and the prevailing situation. The decisive causes for the 
introduction of the one-man company are as follows. 
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The first cause is economic necessity. The adoption of the Associations Act served 
to develop market relations, to encourage an open economy and to remove the mountain 
of obstacles to undertakings of indviduals and economic organizations through 
partnerships. The reregulation of associations served a useful purpose mainly as a means 
of revitalizing the economy. The political significance of the Act of 1988 lies in 
promoting the creation of a mixed-property economy and providing stimulus for 
economic openness to the outside world. Legal considerations paled in comparison to the 
highly important economic and political transformations, although the Associations Act 
was intended to be a momentous and long-lasting regulation by: 
— codifying scattered provisions of law, 
— raising lower-level regulations to the legislative level, and 
— streamlining old rules and introducing new institutions of law. 
The need for introducing one-man companies was not caused so much by legal theory 
as by economic policy motives.33 
The one-man company is an institution which seemed fit to encourage enterprise. Its 
introduction served primarily to enhance motivation for potential entrepreneurs. In 
Hungary the one-man private undertaking of artisans and retail dealers existed even in 
the centrally planned economy. Along with previous ideological reservations and 
bureaucratic rules however, there was another restrictive factor, namely that the 
entrepreneur was liable with the whole of his property for eventual economic loss. The 
introduction of one-man companies has been intended to eliminate the discouraging effect 
of "built-in" unlimited liability. The more favourable extent of liability naturally applies 
only to the founder of a limited liability company, but the vast majority of one-man 
companies in Hungary can be expected to be established as one-man limited liability 
companies. 
In allowing precisely natural persons to set up one-man companies in the form of 
limited liability companies it was the legislators's avowed intention to integrate into the 
economy a part of the population's savings previously used for consumption. In the 
future, potential entrepreneurs will have no reason to fear that they will lose all their 
property as a consequence of an eventual abortive business transaction. It is to be 
expected, therefore, that independent economic activities will also be undertaken by 
33 "In particular, I should like to emphasize the economic policy possibilities inherent in the general 
institutionalization of the one-man limited liability company. Sharply disputed by the vast majority of the 
representatives of legal theory, this institution was gradually expanded in the course of preparation until it came 
to be generally recognized by the Act: it may be established by juristic persons and individuals, both nationals 
and foreigners, on an equal footing, since the one-man Ltd company may, inter alia, facilitate transformation 
of state enterprises into associations, leaves room for mending the existing deformed system of subsidiary 
companies with a sole founder, and allows artisans and retail traders to choose between the traditional business 
with unlimited liability (and subject to payment of a personal income tax) and the form of association with 
limited liability (and subject to payment of a tax on profit from the business)". In: SÁRKÖZY, T. : A társasági 
törvény előkészítése. Szubjektív beszámoló egy törvényhozás anatómiájáról (Preparation of the Associations 
Act. A Subjective Account of the Anatomy of a Legislative Enactment), Valóság, 3/1989. p. 48. 
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individuals who, given their personal qualities, would refuse to take such risks in view 
of the frequent changes in Hungarian financial-economic regulations. 
For enterprises, the one-man Ltd company offers the possibility to transform their 
existing subsidiary companies into this type of undertaking or to give greater autonomy 
to their subdivisions or units making consistent losses. In actual fact a considerable 
discouraging effect in relation to the subsidiary company could be observed in that the 
centre of the enterprise practically lost the decision-making power in daily business in 
respect to independent units, but if such a unit operated at a loss, the negative 
consequences were for the enterprise to suffer. In the case of the one-man Ltd company 
the risk is limited, whereas motivation increased through autonomy may result in a 
profitable autonomous operation of formerly loss-making units integrated in the enterprise 
organization. 
As is stated in the general motivation to the Act, the legal policy objective was to 
promote the establishment of businesses. "There is a real need to allow the State, juristic 
persons and economic associations without juridical personality or natural persons to 
invest, under specified guarantees, a separate part of their property in businesses, with 
the risks limited only to that part of property." (Art 5.) Accordingly, the following 
economic reasons are advanced in connection with Art. 156: "The regulation on the 
economic undertakings of natural persons (artisans, private dealers) is characterized by 
unlimited liability. The institution of the firm with limited liability is unknown to the 
Hungarian legislation in force, so the Bill has allowed its establishment under the law of 
association. Accordingly, in the future, a natural person wishing to set up a business may 
choose to operate, as an artisan or a private dealer, either subject to the stricter liability 
rules, but under simpler provisions of operation, or with limited liability, but under the 
stricter rules of the law of associations applicable to creditors' protection." 
— Another group of companies consists of those originally operating with several 
members but transitorily becoming companies. Economic reasons can likewise be 
adduced for the law to have allowed the operation of a one-man company during the 
grace period, since the enforced termination of a prospering, profit-making company is 
not in the interest of either the member remaining alone or of the national economy. This 
is why the legislature has granted a grace period of six months in order to ensure that a 
new member may enter the company and that the company may carry on its activity. The 
relevant part of the motivation to the Act reads as follows: "In order to ensure the 
continuous operation of economic associations, to avoid the termination of viable 
companies, the Bill grants a grace period of six months also for forms of a company 
where the operation of one-man companies is otherwise deemed to be inadmissible. If 
during that period another member joins the remaining one, the company may carry on 
its activity without hindrance." 
Another factor in favour of recognizing the company was the intention to draw on 
international experience. It was more than a century ago that companies in Hungary were 
covered by a coherent and comprehensive law. Both the intervening period and the 
importance of the question have justified the need for codification to take into account 
not only the requirements and specific conditions of the Hungarian economy, but also the 
20 Péter Miskolczi-Bodnár 
achievements of other countries where companies had formed an organic part of 
economic life over the past 40 years. 
In addition to the German legislation, which has always influenced developments in 
Hungary, most of the countries taken as a guide have been characterized by the 
recognition in one form or another of the company.34 The codification undoubtedly 
bears the mark of international influence, as is manifest, on the one hand, in Hungary 
realizing the need for legislative coverage of companies and, on the other, in Hungarian 
law-makers relying on concrete solutions to serve as a model. 
As is stated in the general motivation to the Act, "Today the one-man company is 
recognized by most of the modern company laws vis-a-vis the traditional prohibitive 
attitude. We must not adopt a 19th-century law, but should, by relying on comparative 
analyses of law, incorporate in the Code as many modern solutions as possible ... 
Account has been taken of the most up-to-date solutions of the past 20 years, e.g. the 
organizational setup of the French groupement d'economique in the case of associations, 
the Common Market guidelines for one-man companies, the law of the Federal Republic 
of Germany regarding holding companies. The theoretical aversion to the company is 
naturally understandable, since such a company can be regarded as a notional absurdity. 
At the same time this form of company has been spreading rapidly all over the world. 
We, too, have included it virtually for technical reasons".35 The first sentence in the 
motivation to the regulation of the joint stock company reads as follows: "Taking into 
account the international development of company law, the Bill has allowed the operation 
of the joint stock company, too". In explaining the increased liability of the sole 
shareholder compared with the limited liability of shareholders, the motivation to Art. 299 
refers again to the experience of foreign legislation on companies: "In line with the 
development of modem company law, the Bill has allowed two exceptions to the general 
rule in view of the nature of company". 
2. Questions of Liability 
(a) In Western Europe there are serious debates on the appropriateness limited 
liability in the case of a single owner. The conceivable solutions include: 
— the liability of the sole owner for the debts incurred by the company; 
— the joint liability of the sole owner and the company; 
— the joint liability of the sole owner only in cases where the company is unable to 
pay its debts. 
Theoretically, we find the last solution to be correct, for once the company has been 
recognized, it becomes a separate subject at law from the moment of its foundation, and 
34 This is pointed out by, e.g. NOVOTNI, Z. in: Társulási formák a gazdaságban. A vagyonegyesítő társaság 
(Forms of Association in the Economy. Association for the Pooling of Assets). Élet és Tudomány, 1/1989. 
p. 117. 
35 SÁRKÖZY, T.: op. cit. in fn. 33. 
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there is no reason for that subject at law to be exempted from the consequences of its 
own obligations. 
The recognition of the company's liability raises the question whether its members 
should be liable jointly and severally with the company or should bear only secondary 
liability. (This problem is similar to the relationship between surety and joint and several 
surety.) The Hungarian law has opted for the latter solution, with the procedural 
advantage that the creditor may indicate in the Letter of Credit that he will assert his 
claim against the member(s) if the company's property is insufficient for payment of its 
debt. This expedites procedure, and fees are also favourable to the creditor, statisfies 
creditor's claims and is in keeping with legal theory that if the debt was incurred by the 
company (not the member), the company should be primarily liable to repay it. Para. (2) 
of Art. 75—stating that "[a] judgement against company property can only be passed if 
the members are not litigants, and against the members' property only if the members are 
litigants. Members can also be sued together with the company, without prejudice to their 
secondary liability"—relates to unlimited partnerships, but is applied on a broader scale. 
(b) If we accept the secondary liability of a company's single member, the question 
arises as to what that liability should be. The possible solutions include; 
— unlimited liability; 
— limited liability; 
— limited liability combined with liability for damages in tort caused by the member. 
The member's unlimited liability resembles responsibility for the acts of others (e.g. 
the custodian's liability for damages caused by minors). It presumes no tort on the part 
of the member36, but simply flows from the debt of a company established by the 
member and unable to repay it. This solution is satisfactory for companies in general, but 
contradicts the underlying reason that the limited liability company and the joint stock 
company have come into being precisely for the purpose of limiting the member's 
liability to the amount of assets contributed to the company. The question is whether 
departure from this rule is warranted in cases where the company has but one member. 
The concept of limited liability is based precisely on the fact that the company's 
having but one member cannot bring about so important a change as to practically cause 
the company to transform from one type into another (extinguishing the limitation of 
liability as the core of the joint stock company and the limited liability company). 
A former view in Hungarian jurisprudence denied the existence of a direct 
relationship between shareholder and creditor concerning debt repayment. "Considering 
that the shareholder's obligation consists in making available to the joint stock company 
the face value of property or non-pecuniary contribution, such liability is not only limited, 
36 "In respect of associations, legal responsibility takes primarily the form of liability for risk, which cannot 
always be identified with the consequences of a tort; it is mainly liability for economic activities, and may be 
borne by the company and its organs vis-a-vis the members, or by the members vis-a-vis the company's 
creditors as well", in: NOVOTNI, Z.: op. cit. in fn. 26, p. 68 
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but also indirect Moreover, one cannot even speak of 'liability' in this sense, because 
the shareholder's obligation is towards the joint stock company (not the creditors), with 
the company being entitled to invite and oblige the shareholder to comply with such an 
obligation. Creditors may never raise claims against the shareholder by invoking 
'liability'. Even in cases where a joint stock company goes bankrupt, where the board 
of directors is reluctant to invite the shareholders to pay their contributions, the public 
trustee sues them as legal representatives, not of creditors, but of the joint stock 
company. On the other hand, the joint stock company as a juristic person is liable with 
the whole of its property for all its obligations."37 
In actual fact, this concept can be traced even in present-day Hungarian law38 
inasmuch as para. (2) of Art. 319 provides that "liquidators may demand the shareholders 
to pay their contributions in arrears if required for repayment of the joint stock 
company's debt". 
The third possible solution combines, as if by way of a compromise between the 
previous two, the member's secondary limited liability (quasi limited liability for the acts 
of others) with the member's own culpability constituting a separate class of cases. In 
certain typical cases specifically stated, the law lays emphasis on the member's 
tortfeasance and imputes directly to him the damage resulting from such misfeasance, 
rather than considering the company's debt to have been incurred by the company (as a 
result of its conduct). Under Hungarian law, which applies practically the same rules of 
liability for for breach of contract as for extra-contractual damage, we might say that in 
such cases the company is liable for breach of contract, whereas the member can be 
obliged to pay damages under the rules governing extra-contractual liability: the law thus 
taking a step forward in the series of causal relationships, but presuming actual damage 
rather than a contractual relationship between the member and the company's creditors. 
(The rules on liability for damage caused by breach of contract versus non-contract 
damages are essentially different in other systems of law, but perhaps the latter can also 
be said to state the member's liability for damage to hold for the creditor's loss of 
income as damage suffered by the creditor.) 
(c) Hungarian jurispundence was exempt from theoretical debates over the liability 
of a company's single member. The questions involved arose in inverse order in 
Hungary. The problem did not concern the kind of liability to be borne by a member of 
a one-man Ltd company but the institution of the one-man Ltd company was introduced 
in order to limit one's liability in an effort to encourage economic undertakings. In our 
current concept, a one-man Ltd company without limited liability would be meaningless. 
37 KUNCZ, Ö.: A magyar kereskedelmi és váltójog tankönyve (Textbook of Hungarian Commercial and 
Exchange Laws), Budapest, Grill, 1938. pp. 158-159. 
38 "Only the shareholder is in a relationship with the joint stock company and he cannot be obliged to pay 
except the face value of his share and/or its value of issue, but in any case vis-a-vis the joint stock company, 
not the creditors", in: CSANÁDI, P.—FÉNYES, L.: A társasági jog kézikönyve (Textbook of the Law of 
Association), Szekszárd, Babits Kk., 1989. p. 281. 
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The effect of the member's culpability creating separate liability is absent from 
Hungarian law unless we consider the rule on the joint stock company under which 
failure to record a company's transformation into a one-man company as entailing the 
shareholder's unlimited liability. 
3. Protection of Creditors' Interests 
(a) Protection of the interests of creditors is an essential endeavour of regulations on 
any type of company and assumes increased importance in the case of one-man 
companies. "As in the case of one-man companies ... there is a danger of damage being 
caused to creditors, it was necessary for the Bill to devise guarantees"—reads in part of 
the general motivation to the Act This concern is shown by the fact that the Hungarian 
law provides for a series of measures, common to Western laws, to secure the creditors' 
position to the extent possible. 
— In the case of a one-man company the contribution of assets must be made in full 
at the time its foundation (see Sect. H/3 supra page 11). (This rule applies only to the 
limited liability company. In the case of joint stock companies the legislature is content 
with the general rule, under which at least 30% of the primary capital must be paid 
before registration at the registry court.) 
— The nature of a one-man company as such must also be notified at the time of 
registration (see Sect. II/3 supra page 11). The same rule applie to companies becoming 
one-man companies (see Sect. H/3 (b) supra page 34). The registry court enters the 
one-man nature of the company in the register by notation, and publishes it, and the 
register is open for inspection at any time. 
— The sanction for failure to give notification as mentioned above entails the 
increased liability of the sole shareholder (see Sect. II/3 supra page 14). (There is no such 
rule in respect to Ltd company). 
— Employment of an auditor to control administration is always mandetory (even at 
a company with several members in the case of joint stock companies, while, as is 
specifically provided for in law, only at a one-man company in the case of limited 
liability companies. Establishment of a supervisory board is therefore mandatory in one 
case, rather than in three, at a one-man Ltd company (see Sect H/3 supra page 13). 
(b) In addition to these generally known guarantees, Hungarian legislation seeks to 
prevent infringement of creditors' interests by imposing further restrictions on one-man 
companies. 
— A one-man Ltd company must neither acquire nor withdraw any business share for 
its own purpose (see Sect II/3). 
— Of course, it would be possible to widen the range of provisions to improve the 
creditors' position. In principle, one could conceive of rules regarding contracts between 
the company and the sole owner which would disallow certain forms of regrouping of 
assets to the injury of creditors. It should be pointed out, however, that the rule of the 
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law of obligations spelling out the relative nullity of contracts aimed at draining away 
funds for cover (Actio Paulina) is applicable to this case as well.39 
(c) The effectiveness of the provisions for creditors' protection is of varying degrees. 
(The mandatory payment of the full amount of contribution at the time of foundation, for 
instance, is no guarantee that the amount will be sufficient for a business to operate in 
such a way as not to expose creditors to excessive risks.40) However, we think that the 
set of provisions for creditors' protection is, on balance, suitable to serve the desired 
purpose, particularly if viewed in relation to the additional rules on companies with 
several members. Recent years have seen a radical change in the position of creditors. 
Over the past four decades, Hungarian law propounded the theory of unlimited liability 
of organizations. 
— Until very recently, a role for the joint stock company and the limited liability 
company was reserved only to the domain of international relations. 
— In Hungary, enterprises bore unlimited liability for the debts of their subsidiary 
companies or the associations established by them. 
— It was a long-held view that in an economy based on state property an enterprise 
could not go bankrupt, with the state securing repayment of debts even in the case of 
mismanagement That budgetary practice afforded an effective guarantee for creditors in 
addition to the security they enjoyed under the law. 
The reappearance of the institution of bankruptcy and the general recognition of 
forms of company with limited liability brought creditors into a more defenceless 
position. By contrast, the additional risks involved in one-man companies are of a much 
narrower dimension, though not negligible. 
4. Taxation 
Tax rates may be an important consideration in one's decision to form a company. 
The current Hungarian tax legislation requires every taxpayer to pay an income tax based, 
on all his income, at rates graduated by scales of income. The tax rates are high even by 
international comparison. Dividend-like income is treated separately (i.e. it is not 
combined with income derived from other sources). Income from a company is subject 
to a uniform rate of 20% which is more favourable even if dividends are paid out after 
payment of taxes on profit. It should not be forgotten that business profit taxes subject 
to a variety of benefits and exemptions, so they are, especially in the initial period, not 
payable or payable only in part. For natural persons who would have to pay the highest 
rate of tax after a considerable part of income, it pays to found a company, because such 
39 Article 203, para (1) of the Civil Code reads: "A contract by which the claims of a third person have been 
deprived of the material basis for their statisfaction shall have no effect in respect to the third person if the other 
party acted mala fide or the contract resulted in a gratuitous advantage to him". 
40 The minimum amount of primary capital as fixed by our current legislation is rather low: Ft 1 million for 
a limited liability company and Ft 10 million for a joint stock company. 
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a person will be better off even in the case of double taxation (after payment of a tax on 
company profit plus a 20% tax on personal income), by making us of the benefits and 
exemptions concerning the tax on company profit. Considering that the Hungarian system 
of personal income tax follows the West European pattern, it is still a novelty and subject 
to annual change, it can be expected that financial regulations will close this "loophole" 
sooner or later. 
5. Termination of Transitional One-Man Companies 
West European legislation differs widely in respect to the termination of companies 
which continue their activities as a company one-man when no new member has joined 
it during the grace period. 
In some countries (e.g. Denmark) such companies are terminated ex officio by public 
authorities and in others (e.g. France) upon the action by an "interested" person. 
Hungarian legal development has also produced similar results. (Article 16 of Act V 
of 1930 provided for court action ex officio, whereby the court terminated, in extra-
judicial proceedings, a company after expiry of the grace period.)41 
In Section I we referred to proposals and draft laws which discussed the possibility 
of joint stock companies and limited liability companies, which were transformed into 
one-man companies, could be terminated at the creditor's request. 
Act VI of 1988 adopted neither solution, but provides for the automatic termination 
of companies by operation of law, with no request or action required of anyone. Some 
doubt is nevertheless left by the wording of Art. 46 (2), under which economic associ-
ations are terminated by eliminating them from the register of firms. This allows the 
conclusion that as a result of action by the registry court they are terminated at a date 
after the expiry of the grace period of six months as stated in para. (1), subpara (d) of 
Art. 46. 
This view is supported by the motivation to that Article reading: "An economic 
associaton shall be deemed to be in existence as long as it figures in the register of 
firms". 
6. De Facto One-Man Companies 
(a) In Sect. III/l (a) we have referred to the position of Western legal literature 
concerning de facto one-man companies. These companies exist in Hungarian practice 
too. They are not deemed to be one-man companies in the legal sense, but the vast 
majority of their assets are held by a single person. For all practical purposes, the 
member possessing the majority of the assets directs the company's activity as if he were 
41 For a discussion and a presentation of legal practice, see LŐW, T .: A korlátolt felelősségű társaságok 
alakulása (Formation of Limited Liability Companies), Jogtudományi Közlöny, 32/1932. 
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the sole owner. (Cases in which the Hungarian law requires an unanimous decision are 
rare.) 
(b) Such a situation can be produced in several ways. 
— It may happen that the person deciding to found a company has not enough capital 
and is able to contribute the statutory minimum of capital only by admitting other 
members. 
— It is common for future clients of a prospective company to join in the foundation 
with payment of a symbolic amount in the hope that the member interested in the 
company's profitable operation will give preference to the company in placing orders. 
— Also, during the operation of a company, one of the members with originally equal 
shares in property may happen to become dominant (e.g. by exercising the right of 
preemption). 
(c) The causes enumerated so far are of an economic nature, with evasion of the law 
not the motive. In view of the restrictions on the joint stock company as well as of the 
prohibition of one-man companies among unlimited partherships, deposit companies, joint 
ventures and associations one can imagine cases in which reliance on a second member 
is specifially aimed at circumventing such restrictions or prohibitions. Contracts of 
association made for that purpose are null and void on several grounds. On the one hand, 
contracts offending the law or concluded in evasion of the law null and void and, on the 
other, fictitious contracts are likewise null and void [para. (2) of Art. 200 and para. (1) 
of Art. 207, respectively, of the Civil Code], This is a fairly long-held position of the 
law. In an article published as early as 193342 one can read that "if a contract is made 
through the mediation of a pseudo-partner (Strohmann), his involvement being designed 
to ensure that a company may be established by a single person, such procedure must be 
deemed to evade the law and is therefore inadmissible". 
(d) Our legislation in force does not cover de facto one-man companies designed 
without the intent to evade the law in the manner described in subparagraph (c) above. 
No suggestion was made to apply the rules of the one-man company to companies with 
several members where the sole owner's share in property reaches, e.g., 90%. Nor would 
it be wise to formulate such a rule since the formal requirements of one-man companies 
(see Sect. II/3 at p. 26 supra) case to exist at the moment another member joins the 
company, no matter how small his share of property. However, consideration could be 
given to extend the application of the additional substantive requisites concerning one-
man companies to those companies whose property is owned mainly by a single person. 
In the absence of a prohibition in this respect it is at present easy to evade the 
provisions which require payment of the full amount of contribution by relying on the 
cooperation of a partner joining the company with a symbolic contribution and thereby 
establishing a limited liability company regarded by law as one with several members. 
42 LOW, T.: A korlátolt felelősségű társaság semmissége (Nullity of the Limited Liability Company), 
Jogtudományi Közlöny, 47/1933. 
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Boldizsár Nagy Asylum Seekers and Refugees: 
Hungarian Dilemmas 
Introduction 
The 1956 Hungarian revolution caused the largest refugee wave in Europe during the past 
few decades.1 Now, thirty years later Hungary has entered the road to becoming one of 
the most important refugee receiving countries in Europe.2 This brief report intends to 
describe the developments leading to the present situation: the first wave of asylum 
seekers coming from Romania; the second wave flowing from the former Yugoslavia; 
and, the development of the Hungarian refugee law. It puts specific emphasis on the 
policy issues and dilemmas faced by the Hungarian legislator, including aspects of the 
possible third wave from the CIS or elsewhere and acute questions of neighbouring legal 
disciplines such as alien's law and human rights. 
1 In 1956/57 193.885 persons fled the country, most of whom were recognized—usually without an individual 
procedure—as political refugees. See the survey of the National Statistical Office completed in 1957, but only 
published in 1991. In: Regio, vol. 2 (1991) No. 4, p. 174. 
2 In the years 1988, 1989, 1990 only Austria, Germany, France, Sweden and Switzerland have registered 
more asylum seekers than Hungary, but all of them (with the exception of Germany and France) were in the 
same range of 15-30.000 applicants per year. If successor states of Yugoslavia are not considered then in 1991 
Hungary received the third largest asylum seeker wave of 54 000 only preceded by Germany (256 000), and 
the UK (57 700). For the data except for Hungary see: LOESCHER, G.: Refugee Movements and International 
Security, Adelphi Papers 268 London, 1992, Table V on p. 74. 
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Recent Events 
Until 1987 Hungary did not differ from any other authoritarian East Bloc country 
thoroughly controlling its borders, excluding all aliens exempt for only a few thousand 
who could setde in Hungary, mainly under family unification schemes.3 Twice the 
communist party had decided to open the count y for a limited quota of refugees; first 
for the Greek communists after the civil war and second for the Chilean communists, 
after Allende's fall.4 In accordance with the purely political treatment of refugee 
affairs—except for a few ideological phrases—Hungarian law did not contain provisions 
on refugees or on asylum.5 The rapid deterioration of the conditions in Romania and the 
mounting pressure on the approximately 2 million members of the Hungarian minority 
there have compelled ethnic Hungarians who were visiting Hungary to refuse return, or 
others, who lived in Romania to illegally cross the non-strictly guarded border and find 
refuge in Hungary. What follows are the statistics reflecting the first asylum seeker wave 
(see table 1). 
It is remarkable, that—contrary to the expectations—the influx from Romania did not 
decrease soon after the 1989 December termination of the Ceausescu dictatorship. Rather 
it even grew after the bloody ethnic conflicts in Spring 1990, and only started to abate 
in 1991. 
Unfortunately there had been hardly time to start to develop long term policies, 
concentrating on the integration of the more than 50 000 asylum seekers wishing to settle 
in Hungary, when the tragic civil war in Yugoslavia once again forced the Hungarian 
authorities to return to emergency planning, provisional measures and life-saving 
temporary solutions (see tbale 2). 
3 The number of legal immigrants for the eighties was as follows: 1980—1326; 1981—1254; 1982—1467; 
1983-1606; 1984-2221; 1985-2122; 1986-2505; 1987-2835; 1988-12652; 1989-8176; 1990-2290; 
1991—19955 (Applications, submitted). 
(The numbers for the years after 1988 are somewhat misleading, because they include those who applied 
for a durable residence permit from within Hungary in a refugee-like situation...) Source: (with the exception 
for the year 1991) RÉDEI, M.: Magyarországon tartózkodási engedélyt kérók összetételének alakulása az elmúlt 
évtizedekben és a folyamat demográfiai következményei, in: Menekülők, vándorlók, szerencsét próbálók, Az 
MTA Politikai Tudományok Intézete Nemzetközi Migráció Munkacsoportja Évkönyve, szerk. Sík Endre, 
Budapest, 1992. p. 76. Her data are based on statistics provided by the Aliens Department of the National Police 
Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior. The same author uses somewhat different data in her report to 
SOPEMI, see: Trends in International Migration, OECD, 1992. p. 154. (Probably the cause of the larger number 
appearing in the SOPEMI report is that those figures include yet undecided applications for immigration.) 
4 The number of the Greeks was less than four thousand, that of the Chileans approximately twelve hundred. 
See: NAGY, В. : The Hungarian Refugee Law, in: Refugees in Hungary, ADELMAN, H.-SIK, E - TESSÉNYI, 
G., York Lane Publishers Ltd.-Toronto, 1993. 
5 The Constitution in force between 1949 and 1989 has declared in section 67, that: "Everybody who is 
persecuted for his democratic behaviour, or for his activity to enhance social progress, the liberation of peoples 
or the protection of peace, may be granted asylum". 
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Table 1 
The number of asylum seekers in the first wave 
until the 
end of 
1988 1989 1990 
until 
June 1, 
1991 
total until 
June 1, 
1991 
Total 13 173 17 448 18 283 2 629 51 533 
From 
Romania 13 098 17 171 17 416 2 103 49 788 
Formally 
recognized 
as refugee 0 185 2 561 149 2 895 
Source: Authors calculations based on data of the Refugee Department of the Ministry 
of the Interior.6 
Table 2 
The number of asylum seekers in the second wave 
June 1,1991-
December 31, 
1991 1992 total 
Total 52 064 16 204 68 268 
From 
Yugoslavia 
approx. 
48 000 15 021 
approx. 
63 000 
From 
Romania 1791 844 2635 
Formally recog-
nized as refugee 285 472 757 
Source: Data of the Refugee Department of the Ministry of the Interior. 
6 Unfortunately there is a lack of consistency in the data provided by the Department of Refugee Affairs. 
Figures for the same period may differ in subsequent communications. Even interviews with the person 
compiling the statistics could not entirely clear the puzzles. 
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This new wave of asylum seekers differs characteristically from the first wave in the 
following aspects. 
— The influx of the Romanian citizens was a response to the general "normal" state 
of affairs with steady deterioration and growing discrimination against the minority. The 
Yugoslavian citizens escaped from the civil war, frequently only saving their bare life, 
but losing most of their assets left at home. 
— The people from Romania came from a country with which the political relations 
were and to a lesser extent still are—strained. Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herze-
govina—the regions where most of the asylum seekers came from—are friendly countries 
and even Serbia—or the federal Yugoslav state—is not considered to be in conflict with 
Hungary. 
— The asylum seekers from Romania were mainly poor people, with a real chance 
to improve their condition of life if settled in Hungary or in the West, whereas most of 
the asylum seekers from Yugoslavia have left some assets, frequently considerable 
wealth, behind. 
— Consequently while most of the asylum seekers of Romania did not want to volun-
tarily return to their home country, the majority of the asylum seekers from Yugoslavia 
would return if their property survived the fighting and if the rule in their village did not 
fall into the hands of enemy groups (which might be Serbs or Croats depending on the 
location). Indeed, according to estimates of the Refugee Department 7-10 000 asylum 
seekers have voluntarily returned and 6 000 traveled to third countries. 
— A major difference is that whereas 70-90 % of the Romanian citizen asylum 
seekers were ethnic Hungarians, only about 20-30 % of those who fled Yugoslavia claim 
themselves Hungarian, the overwhelming majority being Croat and Moslem.7 
These differences warranted the different treatment of the asylum seekers coming 
from Yugoslavia. The overriding feature is the temporary character of their stay. Both the 
Hungarian authorities and the several tens of thousands of people concerned presume that 
no durable solutions within Hungary are necessary. This explains the difficulty with the 
statistics, since a significant portion of the asylum seekers formally never contacted the 
Hungarian authorities. Those who have found accommodation in private homes only 
receive limited financial support from the state budget,8 and still others keep coming and 
going depending on the military situation.9 The twenty temporary "camps" or refugee 
centers set up to meet the requirements together with the permanent refugee installations 
7 21.3% of the more than fifty thousands asylum seekers were of Hungarian ethnic origin in 1991. The data 
for 1992 show 35.2% Hungarian share (Author's calculation, based on data provided by the Department of 
Refugee Affairs). 
8 According to an unpublished government decision, each asylum-seeker is entitled to 600 Fts per week. 
(600 Fts are approximately 12 DM, i.e., 1/4 of the average per capita weekly income.) Families housing asylum 
seekers may be reimbursed for heating and electricity cost increases 2 000 Fts per month. 
9 This does not apply to the case of active soldiers. Those soldiers who had crossed the border and sought 
refuge in Hungary were not allowed to return to Yugoslavia later. This was a measure to exclude repeatedly 
raised charges that Hungary allegedly served as a base for the Croat National Guard. 
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in Bicske, Hajdúszoboszló and Békéscsaba have hosted 12,200 asylum seekers from 
Yugoslavia during 1991, the other 40,000 persons being accommodated in private homes 
or living on their own account in commercial accommodations. In 1992 the situation has 
changed somewhat with the UN involvement and the calming of the conflict in Croatia, 
but the civil war spreading in Bosnia. Hungary repeatedly made efforts to control the 
inward flow which was taking a great array of routes anyhow. Since asylum seekers from 
Bosnia had to cross other countries (notably Serbia, or Macedonia, Bulgaria and Romania 
or Croatia) before arriving to the Hungarian border and because the West was firm on 
not opening its territories for Bosnian asylum seekers, Hungarian authorities were inclined 
to differentiate among arrivals. The authorities were receiving as asylum seekers only 
those, who explicitly claimed that they directly came to seek refuge in Hungary. Others 
sometimes were prevented from entering. 
The Situation in 1992 
Many members of the first asylum seeker wave have in the meantime regularized their 
status. Approximately 20 000 have received Hungarian citizenship, and many further 
applications are still pending, with a finn prospect of positive decision. More than 10 000 
have chosen to apply for immigrant (permanently resident alien) status. Therefore the 
majority of the asylum seekers who have come from Romania have drifted into another 
status including several thousands successfully resetded in the West and other hundreds 
who voluntarily returned. The total lack of continuous record of former asylum seekers 
makes it impossible to produce precise statistics.10 
With regard to the second wave of asylum seekers from Yugoslavia a communication 
from the Refugee Department11 gives the following picture (see Table 3). 
10 Since figures on naturalization and immigration include "normal" cases and asylum seekers one cannot 
simply deduce from the number of asylum seekers from Romania the naturalized or immigrated Romanian 
citizens. (As a matter of fact even statistics enabling this simple calculations are not available.) 
11 "Összefoglaló adatok a Magyarországra érkezett és befogadott jugoszláviai menekültekről" (Summary data 
on refugees from Yugoslavia who have come and were received in Hungary) Budapest. 
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Table 3 
Statistics used by the Refugee Department concerning the asylum seekers from 
Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in January 1993 
Category Number of persons 
Asylum seekers living in one of the presently operating 
eleven reception centers 3 800 
Asylum seekers receiving support from the municipal 
authorities, but hosted by families or living on their 
own account* 19 100 
Non-registered asylum seekers * 20 300 
Died 200 
Voluntarily returned* 10 000 
Resettled* 6 000 
Recognized as refugee under the 1951 Geneva Con-
vention 534 
* = estimate 
It must be added, however, that these figures were challenged by many, including the 
Representative of the UNHCR in Budapest. His local office in Pécs has conducted a 
survey in December 1992 among the Hungarian municipalities. The result differed 
sharply from the above figures claiming that only approximately 4 500 persons were 
privately accomodated in Hungary. (The number of persons in reception centers did not 
raise any doubt.) Not surprizingly the figure in a UNHCR survey of the implementation 
of temporary—protection also limits the number of privately accomodated to 5 000 not 
denying that there might be 20 000 unregistered.12 Clarity is expected to come after the 
renewal of refugee identity documents to be completed on May 15 1993. 
12 I am grateful to Mr. Thomas Birath, the representative of the UNHCR in Budapest, who not only provided 
valuable commentaries to this draft, but also furnished the information upon which this paragraph is based. 
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The Applicable Law 
After protracted political struggles with the opposition, which at those times was not 
represented in Parliament yet, the Hungarian political leadership decided to reflect in law, 
what had become practice by 1989 Spring-Summer and laid the cornerstones of the 
Hungarian refugee law. The new rules include the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to 
the Status of Refugees (with geographic limitation to European events!) and its 1967 New 
York Protocol, a Cabinet decree on the recognition procedure, a Law-Decree on the status 
of recognized refugees, and-as part of the fundamental revision of the Hungarian 
Constitution—a new provision on asylum.13 This says: 
Section 65 
"(1) The Republic of Hungary—in accordance with the provisions of law—grants 
asylum for those foreign nationals, who in their country of nationality, or for those 
stateless persons who in their residence, were persecuted for racial, religious, 
national, linguistic or political reasons. 
(2) A person granted asylum cannot be extradited to another state. 
(3) The adoption of the law on asylum requires the votes of two thirds of the 
Members of Parliament who are present."14 
The system established by the other rules mentioned can be summarized as follows.15 
Procedure 
Anyone fleeing European events can make a statement concerning his alleged refugee 
status to any organ of the police or the frontier guard within 72 hours after the border 
crossing, having a further three days to submit a formal claim for refugee status at one 
of six branch offices (as they are called: local authorities), of the Department of Refugee 
13 The Convention and the Protocol together became Law-Decree No. 15 of 1989 (1989. évi 15. tvr.), see 
Magyar Közlöny (Official Gazette) 1989, No. 60, p. 1022 entering into force on 15 October, 1989, Hungary 
became bound by them on March 14 (Protocol) and June 12 (Convention). The Cabinet-Decree (101/1989. Mt. 
rend.) on the procedure was published in Magyar Közlöny (Official Gazette) 1989, No. 66, p. 1090. An 
unofficial and inaccurate translation of it can be read in Report of ECRE Biannual General Meeting, Budapest, 
1991, Appendix 14, which reproduces the Council of Europe, European Committee on Migration document 
(CDMG) "Information on the main features of the situation with regard to refugees in Hungary" The Law-
Decree on the status of refugees (1989. évi 19. tvr.), see Magyar Közlöny 1989, No. 66, p. 1090—just like the 
Cabinet-Decree on the recognition procedure has entered into force on 15 October 1989. The Law No. XXXI 
of 1989 radically reshaping the Constitution and enacting the new rules on asylum was promulgated on 23 
October 1989. (Magyar Közlöny, 1989. No. 74, p. 1244.) An unofficial translation incorporating later 
modifications was published in a trilingual law publication called Hatályos magyar jogszabályok, Geltende 
Ungarische Rechtsnormen, Hungarian Rules of Law in Force, vol. I (1990) No. 26, p. 1625. 
14 Author's translation. 
15 More detailed description of the legal framework is to be found in NAGY, В.: The Hungarian Refugee 
Law [in: ADELMAN, H.-SIK, E—TESSÉNYI, G. (eds.) Refugees in Hungary, York Lanes Publishers, Toronto, 
1993 in print]. I'll offer comments and critical remarks after the unimpassioned description of the (legal) facts. 
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Affairs. That office should make a decision regarding the status within thirty days. In 
case of denying a claim for refugee status, an appeal is to be submitted within five days 
to the Department itself, which will decide within another thirty days. A negative decision 
by the Department, is subject to non-litigious judicial review which must be completed 
within 15 days. The judgement of the first instance court is subject to appeal. However 
this judicial review is limited to the control of explicit violation of legal rules by the 
authorities proceeding in the recognition procedure.16 
Status 
Those who can in the procedure "make probable that the recognition as refugee is 
justified"17 and against whom no reason for denial18 of the status can be substantiated 
are recognized as refugees in accordance with the definition of the 1951 Geneva 
Convention. This recognition normally extends to the closest family members, who do 
not have to verify that they personally were subject to or would be subject to such in-
dividualized persecution as foreseen by the said convention. Recognized refugees enjoy 
favourable status. Law-Decree No. 19 of 1989 (1989. évi 19. tvr.) on the status of 
recognized refugees defines the rights and duties of them in the following manner 
"For the purposes of application of provisions of law, the person recognized as 
refugee shall be considered as a Hungarian national with the difference that 
a) he shall not have the right to vote on elections 
b) he may not be engaged in jobs which—by force of law—may only be occupied 
by Hungarian citizens...". 
Refugees also have privileges such as not being subject to compulsory military 
service, having a right to obtain a refugee travel document, participating in free 
Hungarian language education and being relieved of the three-year domicile requirement 
otherwise required for naturalization. 
Termination of the status 
According to Art. 17 of the Cabinet-decree on the procedure there are compulsory 
and discretionary reasons for termination of the status. 
16 Remarkably no public statistics exist on the number of appeals against first instance decisions and on 
judicial review procedures. According to unofficial communications to this author, very few of the first instance 
negative decisions are appealed (approximately fifty in 1991) and an insignificant portion of the second instance 
denials are brought to court. (Eight in 1991-1992. In three cases the application was revoked before the court 
passed a judgement.) The explanation for this may be twofold: Most of those refused are allowed to stay on 
humanitarian grounds. — The limited powers of the court are not promising. 
17 Art. 11 of the Cabinet-decree on recognition (101/1989 Mt. rend.) as translated by the Refugee Department. 
18 Compulsory grounds for denial are: the termination and exclusion grounds listed in Art. 1 C, D, E, and 
F of the 1951 Geneva Convention; and that the applicant's stay in Hungary interferes with the security of state, 
public order or public health. 
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The status must be withdrawn if any of the five grounds enlisted in Art. 1 С of the 
1951 Geneva Convention emerge, or if already at the time of the recognition the person 
should not have been recognized since ab ovo reason(s) for denial" had existed, or the 
refugee renounces his status in writing. 
The status may be withdrawn if recognition was granted on the basis of false or 
incomplete data, or if the behaviour or lifestyle of the refugee prejudices national security 
or public order. 
Decision on the withdrawal is delivered by the local authority. One may only 
presume on the ground of a somewhat broad interpretation of Art 18 of the Cabinet 
decree that appeal is also admissible against a decision concerning withdrawal.20 Most 
withdrawals of the status were based on the fact that the refugee has re-availed himself 
of the protection of the country of his nationality, [Art 1 С (1) of the 1951 Convention] 
usually by voluntarily traveling back to Romania. 
Unresolved Legal Issues 
This rudimentary picture of the legal landscape is certainly not detailed enough to reflect 
all of the traps and obstacles scattered through Hungarian refugee law. What follows is 
a discussion of the most critical unresolved legal issues. 
The lack of a formal de facto status21 
Out of the approximately hundred and ten thousand asylum seekers who have put a 
foot on Hungarian soil in the last six years, less than five thousand were recognized as 
political refugees. Approximately fifteen thousand more may have left for third countries 
or voluntarily returned home and a further thirty thousand may have received immigrant 
status or become naturalized. The remaining seventy thousand asylum seekers have no 
formal legal status. They do not and will not meet the requirements set for aliens' stay 
and residence in Hungary,22 neither are they able to produce the documents and 
19 See footnote 17 supra. 
20 The uncertainty stems from the fact that of Section 18 states: "Against a decision made in connection with 
the recognition as refugee an appeal is admissible." Is withdrawal of refugee status a "decision in connection 
with recognition"? In my reading it is. 
21 Participants of the International Seminar "Refugees and Displaced Persons in New Host Countries", 
Budapest, May 1991, have agreed that there was a need to establish such a category within the Hungarian legal 
framework, along the lines of the 1984 Cartagena Declaration or at least comprising cases covered by the 1969 
OAU Convention governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa. See, e.g., G. Tessényi's report, 
in The New Refugee Hosting Countries: Call for Experience—Space for Innovation (Peter R. Baehr, and Géza 
Tessényi eds.), SIM (Netherlands Institute of Human Rights) Special No. 11, Utrecht, 1991, p. 120. 
22 The rules in force concerning the entry and presence of foreigners were adopted in 1982, and although 
modifications have occurred since then, they still reflect the spirit of a closed authoritarian society, giving 
almost unlimited and unchecked authority to the police to decide on permissions to enter and stay, and on the 
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evidence normally required from aliens, who migrate for employment or business into 
Hungary. They form three major groups in sociological terms. 
a) The first group consists of those—predominantly ethnic Hungarian—persons who 
want to settle and integrate in Hungary. They may and should have a special treatment 
in the naturalization process and be relieved from certain requirements applicable to 
others (like a longer period of residence in Hungary). 
b) The second group is composed of those asylum seekers who come in great masses, 
are of different national and cultural background and only seek temporary refuge because 
of the emergency in their home country. Normally their intention is to voluntarily return 
home as soon as circumstances allow. This applies to most of the asylum seekers coming 
from Croatia and Bosnia. Parts of the potential great influxes from the former Soviet 
territories will have this character in case of civil strifes or another Chernobyl-type 
environmental catastrophe. In this groups case, no individual determination procedure is 
needed; neither is it practicable with thousands appearing overnight. These groups could 
collectively be recognized by the Parliament or by another authority (government, 
competent minister or a mixed body including non-governmental actors as well) for a 
limited period of time and with limited—but well defined—rights, e.g., in the fields of 
employment, health care, social services etc.23 
c) The third group is of those—mainly non-European—asylum seekers who are either 
excluded from the recognition of their refugee status because of the geographic limitation 
attached to the 1951 Geneva Convention by Hungary, or cannot prove that they qualify. 
The majority of these Asian, African but also Turkish groups normally do not intend to 
setde in Hungary. Their aim is to reach Western Europe and this country only serves as 
a take off base. The non-refoulement principle and obligations stemming from human 
rights documents—like the prohibition to subject someone to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment—should be observed.24 Therefore after individual procedure, 
these persons should get an "asylee" or "de facto" status which would not entitle them 
revocation of these permissions. According to a much criticized feature of the law in force, there is no appeal 
against an administrative decision of expulsion. The relevant rules are contained in Law-Decree No. 19 of 1982 
(1982. évi 19. sz. tvr.) on the presence of foreigners in Hungary, and in the Decree of the Minister of the 
Interior No. 7/1982 [7/1982 (VIII. 26.) BM. sz. rend.] issued for the execution of the Law-Decree. Both are 
under reconsideration at the moment. 
23 The temporary protected status in the United States could serve as a reference point contradicting to 
European developments leading to the abolition of such forma] "intermediary" status like in Sweden. Section 
302 of the Immigration Act of 1990 which became Section 244 A of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1952 in the United States has established the temporary protected status for aliens who because of an ongoing 
armed conflict, or environmental disaster or other extraordinary and temporary conditions in their home state 
are prevented from returning there. 
24 Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has become part of the Hungarian law 
on 22 April 1976 (Promulgated as Law-Decree No. 8 of 1976). Article 3 of the 1984 UN Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment expressly prohibiting refoulement or 
extradition of a person "to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in 
danger of being subjected to torture" became part of Hungarian law in 1988 as Law-Decree No. 3 of 1988. 
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to all of the benefits of refugees but would protect them from refoulement and enable 
their participation, albeit limited, in economic and social life. 
The UNHCR representative and the non-European asylum seekers 
As already mentioned, Hungary has limited the application of the 1951 Geneva 
Convention to European events, thereby excluding all non-European asylum seekers25 
from the Hungarian refugee status determination procedure. However on October 4,1989, 
UNHCR and the Hungarian Government concluded an agreement26 which in its 
preamble recalls "the function (of UNHCR) of providing international protection, under 
the auspices of the United Nations to refugees who fall within the scope of the Statute" 
(of the UNHCR) and states in Article III, paragraph 4 that 
"The (Hungarian) Government shall at all times grant UNHCR personnel unim-
peded access to refugees and other persons of concern to UNHCR..." 
What is the status in Hungarian law of that person, who fleeing a non-European event 
is barred from starting the procedure in front of the Hungarian authorities, but who is 
recognized as a refugee by the representative of UNHCR? Is he a refugee according to 
Hungarian law? The agreement itself is silent on this question as is the other agreement 
concluded between the Hungarian Government and UNHCR on the very same day on the 
actual forms of assistance provided by UNHCR in setting up the reception centers.27 
Annex A to the latter in point 2 mentions that the majority of the assisted "are refugees 
and asylum seekers coming from Romania", without specifying the country of origin of 
the minority of refugees and asylum seekers. Could that be a third world country? 
Practice is scarce and totally informal. None of the two subsequent representatives 
of the UNHCR active in Budapest have recognized great numbers of applicants as 
refugees. Less than forty non-European asylum seekers were found to qualify according 
to UNHCR criteria since 1989. Their legal status in Hungarian law is unregulated at the 
moment. This entails the danger that if the representative of the UNHCR recognized 
refugees in greater numbers, the smooth cooperation with the Hungarian authorities and 
the liberal approach of the Hungarian side would terminate. Certainly this is an unhealthy 
situation where both parties can exert pressure on the other. A greater readiness to 
recognize non-Europeans by the UNHCR representative may lead to the denial of stay 
25 A word for the sake of accuracy. Strictly speaking one should always refer to persons persecuted in 
consequence of non-European events. They usually are non-European nationals, but in exceptional cases they 
could be Europeans as well, just as in the opposite case, where non-Europeans suffer from European events and 
qualify for protection even when the geographic limitation applies. Nevertheless, this level of precision would 
make the main text too cumbersome. Therefore, the phrase "non-Europeans" will denote "persons who because 
of events occurring outside of Europe are unable or unwilling to return to their country". 
26 It was promulgated as 23/1990. (H.7.) MT rend. (Cabinet-decree) in Magyar Közlöny (the Official Gazette) 
No. 11 in 1990, p. 172. Exceptionally not only the Hungarian, but also the English text was published. 
27 Published—without formally enacting into Hungarian law—as Communication from the Minister of Interior 
No. 4, 1989, in Magyar Közlöny (Official Gazette) 1989. No. 76, p. 1274. 
38 Boldizsár Nagy 
and work permits which presently are issued to these persons regardless of the formal 
Hungarian rules in force. On the other hand, restrictions by the Hungarian authorities 
would undoubtedly reduce the willingness of the UNHCR to raise funds in support of the 
Hungarian state in its effort to cope with the displaced persons coming from Yugo-
slavia.28 
Before attempting to find solutions one has to recall another feature of Hungarian law 
concerning non-European asylum seekers. This is Section 65 of the Constitution (quoted 
above) which speaks of "foreign nationals" without any reference to the geographic 
location of their persecution. The spirit of that constitutional provision definitely calls for 
the extension of the protection to non-European refugees as well.29 
How could this confusion be alleviated? 
Evidently the simplest method would be to withdraw the declaration on geographic 
limitation.30 This would oblige the Hungarian authorities to deal with claims of non-
European applicants as well, which obviously would mean that the costs of the 
recognition procedure and of the physical care of the applicants would fall on Hungary, 
instead of the UNHCR together with the Hungarian Red Cross and other NGO's that 
presently bear them. Even if the government was unwilling to revoke the geographic 
limitation, a solution could be provided by setting up refugee quotas. Those quotas set 
by the Parliament could then be filled with those non-European refugees, who were 
recognized by UNHCR's local representative, but who otherwise would not fall under the 
ambit of the Hungarian refugee law.31 
The influx of non-European migrants, including asylum seekers, raises further 
problems, well known in other industrialized nations' practice. The most pressing of them 
derives from the inconsistencies of their entry into Hungary. Whereas significant numbers 
appear at Budapest International Airport precisely reproducing conflicts experienced at 
other European airports32 the majority still comes by crossing land borders that Hungary 
shares with its neighbours. Not infrequently groups of Third World nationals choose to 
28 UNHCR has a growing share in covering the costs associated with asylum seekers. In 1992 funds provided 
by the UNHCR constituted approximately 30% of the total budget of the Refugee Department. 
29 Certainly the phrase in that section requiring that asylum be given "in accordance with the provisions of 
law" leaves room for doubts. May it refer to the declaration containing the geographic limitation which became 
part of Hungarian law as Section 3 of the Law-Decree enacting the Geneva Convention and its Protocol into 
domestic law? Until this issue will be raised in court, there will be no final answer. 
30 On several occasions including a public hearing on July 1, 1992 at the meeting of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe in Budapest the Minister for the interior, Mr. Boross has anounced that the 
limitation will be withdrawn, and plans for this step are under consideration. 
31 Obviously this would "tempt" the UNHCR representative to recognize approximately as many refugees 
as allowed by the quota, which of course is exogenous to genuine refugee recognition criteria, but it may still 
be the lesser of two evils. 
32 See e.g. Report of ECRE Biannual General Meeting, Budapest, 1991, pp. 6-7; or Lord Mackie of 
Benshine's "Report on the arrival of asylum seekers at European airports", Council of Europe, Parliamentary 
Assembly, Doc. 6490, 12 September 1991. 
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enter illegally with the help of man-smugglers. The issues unsatisfactorily regulated are 
the followings: 
— Should the representative of the UNHCR have access to each of them, or only to 
those, who claim that they are refugees. Where and when should the interview with the 
UNHCR representative—or his assistant—take place? Preceding legal entry at the bordeiMf 
the person chose the normal crossing point, or he was caught by the border guard—or 
after granting entry into Hungary at the representative's premises in Budapest? How to 
act if nobody from UNHCR is available?33 Practice now is inconsistent and not satis-
fying, since according to informal reports it is almost a matter of chance whether the 
UNHCR representative is informed of the appearance of a claimant at the border, and 
whether the representative is successful in convincing the border guard via telephone to 
let those people enter the country. With respect to those non-Europeans who already are 
in Hungary, it has become routine to direct them to the UNHCR representative's office 
if they apply for asylum. 
— Would the return of some of these people to Romania, Czechoslovakia, Ukraine 
or Yugoslavia amount to refoulement or could the Hungarian authorities argue that these 
states were safe countries for the Sri Lankans, Kurds, etc.? Could Hungary argue that 
their return does not amount to refoulement because one could not prove that their "life 
or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of 
a particular social group or political opinion" (Art. 33 of the 1951 Geneva Convention) 
in those neighbouring countries? 
— What should happen to those, who have no legal title to stay? This problem will 
be discussed in the next section together with other issues falling on the borderline 
between refugee matters and aliens law. 
Aliens: residence, immigration, naturalization 
A much criticized feature of Hungarian law34 is the lack of clear distinction between 
policies concerning the following issues: 
— short term stay of aliens, 
33 Hundreds of further-partly even more technical—questions arise, from the vital problem of interpretation, 
to the nature of guarantee the representative could offer for die case in which someone only allowed to enter 
in order to see him would not qualify and thereby be under an obligation to leave, but unwilling to do so. The 
size of this paper does not allow taking them up here, but it should also be added that answers would really 
be difficult to find because of the lack of practice, and the absolute non-existence of publicly recorded cases. 
34 See, e.g. NAGY, В.: Hetvenezer törvényenkívüli, HVG, 1992. február 15., and: Before or After the Wave 
Thoughts about the Adequacy of the Hungarian Refugee Law, International Journal of Refugee Law, Special 
Issue, vol. 3 (1991) No. 3, p. 532; TÓTH, J.: Towards a Refugee Law in Hungary, Paper, presented at the 
International Seminar "Refugees and Displaced Persons in New Host Countries", Budapest, 1991 May; 
TESSÉNYI, G .: The Development of Immigration and Refugee Policy in a New Host Country: the Case of 
Hungary, in The New Refugee Hosting Countries: Call for Experience—Space for Innovation (Peter R. Baehr, 
and Géza Tessényi eds.), SIM (Netherlands Institute of Human Rights) Special No. 11, Utrecht, 1991, p. 119. 
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— immigration of aliens who have no links to Hungary, 
— repatriation of Hungarian exilees, 
— immigration into Hungary of members of the Hungarian minority living over the 
borders, and 
— treatment of asylum seekers. 
Whereas the policy and its legal reflection concerning the entry, the residence and the 
immigration of simple aliens can and should be based on rational calculations using 
values derived from the national interest,35 the procedure concerning the last three 
groups should not be based on a utilitarian calculus, but on the principle of solidarity. 
In this period of growing migrational pressure it is normal that European countries 
elaborate aliens' policies which clearly reflect security concerns, the state of the labour 
market, the desire to cooperate with the neighbouring countries and with the European 
Communities. Immigration of simple aliens with no connection to Hungary should be 
based on criteria set by the Parliament and derived from the needs of the demographic 
situation, the state of economy, and other factors identified and evaluated by the Par-
liament.36 
The policies concerning the repatriation of emigrees, the immigration of ethnic 
Hungarians and the treatment of asylum seekers should reflect the specific features of 
these groups. The cultural proximity of the first two calls for special procedures both in 
getting residence (domicile) within Hungary and in the naturalization procedure. These 
benefits granted to Hungarians who want to settle in Hungary would not run counter to 
any international legal principle and would be in harmony with similar national 
practices.37 
With respect to the third group of asylum seekers, the basis of solidarity is humanity 
which does not leave room for any preference of ethnic or national character of the 
asylum seeker. It will not be easy for the Hungarian authorities to realize that the 
presumption upon which the Hungarian refugee law had been built was false. In 
1988—1989 the concern for the Hungarian minority compelled the government to join the 
1951 Convention but this must not lead to the flawed conclusion and practice of 
preferring certain asylum seekers over others. 
Without suggesting further details concerning the five interrelated, but separate 
policies the importance of the start of a public discussion before it is too late, must be 
stressed. The mounting wave of hostility towards aliens, especially non-Europeans is 
35 Although I doubt the existence of a homogeneous "national interest", the term is used here since the 
critique of the premises of current international relations theory is beyond the scope of this undertaking. 
36 Since 1981 Hungary has a negative fertility rate. The accumulated natural decrease of population in 
absolute numbers is in the range of 100 000 (out of ten millions) for the last ten years. See В ALÓ—LIPOVECZ 
(eds.): Tények könyve, 1991, p. 753. At the same time there is a growing unemployment. Whereas the first 
factor calls for immigration, the second at least qualifies it. 
37 Germany, Turkey, France, Italy or Israel may serve as examples. 
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sweeping over Europe and bitter signs indicate that Hungary is no exception.38 If one 
wants to avoid harmful spill-overs from one issue-area to the other and limit the 
instinctively intolerant actions of public, press and sometimes of the executive,39 a 
public debate is needed, which would not be limited to discussions within the Parliament, 
but also involve NGOs and other interest groups (e.g. representatives of municipalities 
of specially affected regions in East and South Hungary). 
The recognition of the need for the elaboration of these interrelated but separate 
policies was reflected in the establishment of an Inter-Departmental Committee in August 
1991.40 Although its formal denomination refers to "refugee issues", the tasks of this 
committee embrace the whole field of migration. It has competence for "immigrants", 
defined broadly for the purpose of the resolution as "recognized refugees, persons 
enjoying territorial asylum, repatriated persons, and migrant workers" (Point 1 of the 
resolution). The nine paragraphs enlisting the responsibilities of this committee include 
the task "to elaborate proposals for the Government for an immigration policy", to initiate 
legislation and other measures concerning the daily life and needs of the immigrants, to 
control the performance of obligations concerning these groups as codified in interna-
tional agreements, to coordinate state action and to facilitate domestic and international 
assistance to the immigrants. Unfortunately this Committee has not produced any pro-
posals to be discussed publicly, nor has it produced any document which would reflect 
the integrated approach. The influx from Yugoslavia causing an emergency only partly 
justifies this inaction. This is very unfortunate because the new law on aliens would 
replace the outdated regulations of 1982. Although this new law was expected in 1991, 
as of February 1993 the bill is still in a pre-parliamentary coordination phase. Similar 
uncertainty surrounds the new law on nationality which is to replace the regulation 
adopted in 1957.41 
It has to be emphasized that whatever the outcome will be it should clearly separate 
the policy concerning aliens which may be based on domestic and foreign policy 
calculations, economic and social considerations, and the policy related to repatriation of 
former Hungarians and to immigration of ethnic Hungarians. Neither of these two must 
replace a well articulated refugee policy based on Hungary's willingness and obligation 
to participate in the global burden-sharing. Certainly there are legal norms regulating all 
38 1991 and 1992 have witnessed various conflicts of aliens in Hungary. The first involved illegal aliens who 
were kept in a much criticised closed establishment in Kerepestarcsa before forced return to home. The second 
type of conflict emerged between nationals of the Third World and rightist skinheads. The press regularly 
carried reports on these. See e.g. VARGA, К.: Ecc-pecc kimehecc... in: Beszélő, 1992, January 19, or the report 
in Budapest Week, Vol. 2 (1992) No. 32, October 15-21, p. 6. 7. 
39 See e.g. the statement of Mr. Boross, Minister for the Interior claiming that the "refugee wave must be 
halted" by way of re-introducing entry—visas. Népszabadság, 1992 February 4, or the debate surrounding the 
establishment of a new reception center in Debrecen. 
40 See the Government resolution on setting up the Inter-Departmental Refugee Committee [1037/1991 (VIII. 
6.) Korm. hat.] published in Magyar Közlöny No. 89/1991, p. 1909. 
41 1957. évi V. tv. az állampolgárságról (Law No. 5 of 1957 on Nationality). 
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of these fields, primarily those human rights obligations that set the minimum standard 
for the treatment of aliens, including the absolute prohibition of refoulement, or the wider 
obligation not to subject anyone to torture or to cruel or inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment. The right to privacy, the right to family and the right not to be 
discriminated—as interpreted in international practice—also belong to every alien.42 
Procedural Aspects 
At first sight the Hungarian status-determination procedure is critique-proof, providing 
three levels of review, guaranteeing the right of the UNHCR representative to participate 
in the proceeding at any stage, fixing short time limits for the delivery of the decision, 
granting protection against refoulement during the procedure, providing for a personal 
hearing and arranging for the presence of an interpreter. 
Scrutiny of the practice, however, reveals that "living law" differs from the books. 
This is certainly not only understandable, but also desirable in times of mass influxes 
when even a relatively lax Central European bureaucracy has to increase its flexibility.43 
Nevertheless viewed from a broader, and hopefully more peaceful perspective, a few 
features of the practice deserve commentary. 
One may wonder what happens to those "newcomers" who appear at the input side 
of the statistics but disappear before the numbers concerning formal recognition pro-
cedure starts. To take a non-exceptional year, preceding the flight from Yugoslavia, in 
1990 18 283 asylum seekers were registered but only 3 513 procedures for recognition 
were started. What happened to 4/5 of the asylum seekers, to almost 15 000 persons? In 
their case a sort of "eligibility" procedure or preliminary screening has shown that their 
claim is manifestly unfounded. There are two basic groups involved. 
The first comprises aliens, who because of the lack of information simply did not 
precisely know how to achieve their goal of remaining in Hungary. They might have 
approached the organs of the Refugee Department with a vague idea of their possibilities 
for remaining in Hungary and after receiving advice might have entered the normal route 
42 Hungary is bound by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and 
its Protocols which she signed in November 6 1990. On the procedure leading to ratification see: BÁN, T.: 
Előkészületek az Európai Emberi Jogi Egyezmény megerősítésére (Preparations for the ratification of the 
European Convention on Human Rights) Acta Humana No. 2 Budapest, p. 4, revealing further details from an 
insider's view. Certainly the recent practice of the Strasbourg institutions concerning articles 3, 5, 8 and 13 are 
of paramount importance. See e.g. Bozano 12 December 1986, Series A vol. I l l ; Soering 7 July 1989, Series 
A vol. 161; Djeroud 23 January v 1991 Series A vol. 191 -B; Moustaquim 18 February 1991, Series A vol. 193; 
Cruz Varas ond Others, 20 March 1991 Series A vol. 201; Vilvarajah and others 30 October 1991, Series A 
vol. 215. 
43 Interviews conducted by this author with officials working in the field had the recurring motive of having 
only one instruction from Budapest in times of extraordinary events: "Solve the problem within your own 
competence" having the meaning "proceed as you can and want". 
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of aliens desiring residence. No serious reservations should concern these cases since the 
persons concerned voluntarily observe the advice of the contacted organ. 
The other group is composed of cases in which the asylum seeker is prevented from 
starting the procedure against his will. The authority may find that his application is 
simply repeating an earlier one and deny its processing or it may declare that it is 
manifestly unfounded or late in time. The effort to start a procedure may fail right at the 
outset when the alien does not succeed in convincing the border guard that as an asylum 
seeker he or she is entitled to enter Hungarian territory and submit a formal application. 
In both cases no formal—and therefore appealable—decision is taken, everything 
happens in an informal, non-written way which by definition raises doubts. Only the 
adoption of public regulation of this preliminary screening procedure could clear this 
anxiety. 
There are further dilemmas connected with the procedure. Officials of the Refugee 
Department and of the local offices repeatedly complain about the lack of firm 
information on which to base their decision. It is rarely possible to verify by external 
means whether the fear of persecution is well founded. Therefore the credibility—or 
alleged non-credibility—of the applicant becomes paramount. There are hardly any data 
banks and other sources of information within reach of the acting authorities to confirm 
or defy statements of the applicant. If asylum seekers come in great numbers from well 
defined areas of neighbouring countries this problem can be overcome by comparing 
reports and statements of the asylum seekers who frequently described the same events 
in terms allowing cross checking.44 But in the case of asylum seekers coming from 
remote areas of the world—especially after the lifting of the geographic reservation—the 
authorities entrusted with the responsibility to decide will have to multiply their efforts 
in order to get access to information generated and transmitted by impartial actors. This 
task is already existing, even if the geographic limitation is in force, because the non-
refoulement principle binds Hungary in relation to forced migrants, wherever they may 
have come from. 
The problem of gathering information is related to the other one of publicity. As the 
authorities in satisfying their need for information could benefit from activities of national 
and international NGOs engaged in the protection of asylum seekers and refugees, so they 
should also increase the transparency of the Hungarian situation for the benefit of the 
NGO community. At present only the representative of the UNHCR and the counsel of 
the applicant—if there is any—are entitled to participate in the determination procedure. 
None of the almost five thousand decisions concerning refugee status were published; 
there is no kind of reporting system of the leading cases. This total secludedness of the 
authorities prevents the relatively underdeveloped national NGO community, as well as 
44 According to recollections shared by officials active in local authorities in cases when Hungarians were 
persecuted in Romania in spring 1990, then after the first person's account of the events taking place in a 
village or similarly well defined location (pogroms, whatever) they could expect that further persons affected 
by the persecution would show up and frequently those persons indeed appeared within a matter of days. 
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the legal profession, from controlling the interpretation given to the 1951 Convention 
definition by the local authorities.45 
Certainly it is high time that a form of free or at least non-profit legal assistance be 
made available to the asylum seekers to successfully overcome the hurdles of the legal 
and formal procedure. There are signs of growing interest in refugee and human rights 
law, but without a state or privately funded legal service which is independent one can 
hardly expect a substantial increase in the number of well-trained and problem-oriented 
lawyers willing to assist the applicants. 
An institutional reform accompanying the redrafting of the relevant rules of refugee 
law and aliens law is also desirable. Whereas the law governing the asylum seekers 
position is relatively recent—albeit not statutory, but only on decree level—the law 
regulating the entry and short and medium term residence of foreigners is a reflection of 
the closed society of the '80s.46 It is a duty stemming from the constitution to regulate 
the rights of individuals at a statutory level, through acts debated and adopted in Par-
liament. Unfortunately, the draft presently circulated on aliens' law does not respond to 
the repeated calls for a new institutional system, in which decisions concerning migration 
and decisions concerning asylum could be taken by a single agency unlike now when the 
aliens' police and the Refugee Department do not have institutional links.47 This single, 
professional authority could build up a reliable information base, could follow the 
changes in the legal position of the asylees (persons enjoying temporary protection), 
could guarantee that members of the administration who encounter a potential refugee do 
not turn a blind eye to her or his claim. This authority could also effectively participate 
in the growingly intensive European cooperation. 
European Challenges 
The rapidly changing attitudes and techniques concerning refugees and migrants adopted 
and planned by Western European states and the EC pose an enormous challenge to the 
45 As a matter of luck some of the senior officials of the Department of Refugee Affairs have the—almost 
personal—ambition to maintain good contacts with the non-governmental sphere. They indeed managed to keep 
relations with the churches, other humanitarian organizations and the opposition parties in an exceptionally 
peaceful and cooperation-oriented shape. Nevertheless these informal bridges of communication and mutual trust 
are threatened to collapse if the refugee situation worsens or if the already present xenophobic aspirations spill 
over to the so far unaffected refugee and asylum seeker population. 
46 The rules in force were adopted in 1982, and although modifications have occurred since then, they still 
give almost unlimited and unchecked authority to the police to decide on permissions to enter and stay, and 
on the revocation of these permissions. The relevant rules are contained in Law-Decree No. 19 (1989. évi 19. 
sz. tvr.) on the presence of foreigners in Hungary, and in the Decree of the Minister of the Interior No. 7/1982 
[7/1982 (VIII.26.) BM. sz. rend.] issued for the execution of the Law-decree. 
47 It is also remarkable that no public regulation of the status and duties of the Refugee Department exists. 
Most of its powers and responsibilities are based on custom and tradition with the only exception of the 
recognition procedure and the administration of the reception centres, which are regulated by decrees. 
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Hungarian decision-maker. Moral and national security dilemmas are at the two ends, 
with several others in between. 
The moral question sounds compelling: is Hungary free to close its borders before 
asylum-seekers and migrants driven by serious human needs, bearing in mind that there 
were periods when millions of Hungarians emigrated, seeking a safer world or better 
living conditions? Before and after World War I more than a million Hungarians set to 
road and hundreds of thousands escaped fascism and communism afterwards. Is the 
historic past without influence on present day "realpolitik" or should the decision-maker 
feel a moral obligation to return to the needy now what our nation has received from 
others when we, including our ancestors, were seeking shelter and safety?48 
The public policy and security arguments are also forceful. Hungary cannot become 
the target country and destination of all those forced and voluntary migrants who are 
excluded from Western Europe. With a GDP five to eight times less than that of the EC 
member states, Hungary cannot assume the burdens Western Europe claims incapable to 
carry. 
As a concentrated expression of these issues, it is worth to look at the agreement 
between Poland and the Schengen states.49 The essence of the agreement concluded on 
March 29, 1991, by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands 
on one side and Poland on the other, which provisionally applied even before ratification 
by the parties, establishes the obligation of the parties to readmit their nationals and other 
persons who crossed their external borders and who are found to be irregular in the 
territory of one of the other state parties. The effect of such an agreement is that Poland 
becomes "an extended arm of the border guards of the Schengen territory" and would be 
compelled "on issuing a visa or in permitting entry at the external border to scrutinize 
whether an alien meets the national entry requirements ... of each and every one of the 
48 For those still sitting on the fence it may be instructive to read about Canadian motives for the reception 
of Hungarian refugees after 1956. Howard Adelman argues that the admittance by Canada of practically as many 
refugees as by the US (37 000 and 38 000 respectively) "was primarily motivated by a humanitarianism of 
Virtue". ADELMAN, H.: Humanitarianism and Self-interest: Canadian Refugee Policy and the Hungarian 
Refugees, in: The New Refugee Hosting Countries: Call for Experience—Space for Innovation (Peter R. BAEHR, 
and Géza TESSÉNYI eds.), SIM (Netherlands Institute of Human Rights) Special No. 11, Utrecht, 1991, p. 100. 
49 The Schengen Agreement and the Schengen Implementation Agreement were concluded by France, 
Germany and the Benelux countries; see ILM, vol. 30 (1991) p. 68. Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain 
adhered later. They include provisions on control at outer frontiers, a common visa policy, carrier's sanctions, 
responsibility for dealing with requests for asylum and establish the Schengen Information System. Asylum 
seekers only have one single chance to be recognized. Refusal by any of the states is valid for all the other 
parties. This system is subject to severe criticism indicating that it will result in effectively preventing asylum 
seekers from submitting their application and generally limit the possibilities of free travel and movement of 
non-EC nationals. See e.g. MEIERS, H. at al.: Schengen, Internalization of centra] chapters of the law on aliens, 
refugees, privacy, security and the police, V. E. J. TJEENK WILLINK—Kluwer, 1991, and several notes 
circulated by the Dutch Standing committee of experts on international immigration refugee and criminal law. 
One of them describes and reproduces the agreement betweenPoland and the Schengen states, see "Readmission 
agreement between the Schengen States and Poland" undated photocopied note, reproducing the agreement in 
full in French. 
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Schengen States".50 If one adds to this the resolutions adopted on December 1, 1992 in 
London by the EC ministers responsible for immigration matters on manifestly unfounded 
applications for asylum and on host third countries, as endorsed by the conclusions of the 
Edinburgh meeting of the European Council on December 12, then it can clearly be seen 
what enormous challenges the Western European steps pose. A Schengen—Poland type 
agreement can be concluded with Hungary as well. If Hungary is compelled to take back 
everybody who is returned because his or her claim is manifestly unfounded or is not to 
be processed because the applicant comes from a "host third country" (and Poland, the 
Czech Republic as well as Hungary would undoubtedly qualify as host third countries) 
then all the voluntary and forced migrants who have passed through this route to Western 
Europe would end up returned to one of these countries. 
Outlook 
So far Hungary has been fairly successful in finding a humane and generous response to 
the challenges posed by the two asylum seeker waves flooding over her borders. A 
historic feeling of obligation, the lack of bad experiences with asylum seekers, the wish 
to demonstrate her place among the asylum granting democratic European states, the 
desire to assist fleeing members of the Hungarian minority in Romania, Croatia and 
Serbia, all contributed to the decision to keep the borders open and to grant protection 
and assistance to more than one hundred and ten thousands persons seeking refuge. 
Nevertheless as the available resources were put under increasing strain, most of these 
motives have lost of their power. Therefore an eventual third wave of the CIS states or 
greater numbers of asylum seekers from non-European territories will probably face a 
different kind of reception. The conclusion of agreements with Austria, Romania and 
Slovenia on the return and readmittance of illegal aliens51 the intensive participation in 
the "Berlin process"52 aimed at the prevention and checking of illegal immigration, the 
slowly but manifestly spreading intolerance and xenophobia of the Hungarian public and 
the diminishing chances of asylum seekers to have their refugee status recognized call 
for a reinforced vigor of the refugee and human rights lawyers. They must strive at 
resolving the pending legal issues by introducing into the Hungarian statutory law a 
temporary protected status for the victims of civil and international wars, by strengthening 
50 [Dutch] Standing committee of experts on international immigration refugee and criminal law: 
"Readmission agreement between the Schengen States and Poland" undated photocopied note, p. 2. 
51 The agreement with Austria was signed on October 9, 1992, with Romania on September 1, 1992 and with 
Slovenia on October 20, 1992. None of them has been made public nor entered into force yet. 
52 See the "Final communique of the Ministerial Conference on Measures for Checking Illegal Immigration 
from and through Central and Eastern Europe", adopted by the competent ministers of Albania, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Soviet Union, Spain, Switzerland, 
Ukraine, the United Kingdom, White Russia and Yugoslavia in Berlin on October 31, 1991. 
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procedural guarantees and extending protection to non-European refugees as well. The 
costs and benefits of participation in the increasingly restrictive European harmonization 
process requires careful analysis.53 This evaluation must take into account that the 
dilemmas faced by Hungary are not only legal and political, but at the same time and to 
similar extent moral as well. 
53 Useful tools in the analysis may be publications of leading NGOs. See e.g. Amnesty International: Europe: 
Harmonization of asylum policy, London, November 1992; European Consultation on Refugees and Exiles 
(ECRE): Fair and Efficient Procedures for Determining Refugee Status, London, October 1990. 

Acta Juridica Hungarica 
1992 34 № 1-2, pp. 49-56 
Akadémiai Kiadó, 
Budapest 
Csaba Varga The Law and Its Limits 
In our century, there is an increase in the indications pointing to the dysfunctions which 
result from the increasing control and influence, indeed, omnipotence, of the state, as 
well as to the dangers of a state which generates and reproduces itself in more and more 
increased dimensions. Pondering about the social factors which are in play in the 
development of administrative action, the word of Roscoe POUND sounded once like an 
exclamation: "Even if quite unintended, the majority are moving in the line of 
administrative absolutism which is a phase of the rising absolutism throughout the world. 
Ideas of the disappearance of law, namely, that there are no laws but only administrative 
order; doctrines that there are no such things as rights and that laws are only threats of 
exercise of state force, rules and principles being nothing but superstition or pious wish 
[...]; and finally a theory that law is whatever is done officially and so whatever is done 
officially is law and beyond criticism by lawyers—such is the setting in which the 
proposals of the majority must be seen". I would only add the words of a sociologist 
addressed to Marxists with a rather critical tone, claiming that if Marx came amidst us, 
he would surely study The State instead of The Capital. 
Indeed, in spite of the apparently well-founded development of contemporary 
social science, till now we have only considered to a rather limited extent to what 
degree the modem technological arsenal at the disposition of the human kind directly 
resulted in developments which are ordinarily looked upon as purely social a product. 
Namely, to what extent did the mass production of books, facilitated by the invention 
of printing, mould the tactics, as well as the outcome of the political struggles, of the 
Reformation? To what extent did the spreading of trashy, cheap paperback editions, 
through radiating both dissatisfaction and revolutionary agitation amongst the people, 
prepare to and assist in the breakthrough provoked by the French Revolution? To what 
extent did the appearance of bulldozers, as well as of new chemicals (faceless human 
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makes in themselves), facilitate to transform murder, both individual and of a mass 
size, into a quasi-industrial enterprise which could be undertaken in almost quasi-
industrial proportions, analysed in terms of cost and benefit, as a political action? Or, 
quite recently, to what extent has the increasing availability of drafting, processing 
and spreading over messages by the means of type-writing, computerized word-
processing, fast printing and mass-copying, as well as through telecommunication, 
stimulated the bureaucratic machinery to provoke new actions by initiating new 
courses through administrative measures and resorting to law as a panacea for 
achieving social reforms? 
* 
In our age, law is both over-used and over-relied upon, as if it were driven by the 
bewildered passion of gambling. In an apparently uncurbable manner, economic, 
financial, moreover, cultural efforts try in an ever growing mass to assert themselves 
through the instrumentality of law. At the same time, one of the consequences is that the 
law's prestige is tapering away and the ethos of the law's distinctiveness becomes 
increasingly difficult to recognise. It seems as if a sort of legal magic were given a 
rebirth. Both politicians and the public at large look upon the legal instrumentality 
expecting laws to finally untie the knot ever more difficult to untie. 
As is known, however, the knot cannot simply be cut. It can only be disentangled. 
And the job can only be done by disentangling of the threads which have since long been 
entangled in an increasingly chaotic manner. 
Where does this passion to regulate come from? It seems to be a phenomenon 
cropping up in every civilization, in every age. But it can be found exclusively there and 
then—as the hypertrophy of the memory of past successful interferences—where and when, 
for some reason, a strong bureaucratic machinery, designed for being activated with 
considerable uniformity, has previously been established. However, any such hypertrophy 
could ever be partial and temporary at the most. Unless backed by specific reasons under 
pathologically shaped conditions, it is finally bound to fall into its own trap and perish. 
Therefore, as compared to the past, a new situation came about by the development of 
the modern state. For a bureaucratic machinery was established with the claim for 
omnipotency which, by an almost boundless coverage, realized an increasingly more 
complete control and interference. 
For the modem state, a bureaucratic machinery is set into motion under the auspices 
of formal rationalization as one of its potentials. And as one of its actions, rationalization 
proceeds on by transforming all human objectives into legal provisions by prescribing, 
prohibiting or permitting externally observable human behaviours. As one of the 
consequences, human ambition striving for implementing ideas gets replaced by merely 
form-conform behaviour. 
Formal rationalization was originally built into state action in order that the 
interference, control and influence it had had to exert were finally centralized. However, 
the state machinery which proved to be successful in control slowly extended its way 
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elsewhere and became step by step omnipresent Thereby a vacuum was brought about 
around itself. Eventually, it even absorbed other scopes of action increasingly. Finally, 
its success made its presence the natural component of societal environment. Moreover, 
as a result of the acceptance of self-asserting conditions and inertia, it even developed 
our attachment to conceiving and realizing social intentions and desires for change 
through state machinery activating its law. 
Let as take an example to see impacts in both broad contexture and spin-off 
consequences. In a society with one-party rule encompassing the entirety of social life, 
the law will necessarily diminish with it prestige and distinctiveness getting lost. Still, just 
because the law is kept on to be unchangedly recorded in a universal and unpersonal 
form, frequently also purely political actions are clad in a legal form. In consequence, a 
paradoxical situation may be brought about: as to its ultimate impact, the hypertrophy of 
politics annihilates the law. Still, all that appears in a form of the apparent hypertrophy 
of the law. It is just these hypertrophic appendages which are mostly sensed by both the 
public at large and students of law. They may have a variety of forms, ranging from 
over-reliance upon the law and its handling as a surrogate agent, through the cynical 
incorporation of the drafter's own doubts into his/her own enactments issued and the 
institutionalization of planning for social reforms through the mere enactment of laws as 
an independent branch, self-sustaining and self-fed-back, of the new industry of change, 
to the tendency of final instrumentalization reducing legal practice, too, to a merely 
subservient means. 
What finally matters is that all this is not any longer a matter of pure fears and 
phantasm; all that has persisted to be true. Still, disentangling the knot must be started 
at a point where the knot is being tied, and not where the knot has already been 
completed. For especially during the closing period of the kind of enlightened absolutism 
which was imposed upon in the name of "actually existing socialism", legal scholarship 
was forced into a position of defence from the beginning, trying to explain—for that 
matter: in vain—that the law is not a panacea, not the exclusive agent of social reform, 
consequently, it is not its initiating and closing force, either. As if all the roles law has 
happened fulfilling so far have been equally conceivable, originating from the law's 
instrumental existence. Though we should know that, actually, all this was the result of 
a law forced into cripto-roles on the bordering line of getting involved in an abuse. 
The stand of legal scholars is defensive also because their discipline, poor in results 
empirically verifiable and unsuitable for strict formulations, can only diagnose the 
pathology of practice, with a high degree of probability by the way. Legal sociology is 
only able to predict which extremities exhaust the threshold of malaise, without being 
able to formulate notwithstanding either the conditions of normal functioning or its 
features and characters. For the latter can mostly only be approached through the 
method of exclusion. It risks to appear as trivial evidence taken from everyday 
experience. 
For that reason, one has to be rather careful by formulating only sketchy indication 
and exemplification through characterization. As a matter of fact, scholarly knowledge 
collected so far seems to indicate that in primitive societies, in classical antiquity, 
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moreover, all times up to the modern age, law was connected to rites. The law's 
connection to rites was not a result of underdevelopment but an issue of the law's 
distinctiveness. It is the law's social prestige that got expression in this way. Birth; 
becoming an adult; marriage; death; transactions of a decisive (exceptional) character 
in life; criminal actions risking of the upsetting of community life—these are the events 
crying for law as an agent of societal life, which sets up the framework of and 
conditions the decisive switches in community existence. What else may the law be? 
First and foremost, a strictly community affair. Ever since the struggle in ancient times 
for recording the law and making it accessible to any, up to the revolutionary changes 
in our century, the total social process, including mass movements in history, wanted 
to transform the law into the prime factor of society. And as if all these efforts were 
crowned by success. As if only enactments—together with the authority and legitimation 
their legal quality extended to them—could provide the seal of finiteness. Notwith-
standing, in fact it was primarily a symbolic gesture. And its conclusion for the 
state machinery—i.e., that because of a legal enactment, the whole state machinery 
could be mobilized for guaranteeing its enforcement as a last reserve—could only 
count as an ephemeral addition compared to the strength of the total social process 
and the pressure exercised by mass movements and community publicity. Or, what 
is common of all this is that the legal reform is—and can only be—but one component 
of an overall social reform. It just adds to a genuine total motion. It is here that its 
organic unity with these processes originates from; moreover, that it cannot be disrupted 
from and become independent of the other components of the same motion. For it 
proceeds on its own way as its sanctioning power and/or the means shaping its form. 
In this way, the question of the limits of the law is not even raised, for law has no 
independent role to play. Its destiny is linked to the totality of the social processes 
concerned, and any (relative) autonomy of the law can only develop within the frame 
of its instrument role. 
How far is it from this if somewhere a system of norms, reflecting an alien 
(European) intellect and instrumental skill, recorded in books as breaking down the 
complexity of social reality into a definite series of sharp conceptual classifications, is 
imposed from above onto the law and order of a community, inherited and preserved as 
the immemorial tradition of that community? If somewhere a French-typed Civil Code 
system of laws is replaced by a legal arrangement reflecting Common Law tradition, 
experimental mentality and construction, built upon a different level and orientation of 
abstraction, presupposing different sources and skills? Is the construction of law 
something like the engine of a car (which is reliable in case of the make being changed, 
too)—only provided that we fix the points which are relevant from the point of view of 
the vehicle's body and the engine connection? 
Well, of course, points of connection (territorial and/or personal sphere of application, 
etc.) can also be legally defined. However, this does not change the fact that society is 
not a mechanism utilizing the energy of some added or in-built engine for driving or 
braking; moreover, in freely developing societies, it has no driver either to put it at the 
disposition of some outer will as its mechanism. For instance, a legal code formulated 
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with no regard to local traditions and roots can appear as a work of art by itself. But if 
it fails to adjust to the motion of society by offering a managing and manageable form 
to its actual processes, the social corp will throw it out sooner or later, as exemplified by 
a number of attempts at transplantation, otherwise professionally correct. And, then, we 
have not yet mentioned pieces of legislation aiming at social reforms, mobilizing people 
for the practical implementation of some betterment program, reducing society to the best 
of mere instruments, which, even if prepared by scholars, can at most provoke superficial 
external conformism, hardly sufficient even for own survival. 
Taking into account background values and considerations, the conclusion which 
differentiates between the uses of the law as a model and as a programme is undoubtedly 
attractive. Accordingly, the law aimed at offering a model is a series of legally 
guaranteed possibilities to give a shape to social actions by providing them with 
advantageous statuses and, thereby, channellizing them in given categories. In opposition, 
the law aimed at offering a programme is the definition of the road solely and 
exclusively acceptable from a legal point of view. That is, instead of negative limitation, 
defining what has to be avoided in society (and offering patterns only if the meeting of 
some special privileges is meant), the programme is intolerantly positive, prescribing 
what is patterned for and forbidding what is not (putting, thereby, an end to social 
spontaneity). 
Notwithstanding, it is questionable for me whether or not topical problems we used 
to have to face with in the last period of 'actually existing socialism' in Hungary and 
elsewhere could be traced back to this alternative, and whether or not the condemnation 
of them provided a solution for them. Let us take an example from England: Immigra-
tion, mixing of populations, aversions by the mastering populace, then, tensions of racial 
hatred—what is the solution here? It seems obvious to any observer that the tasks to be 
carried out include the arrangement of citizenship, determination of immigration policy, 
setting up quotas perhaps, introduction of economic and financial stimulation, 
socialization to the new situation. But each of the above is only efficient if inserted into 
a complex social program, spanning over several years or decades. Only one of the 
components of this, perhaps necessary but certainly not sufficient in itself, can be the one 
of enacting a law, proceeding prevailing tendencies of the process by providing them a 
form or standardizing the form already practised. 
For obvious reasons, established practice cannot be reversed in a way that pressure 
groups make a law simply enacted in order that manifestations of racial hatred be 
sanctioned. Human enactments are unable by themselves to mobilize society to properly 
co-operate. They are not calibrated to substitute to measures resulting in a meaningful 
solution. Moreover, the control such enactments can initiate is not even sufficient for 
supervising their own implementation or establishing an agency efficiently enforcing iL 
Therefore it may easily happen that, for instance, a burden of initiating a procedure or 
presenting proof is established, namely a burden eventually intimidating those protected 
by the law against those violating iL And, considering the law's being obviously doomed 
to failure from the very beginning, the whole enterprise may finally appear as a factor 
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encouraging or legitimizing counter-forces as the repudiation of the original aim, even 
as a kind of mischivous winking in the eye of the unsuspecting citizen. 
Therefore I believe that the programme is faulty, albeit not for the reason of its being 
a programme, but because it is not backed socially. That is, by reducing a genuine social 
solution to mere law-enactment, the claim of the efforts to find a reforming solution gets 
stuck on the plane of mere appearances. 
Even radical revolutionary forces can only assert themselves if they are backed by 
a spontaneous mass from within the actual social total process. It holds true even if a 
wave of revolution leads to enacting programs. Anything can be turned to become a 
program: rights and/or religious doctrines of salvation, as well as the projection of any 
image of a communistic future into the present. However, any codification of them may 
only gain a legal meaning in so far as it advances (or sanctions) a social program which 
is also socially effective and asserted. 
This is why I assume that in so far as it is socially backed, a programmatic law can 
also be quite an adequate legal manifestation. However, the smaller its social support is 
and the more dispersed and antagonistic the forces in play in society are, the greater the 
pression will be that it is conferred onto the law. Consequently, the more the question of 
its formulation either as a model or as a program comes into the foreground, too. For law 
has a chance to exert an influence by the force of its mere enactment only to the extent 
that it gives priority to socially otherwise desirable and supported alternatives—but it 
leaves the road open for the free game of social forces, including their option of not 
resorting to the law, even rejecting it. 
And the question of legal instrumentalism has not yet been touched upon. This 
appears in a pure form when there are no genuine social forces behind changes that are 
desirable otherwise (as a result of the state of social conditions); perhaps the objective 
is not desirable enough and there may be no considerable force standing behind it 
either, for it can prove to be pure power-voluntarism manifested on account of a 
narrow elite approach. Then, finally, only law as a regulating form, destined to bring 
into operation the monopolized use of compulsion, would be relied upon. In such a 
situation, eventually, an industry of changes, described already in sociology, can in 
response develop in order to provide a raison d'être for the existence, and an excuse 
for the faulty operation, of the state machinery in question. That is, a series of so-
called reforms acts, never thought over and through carefully, never taken seriously, 
still reiterated regularly again and again (trusting, maybe, in natural human forgetting, 
in the inexhaustibility of social credit, in the sufficiency of occasional filling up by 
merely ideological and propagandists lip-services), will be the surrogate agent of 
social reforms, openly, too. Thus, kinds of sham-reform, in order to provide an excuse 
from the very start, can incorporate, as they were, the authors' own doubts in their 
applicability into their textual wording. This is a genuine surrogate action, at the same 
time an attempt at avoiding the responsibility to be borne for the failure, of any actual 
change. 
Theory is obviously not in a position to set up value standards for the desirable 
functions of law, preferences as to the forms of regulation and ideal types for the 
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possible ways of how to institutionalize law. For if it were, it would from the outset 
be biassed by preconceptions. Eventually, it would even close the path of its own 
investigation. At the same time, independently of how much we want our description 
to be objective, we have to acknowledge from the beginning that the limiting points 
of practice indicate also theoretical boundaries. Consequently, law is able and have too 
operate between the extreme points of, on the one hand, subservient institutionalization 
of processes already taking place in society and, on the other, their idealization far 
from reflecting and even influencing actual processes. Within these limiting points, the 
law's actual impact is dependent primarily upon social components and correlations 
which are beyond the reach of the law. Accordingly, the dilemma of the use of law 
either as a model or as a programme can only be raised in a meaningful way in the 
context of the concrete social situation. This, however, inevitably leads to a paradoxical 
conclusion, namely, that the limits of the law are indeed identical with the limits of the 
recipient medium. In other words and in a paradoxical formulation, the law has nothing 
but limits, whose dissolution in any direction and on any degree, etc. can only be 
achieved by the social environment at any location and time. By the way, this 
formulation is nothing but the restatement of totality approach. 
In this respect, totality approach means that even the most topically legal questions 
are confronted with social facticity. Within the totality, law is conceived to be an 
instrumental phenomenon from the very start. While it is established and gets applied 
as an instrument, it will, however, display and assert its own mediatory values as well. 
These values of meditation express the level of socialization society arrived at that 
time. 
I believe that the most universal value of the legal domain (i.e., the most 
comprehensive one, touching upon the question whether or not legal phenomenon as 
such is socially a meaningful category) is the law's own prestige. On the one hand, the 
prestige of law presupposes the law's relative separation, autonomy, particularity and 
social dignity. On the other, it presupposes the law's social presence, efficacity and 
role-fulfilment. For all these are needed for that law can develop and survive amidst 
the day to day pushes of social movement as one of the factors moulding them, fed 
back into them, getting reformulated through them. 
We have thereby reached the point where the question of the limits of law is 
connected to the ontological problem of legal existence. For, on the one hand, legal 
phenomenon can only be made socially meaningful through forms of regulation, control 
and interference which have definite chances to assert themselves through their 
building in the processes of society. On the other, however, there is a number of 
ideological and political considerations that may justify that one resorts to the legal 
instrument also at times when the conditions of its success are missing or the law 
concerned has not even been genuinely aimed at exerting actual influence. The latter 
is the case when shaw-reforms are introduced through mere law-enactment or a law 
is enforced with a merely symbolic purport. No matter what social or political 
considerations may stand behind such practices, they will surely ruin the fundamental 
value of law by undermining its chances to ever play an optimum role. For that reason, 
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the question of the limits of law is not simply a problem of legal technique. As one of 
the basic components of the prestige of law, at the same time it is one of the most 
conspicuous factors of strengthening or annihilating the civilization value of legal 
phenomenon as well.1 
X For the theoretical context of the paper, cf., among others, from the author: 'Macrosociological theories 
of law: a survey and appraisal'. Ill Tidskrift for Raetssociologi [Lund] No. 3-4 (1986), pp. 165-198 and A jog 
és korlátai: Antony Allott a hatékony jogi cselekvés hatásairól [Law and its limits: Antony Allott on the barriers 
of an a efficient legal action] (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Szociológiai Intézete 1985) 34 pp. 
[Elmaradottság és modernizáció: Műhelytanulmányok (Underdevelopment and Modernization: Working 
Papers)]. 
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Viktor MAVI The World Community 
and the Changing Notions of 
Universalism and Regionalism 
One can witness all over the world dramatic changes in the pressure on the interna-
tional normative system whose deficiencies have recently been manifestedly revealed. 
The core of the problem lies not only in the inability of the system's norms to keep 
pace with the changing realities but also in the unpredictable nature and consequences 
of these changes. Suffice it to say that one can hardly find an analyst or politician who 
could have, in due time, predicted the magnitude and swiftness of the changes in 
Eastern Europe. It is not possible either to predict the real consequences of other 
imminent problems (technological development, environmental hazards, energy issues, 
etc.) which beset the modern world. How, and to what extent, modern international law 
can react to these changes is one of the most challenging questions. The challenge is 
so serious that many of its institutions and principles need some reconsideration with 
the aim of finding perspective solutions. 
There are also other kinds of strains within the international normative system the 
sources of which are related to recent quantitative and qualitative changes in the status 
and perception of the international community in general. There is no need for lengthy 
arguments in support of those views which have been trying to prove the existence of 
a universal international community. It has been convincingly shown by others that in 
modern times a new international society has emerged in the sense that it covers the 
whole world.' As for the question of origin, ways and methods of establishing this 
universal society (for example its Eurocentric nature) falls outside the task of this 
1 See, for example: The expansion of international society. Ed. BULL, Hedley and WATSON, Adam. 
Clarendon Press. Oxford, 1984. pp. 117-126. 
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study. It seems to be more important to consider the characteristics and the evolving 
nature of this society, the possibilities of its structure and institutions to meet changed 
circumstances and new challenges. 
The increase in the number of the main actors of this community is one of the most 
vivid manifestations of the quantitative changes. Since World War II more than 100 
new nation-states have appeared on the international scene. Independent and sovereign 
nation-states are still growing in number. Thus, for example, one can witness a 
threefold increase in the number of UN member-states.2 As a result of this rapid 
increase in the number of nation-states, the modem community of states has become 
extremely heterogeneous. The new states which entered the community have different 
political systems, cultural backgrounds and levels of development. This heterogenity 
of the main actors themselves appears as a very serious challenge to the international 
normative system. The basic problem is how to establish common standards, 
universally valid principles for each of the participants; how to overcome the 
contradiction between the need to use universally accepted standards and the above-
mentioned heterogenity. From this follows that the term "universal international 
society", in relation to the main actors, means first of all club-membership, that is 
acceptance of every state as a member of the "club". The community of states itself 
has never been a universal one. Neither in the time when this community was 
exclusively perceived as European, nor later when non-European states were admitted 
to the so-called European club of states. This community has always consisted of 
diverse political, cultural and moral systems and sub-systems, and it would be totally 
wrong to assume that this plurality in the foreseeable future can be replaced by a 
community based on common culture and morals and unified political systems. Due 
to the intense interaction between the community members there is, of course, some 
sort of universalization, system-wide interpénétration, but the differences still remain. 
When examining the modern international community one has to take into 
consideration other changes as well. These changes are of qualitative nature, the 
consequences of which are even more important than those of the changes in the 
system of prime actors. The international community has changed structurally; 
alongside its prime actors new subjects have entered the international stage. The most 
important event is the appearance of international organizations on this scene, and their 
acceptance as separate subjects of the international normative system. Their appearance 
was a very important step toward the erosion of the traditionally perceived international 
community being considered as a community of nation-states. International organiz-
ations have undercut the aspiration of nation-states for exclusiveness and omnipotency 
in the international system, and, notwithstanding the fact that there is still a tendency 
2 As it is known, originally there were 51 states which participated in the creation of the UN. But in 1990 
its membership totaled 170 nation-states. 
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to diminish their role and independent nature,3 they are real players in the game with 
independent will and action. 
One can witness also the widening of the modern international society and its 
normative system in another respect, namely, this society, beginning from the 
midtwentieth century, has slowly started to treat individuals as quasi "members of the 
club", having their own rights and interests separate from those of nation-states and 
international organization. The recognition of individuals as subjects of the interna-
tional society, despite the very restrained and cautious steps taken in this direction, is 
another important change of a qualitative nature. The most vivid example of this trend 
is the notion of international human rights which has already started a process wherein 
individuals are entitled to be treated as direct participants of the international 
community. The legal personality of individuals at the level of the international 
community has become a reality. This has been recognized even by those who for 
decades had been denying the possibility of considering individuals as subjects of the 
international normative system.4 
We are at the very beginning of the process of universal recognition of individuals 
as independent members and subjects of the international community, hence it is 
difficult to make long-term predictions as to its real consequences. But one thing seems 
to be quite obvious: this is a process which weakens the traditionally perceived 
international system based on nation-states, and undercuts the dangerous and selfish 
claims of states to be the sole and exclusive agents destined to manage world affairs. 
The present international normative system is being challenged not only by 
membership-related changes but also by value- and status-related ones. The role of 
values which formerly were of utmost importance in determining the actual weight of 
every nation-state in the community (military might, population etc.) in the last decades 
has perceptibly lost its significance. Factors of another nature, such as economic 
capacity, levels of technical and technological development, stock of needed energy 
resources, have become first priority values. This shift among the values has a rather 
serious impact on the status of some states. Thus, for example, the economic 
backwardness and technological underdevelopment of the Soviet state has radically 
reduced its global interventionary capacity. Notwithstanding its enormous military 
might, it is permanently loosing its statute as a super-power, and it is quite evident that 
if this trend continues the CIS sooner or later will be treated as a third-rank power. But 
even accepting the assumption that in the foreseeable future the two superpowers 
(USA, CIS) retain their status, it is unlikely that they can cope with, or seriously 
influence, modem world problems. These problems are of a planetary nature which 
3 It is customary to describe international organizations as derivative subjects, as actors who do not have 
their own will, independent from the participating nation-states' will. 
4 See for example, ZAKHAROVA, N. V.: The individual as a subject of international law (in Russian).—Sov-
etskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo, 1989. No. 11, pp. 112-118. 
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question the very existence of life on our globe,5 and their solution needs world-wide 
actions based on a unified theory of global development.6 
In light of these new challenges, the réévaluation of the role of the existing 
international normative system and its institutions is not the domain of Utopian designs 
about a brighter future but a pressing imperative having direct relevance to human 
survival. This study does not contend to give precise answers to all of these problems 
facing the international legal system. A more modest aim is being persued, namely, to 
point out some of the disjunctions between exiting rules, institutions and reality, paying 
special attention to the notions of universalism and regionalism, and to the possible 
future trends of their correlation in a time when, due to increasing planetary 
interdependence, national barriers are breaking down, and nation-system has been 
considerably weakened. 
In examining the notions of universalism and regionalism one has to face a lot of 
problems, including definitional issues and problems of a substantial character. These 
two notions as alternative ways of approaching and solving international issues have 
for a long time been on the agenda both in scholarly debates and actual practices of 
inter-state co-operation. However, the search for a precise definition of these notions 
is a vain effort; neither universalism nor regionalism has a unanimously accepted 
definition. This is not to say, of course, that there has been no attempt to clarify their 
meaning, or at least to establish an appropriate criteria for their conceptual clarifica-
tion.7 But most of the arguments so far advanced, that is the pros and cons of 
regionalism and universalism, belong to the field of excessive theorizing and 
generalizing. The advocates of both concepts concentrate on proving the feasibility of 
their choice in world-order building, trying to explain why preference should be given 
to one of the approaches. Regionalists usually claim that the co-operation of states 
within a specific region is the most effective one, since the homogenity of political 
systems, economic interests, cultural traditions and other common values constitute a 
natural basis for more closer relations between the participating states. They also warn 
universalists, on account that the latter fail to take into consideration the heterogenity 
of the world community, that the assumption of universalism is a premature idea. Even 
those regionalists who admit the deficiencies of the present world order based on 
5 On the so-called global or plantary problems see: Our common future. World commission on Environment 
and Development. Oxford University Press, 1987. 
6 On the need for a united global theory for solving modern life-threatening problems see: Van WEIGEL, 
В.: A united theory of global development. Westrport-Praeger, New Work, London, 1989. 
7 See for example: YALEM, R. J.: Regionalism and world order. University of Southern California. Public 
Affairs Press, Washington, 1965; Régionalisme et universalisme dans le droit international contemporain. 
Éditions A. Pedone, Paris, 1977; PENTLAND, Ch.: The regionalization of world politics.—International 
Journal, 1975. No. 4, pp. 599-630; Encyclopedia of International Law, Vol. V. North-Holland, 1983; 
DOLZER, R.: Universalism and regionalism.—In: The spirit of Uppsala. Joint UNITAR—Uppsala University 
seminar on international law and organization of a new world order. Walter de Gruyfer, Berlin-New York, 1984, 
pp. 513-533. 
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nation-states on regional groupings and recognize the need for the establishment of a 
universal/global world community, insist that such a community can be developed only 
through regionalism, regional experience of co-operation. On the other hand, 
universalists emphasizing the interdependency of nations and the magnitude of tasks 
facing mankind, point out the inadequacy of regional efforts, the impossibility of 
precise definition of regions, and the dangers of regionalization. According to them, 
regionalism provides the basis for rivalries and competition on a large-scale, prepares 
the path toward regional autarky and regional nationalism, leading to possibilities of 
very serious confrontations in the world. They firmly believe that only universalism 
can prevent the world from conflicts of regions and insist that priority should be given 
to universal interests and values and to a global sense of community.8 
The relation between regionalism and universalism has not only academic but 
practical relevance to today's world order. These two notions have acquired an 
institutionalized form of recognition, hence, for the purpose of further comments, it 
seems necessary to examine at least briefly the related normative solutions. 
The notion of universalism is actually a product of "one-worldism" ideas which 
started to flourish in the twentieth century, after the first practical steps were taken 
with the aim of creating world-wide security systems. The League of Nations was the 
first attempt to institutionalize universalism, that is to create an absolutely new type 
of inter-state system based on the solving of international issues at the world level (and 
not just at the level of some of its regions) by involving every nation in the related 
decision-making. Though the League of Nations had been created with the aim of 
acting throughout the entire world as a supreme co-ordinating agent of world affairs, 
this universalistic aim, due to historical circumstances and organizational (Covenant-
related) deficiencies, has not materialized. As it is known, the universalism of the 
League was not a complete one even at the membership level. Suffice it to mention the 
controversial attitude toward the League by the two major powers, i.e. the US and the 
Soviet Union. The United States never applied for membership, and the Soviet Union, 
after a short period of co-operation, was ousted by its members. Here it is necessary 
to point also out the fact that the controversy over universalism and regionalism at the 
time of the League's activity did not reach such magnitude as it has today. At that time 
the forces favoring regionalism were not strong enough for institutionalization of 
regional claims and interests in the form of regional agencies. The conflict between 
regionalism and universalism occurred at a later time, when regional identity acquired 
institutional forms. This happened at the San Francisco conference where, after the 
experience of another devastating war, the representatives of the nations of the world 
sat down to formulate the Charter of the United Nations, the second universal 
8 On the claims advanced in support of the supremacy of regionalism over universalism and vica versa see: 
BENNETT, A. L : International organizations. Principles and issues. New Jersey, 1984. pp. 348-349. 
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organization. Owing to the pressure, of the mainly Latin American states,9 the framers 
of the Charter could not by-pass regional interests, and though it basically favours 
universalism among its provisions, there are some which relate to regional interests 
(see Articles 52-54). 
The system of world order created by the UN Charter is actually the most serious 
step taken with the aim of institutionalizing real universalism, notwithstanding the 
above-mentioned fact that regionalism has also acquired some sort of legitimization 
within its provisions. The war between universalists and regionalists has been won for 
the time being by the former. On the supremacy of universalism over regionalism one 
can find quite clear indications in the Charter's provision. Article 1 (4) explicitly 
underscores that for the attainment of the purposes of the Charter the UN acts as 
"centre for harmonizing the actions of nations". In Article 2 (6) of the Charter the 
organization has been empowered to enforce basic principles of the Charter even in 
relation to non-member states, when such enforcement is needed for the maintenance 
of international peace and security. However, the most clear manifestation of charter-
centered universalism can be found in Article 103 which states that "in the event of 
conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the 
present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their 
obligations under the present Charter shall prevail". These provisions clearly 
demonstrate that the framers of the Charter had in mind a world organization based on 
universalism, and on the universal applicability of the Charter-based principles. 
This postulate has also been reinforced in the limited Charter provisions for 
regional arrangements, which subordinate regional interests to universal ones. These 
provisions can be found in chapter VIII which lists the basic principles of regional co-
operation. They are the following: 
a) the creation and existence of regional arrangements or agencies dealing with 
matters of peace and security is not a violation of the Charter, as long as their 
activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations 
(Article 52/1); 
b) participants of such regional groupings are encouraged to settle peacefully 
local disputes through regional agencies (Article 52/2-3); however, this encourage-
ment in no way should impair the related rights of the Security Council (Article 
52/4); 
c) regional agencies with the exception of action against enemy states resulting 
from World War II, are not entitled to enforcement action without the authorization 
of the Security Council (Article 53/1); 
9 Apart from Latin American states there were also other advocates of regionalism. For example, the Arab 
states and even Great Britain provided some support for regional claims. As we know, Winston Churchill 
favored a world order based on regional councils (European Council, Asian Council, Western Hemisphere 
Council). On his proposals see in more detail, LUARD, E.: A history of the United Nations. Vol. I. Macmillan, 
1982. pp. 20-22. 
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d) the Security Council shall be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or 
contemplated by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and 
security (Article 54). 
The content of the above-mentioned provisions aim clearly at securing the 
supremacy of universalism over regionalism in the case of conflict between the 
jurisdiction of a regional agency and the United Nations. Actually it is a compromise 
solution on the compatibility of universalism and regionalism. 
If one takes a closer look, however, as to how these two principles of order-
building were put into operation, a rather disappointing and, to some extent unpredict-
able, evolution can be discerned. 
The universalism declared by the Charter has never materialized. The promising 
perspective of forging a real universal community has disappeared under the pressures 
of harsh realities. The failure of the attempt has different causes, some of which are 
in direct connection with the concept of the Charter itself, and others have nothing to 
do with these inherent obstacles. The basic idea of the Charter was, first of all, loyalty 
of the participants to the entire international community. In other words, its founders 
designed it with the assumption that there would be a general solidarity among its 
members in maintaining the established order. But this solidarity from the very 
beginning was destined to fall because, in the conception of the Charter, many 
principles of the past—the content of which objectively run counter of such solidar-
ity—has not been uprooted. The order established was still an order where the 
observance of community interest depended upon the discretionary will of the 
sovereign masters. The truth is that the importance of national self-interest based on 
such notions as sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs, received not only 
re-afirmation but was actually strengthened. 
Naturally it would be wrong to attribute the failures in order-building based or 
universalism only to these aspects. Other non-charter related factors have also 
contributed to this process. Due to the unforeseen intensity of ideological confrontation 
in the forties and fifties, universal institutions were in fact paralysed. And hence it is 
not surprising that the dissatisfaction with universal institutions has prompted the main 
actors of the international community to seek other forms of co-operation. States 
reacted very quickly to this inadequacy and made considerable efforts to channel their 
relations into regional forms of co-operation. One can witness at this time an intensive 
regionalization of the world. The above-mentioned disillusion over universalism and 
the positive results in the activities of some regional organizations has only 
strengthened the strive toward regionalism. Thus, for example, in the middle of the 
1970s, out of the 300 existing intergovernmental organizations two-thirds belonged to 
regional ones.10 
10 See, supra note 7, PENTLAND, Ch.: Op. cit. p. 605 
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This regionalization of the world has rather particular features because in practice 
the principles of the UN Charter relating to regionalism have been eroded. The 
requirements about the supremacy of universalisai and on the control of regional 
agencies by the Security Council has been undermined by the states through the 
discretionary interpretation of the Charter's provisions. On the one hand, for the 
purpose of avoiding the control of regional arrangements by the Security Council, 
states have managed to find escape clauses even in the provisions of the Charter 
directly related to regionalism. Through the interpretation of such notions as 
"enforcement action", "local dispute", the obligation "to keep fully informed" of the 
Security Council they often successfully by-passed the competence of the universal 
agency. On the other hand, states in their practice have tried to create such regional 
agencies which are not subordinate to the Charter's provisions on regional arrange-
ments. For this purpose they have made use of Article 51 dealing with the right of 
collective self-defense served as an escape clause for creating regional agencies falling 
outside the Charter provisions on regionalism. Such regional security systems have 
been rather often correctly cited as dangers to peace and security rather than as agents 
for its attainment. 
In connection with regionalism another factor should also be mentioned which 
further confused the issue of the correlation between universalisai and regionalism. As 
it is known, the UN Charter contains provisions only on regional agencies dealing with 
questions of peace and security. However, the process of regionalization has moved in 
a quite unexpected direction, namely, in the direction of multifunctional regional 
organizations, the creation of which peace and security issues played a secondary role, 
or were even discarded all together. Other motives, such as economic, political, 
ideological, were the main force behind their creation. Suffice it to mention the 
economic regionalism (EEC) and the political-cultural regionalism (Council of Europe) 
in Western Europe and the burgeoning regionalism in the non-Western parts of the 
world. In the UN Charter this kind of regionalization has not been foreseen and, as a 
consequence, the universal organization has had to face new challenges. With the aim 
of meeting these challenges the UN reacted rather quickly; within its system a network 
of regional commissions has been created. The main purpose of these commissions has 
been to establish contacts and to provide guidance for multifunctional regional 
organizations." The examination of the activities of these commissions is not the task 
of this study, but one general remark seems necessary. Taking into account the 
tremendous changes in the world and the experiences of some of those regional 
organizations which have established co-operational links with the UN, the relevant 
institutional forms of co-operation seem to be outdated. 
The problems have their roots not in the UN efforts but rather in the nature of 
these regional organizations. The original purpose leading to the creation of some 
11 See in more deatail, Regionalism and the United Nations. Ed. by B. ANDEMICAEL. UNITAR Oceana 
Publications—Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1979. 
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regional groupings was basically political or ideological. Lessons of history show that 
such regional units are rather shaky ones, because there can be no real regional 
integration based simply on these considerations. The requirement for the maintenance 
of political and ideological unity put tremendous burdens upon such units and the real 
benefits of the participants are insignificant. 
An organic regional entity should be a cost-effective functional unit where the 
rewards to the participants supersede the burdens of participation. The mere grouping 
together of states on the basis of ideology has little to do with real regionalism. The 
fate of the so-called socialist regionalism (CMEA) based primarily on ideological 
motives is a good example in this respect. The participating states failed to make 
operational the main, vague ideological principles of the grouping, namely, socialist 
internationalism and mutual assistance. In fact, due to the forcible nature of regional 
co-operation, in this part of the world there has never been real regionalism; the 
interest of the region as a whole have not been expressed and protected through the 
established institutions. The same ineffectiveness can be noticed in those regional 
systems where the motives of ideology prevail. For example the Arab League or the 
OAU based on negative ideological goals (the fighting of colonialism in the form of 
hostility against the Western world) have had few achievements. Their activity 
confirms that a united hostility against an outside force is insufficient for the creation 
of real regional unity. 
There can be no clear-cut answer neither about the fate, nor about the main criteria 
to be applied in delineating regions in the future. It is likely that many existing 
regional systems would not withstand the burden of ineffectiveness, that, alongside the 
role of such traditional criteria as cultural homogenity, social and political unity, 
economic interdependence, geographical proximity, other new considerations and 
motives, might appear on the scene. Among these new considerations the positive 
motives of the participants would probably be of great importance. But whatever would 
be the motives for regional unity, the creation and function of regional groupings 
simply on the basis of regional interests and purposes poses a real danger. Considering 
the increasing interdependence in the modem world, pure regionalism might have 
unpredictable consequences. In our time it is a dangerous simplification to regard 
regionalism as good per se, and nourish hopes that through regional co-operation world 
problems can be solved in a more manageble way. Many of these problems are global 
ones, hence, for their solution, global efforts and intensive extra-regional co-operation 
is needed. Otherwise, as it has been pointed out quite correctly, "it is not an imaginary 
danger that regional organizations would develop into a sort of 'citadelles d'exclusi-
vism' and might result in disintegration of international law into mutually alienated 
regional legal orders."12 
12 See, Essays on the development of the international legal order. Sijthoff and Noordhoff, Alphen aan den 
Rijn, 1980. p. 218. 
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The reality of the above-mentioned interdependency has not yet been adequately 
reflected in the regional systems. If one examines carefully the statutory instruments of 
the existing regional systems, this requirement is mentioned only in a few of them. 
Regional solidarity, regional common interest and values are being considered as primary 
goals of the related co-operation.13 In some of the regional instruments the participating 
states try to soften this "regional egoism" by making references to the "Consistency with 
the spirit of the UN Charter"; or confirmation of their faith in the principles of the UN 
Charter". But it seems to be rather a polite gesture toward universalism than a real 
commitment to it. 
There is some hope, of course, that states sooner or later will arrive to a conclusion 
on the limits of regional solidarity and would raise the issue of solidarity at the global 
level. This kind of approach has been clearly expressed in the Charter of Paris, the 
participants of which stated: "Aware of the dire needs of a great part of the world, we 
commit ourselves to solidarity with all other countries ... we stand ready to join with any 
and all states in common efforts to protect and advance the community of fundamental 
human values".14 
This kind of thinking has to be not only reflected among the purposes of all regional 
organizations but also transformed into the practice of their activities. With this in mind 
there is an urgent need to reconsider the relation between universalism and regionalism, 
or at least to specify the limits of their possible compatibility. There should be a limit up 
to which the extension of regionalism is a possible and desirable tendency but beyond 
which it has to be considered as a real danger to the international community. This can 
be done by taking into account political, moral, economic, legal and other realities of the 
changing world, and first of all those novel factors which imperil the very existence of 
mankind. It is evident that in light of those modern threats which do not respect 
boundaries and sovereignty and question the continuance of the human race, the need for 
a world order where global human interests are central is not simply a demand of 
ivory-tower theorists. It should be clear to everyone that civilization has reached a 
stage of development where the morality of survival is the most pressing issue. This 
morality must override national or regional interest and standards. The priority of these 
interests can be secured by strengthening universalism. The notion itself and its 
institutions should receive top priority attention and unrestrained support. 
For the realization of a real universalistic approach it seems necessary to reconsider 
the existing standards and establish new ones of international law; to bestow new 
powers upon universal agencies, and, where needed, to create new institutions. 
13 A very strong accentuation of regional solidarity and interests can be found for example in the preamble 
of many Latin American and Asian regional units. The related documents see, Instruments of economic 
integration in Latin America and in the Caribbean. Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1975, 
vol. I; Basic documents of Asian regional organizations. Ed. by M. HAAS. Vol. VI. Oceana Publications, Dobbs 
Ferry, New York, 1977. 
14 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, 16 November 1990. Section: The CSCE and the world. 
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The reconsideration of at least some of the existing standards should have the aim 
of weakening the traditional claim of states to be the sole judge of their own affairs. 
Today many of the so-called "own affairs" are no longer separable from the 
international ones, that is from the affairs of others. In the era of total interdependence 
where events and situations anywhere concern everybody, the idea about the existence 
of free, independent and equal states is an illusion. Hence those standards which 
support this idea—first of all sovereignty and non-interference into domestic affairs, 
only support this illusion. States are still very reluctant to admit this fact and are not 
ready to accept the idea of the necessity of limiting their sovereignty; they consider the 
principle of non-interference as a protecting shield behind which their freedom of 
action can be justified. 
One has to be aware, of course, that these principles belong to the fundamental 
norms of the inter-state system, that they make up the cornerstones of state actions. 
Hence states consider any suggestions about the modification of the content of these 
principles as a direct attempt to dethrone them from their central position within this 
system. However, in reality, this is not the case; nobody wants to question the 
necessity of the state at the present stage of development. Those who raise these issues 
are simply aware of the disjunction between the established principles and reality. It 
is short-minded to behave as if nothing has happened since Westphalia and treat these 
principles in their original context. Modern societies are facing new problems which 
profoundly affect both national and international life. Economic, social and scientific 
advances make a mockery of the notion of territorial impermeability. Many forms of 
activities carried out at the national level have a direct effect upon other nations. For 
example, such problems as management of natural resources, protection of the 
environment, population policy, introduction of new technologies, at first blush may 
appear as issues belonging exclusively to the domain of domestic affairs. But it is an 
impermissible naivety to think that the handling of these problems has no impact at all 
upon other nations. The wasteful management of natural resources, ruthless destruction 
of the environment in a specific country might adversely affect a neighbouring country, 
or in some cases even a region. Such possible dangers dictate the need to limit the 
freedom of action of states based on sovereignty and non-interference.15 
For the limitation of this freedom it is necessary to institutionalize, in a binding form, 
the notion of solidarity. The requirement for solidarity on the global level is being 
dictated by new situations and problems affecting the whole international community. 
Therefore solidarity has to be treated as a legally binding duty of individual member 
states, and groups of states, to respect the interests of the global international community. 
15 The need for limiting this freedom of action is clearly expressed in the Draft Articles on international 
liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law (1989, Article 6): "The 
sovereign freedom of states to carry out or permit human activities in their territory or in other places under 
there jurisdiction or control must be compatible with the protection of the rights emanating from the sovereignty 
of other states." (See, 1989. UN Doc. A/CN. 47423.) 
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This duty has already received some recognition in existing international instruments. But 
unfortunately this community duty and the underlying requirement of global solidarity 
exists only in the form of a moral obligation.16 This emerging feeling of solidarity in 
the international community should be formulated in the near future in the form of 
precise and operational legal obligations. 
As for new institutions and reforms, on the one hand, there is an urgent need to 
strengthen the existing universal institutions. Due to the changing political and military 
environment, especially in the relations between East and West, there are some hopeful 
signs that states would be more willing to co-operate within the UN framework. They 
are slowly realizing that the international community as such should have the capacity 
to force its individual members in matters of universal concern. In order to avoid, as 
far as possible, direct forcible measures against an "unrully member" it is desirable to 
improve the operation of the international dispute settlement machinery. The wide 
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice is the 
most urgent task in this respect. On the other hand, the existing universal institutions 
cannot cope with some of the arising problems. Thus, for example, for the management 
of the global commons and the practical enforcement of the "common heritage of 
mankind principle,17 the establishment of new universal institutions seems inevitable. 
The same applies to another burning issue, namely the international protection of the 
environment. Without the creation of an international environmental authority and an 
international environmental court18 this problem may run out of control in the very 
near future. 
16 See for example Preamble (sec. 5) of the UN Declaration on Social Progress and Development (1969), 
Article 12 of the Rights of Peoples (Algiers, 1976), Article 27 of the African Charter on Human Rights (1981) 
which mentions also the duty toward the "international community", Article 31 of the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States (1974). 
17 On the notion and practical problems of its enforcement see NAGY, В.: Az emberiség közös örökségének 
elve: kísérlet doktrína építésére (manuscript). 
18 See, Per un tribunale internationale dell'ambiente. Ed. Amedeo POT1GLIONE. Giuffré Editors, Milan, 
1990. 
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Vanda LAMM Universalism vs. Regionalism-
Ad Hoc Chambers of the International 
Court of Justice1 
For centuries there have been various proposals to create some sort of an international 
tribunal for the settlement of disputes between States. Some of the drafts envisioned 
the establishment of special courts to decide particular categories of cases, while 
others—combined with certain federative concepts—articulated the need to form a court 
with general jurisdiction for the most diverse groups of cases.2 
The authors of plans for the latter found it natural for the proposed tribunal to 
introduce some form of internal distribution of work similar to that done in national 
court systems, as they thought or hoped that such a court would deal with very 
different categories of international disputes. However, the method of distribution of 
work within courts was addressed by only a fraction of the proposals, which may be 
explained by the fact that their frames gave little attention to questions relating to the 
daily workings of courts and that most of them confined themselves to outlining the 
main features of the forum they envisioned. The most detailed conception about the 
distribution of work within the proposed international court is perhaps associated with 
the name of Kamarowsky, a one-time professor of Moscow University, who suggested 
in his book that the court should consist of four sections, viz. a Division on 
Diplomacy, a Division on War and Maritime, a Division on Private International Law, 
and a Division on International Social Rights.3 
1 National paper prepared for the 13th Congress on International Comparative Law. 
2 Cf. REVON, M.: L'arbitrage international (Son passé—Son présent—Son avenir), Paris, 1892. pp. 352-368. 
3 See KAMAROWSKY, L.: Le Tribunal International. A., Durand et Pedone-Lauriel, 1887. pp. 50-507. 
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The distribution of work within the future court was also a subject of subsequent 
international negotiations about the establishment of a permanent international tribunal. 
This question was likewise covered by the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes, adopted at the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907, which 
was a landmark in the development of international law, and by the draft relating to 
the organization of a court de justice arbitrale as outlined in the form of voeu at that 
same conference.4 
During the discussion in the Committee of Lawyers, which elaborated the Statute 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1920, plans were presented for the 
establishment of chambers specifically for the distribution of work within the Court.5 
According to the report on the deliberations of the Committee of Lawyers, which was 
prepared by Lapradelle and submitted to the Council of the League of Nations, the 
need was expressed during the discussions to empower the Court, in furtherance of 
international justice, to consider cases in chambers of five judges and also to reduce 
the number of judges from eleven to five in particular cases for the speedy dispatch 
of business and chiefly for reasons of economy.6 Apart from this, however, the report 
virtually rejected the possibility for cases to be determined by chambers of judges, 
claiming that the related proposals would, if adopted, break the unity of the Court and 
that it was accepted only in international arbitration for the parties to increase or to 
decrease, as they wished, the number of judges sitting in a chamber. The report stated 
that, with a view to the speedy dispatch of business, the Court was empowered to 
form, at the request of the parties, "a chamber of three judges" to hear and determine 
cases by summary procedure. However, such procedure would consist only of a written 
part, as was provided for in Art. 30 of the Convention on the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes adopted at the Hague Peace Conference of 1907,7 
Nevertheless, the views in favour of chambers ultimately prevailed and the Statute 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice allowed, in effect, two arrangements 
4 Cf. draft articles 6 and 18. Deuxième Conference de la Paix. Actes et documents. La Haye, Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1908. Vol. I. pp. 703-705. 
5 See Baron Descamps'relevant proposai "Pour l'expédition des affaires, le Tribunal permanent de justice 
international se répartira conformément à un réglement d'ordre intérieur, dans les offices suivants: 
1. une primère Chambre dite des vacations ordinaires de cinq juges effectifs avec trois suppléants; 
2. une seconde Chambre dite des procédures sommaires composée de trois juges et de deux suppléants et 
à laquelle pourra être déférée en outre les parties estiméront qu'une jurisdiction de trois juges est suffisante; 
3. un juge unique avec un suppléant, compétent pour les cas ou les parties, à raison de la nature de 
l'affaire, estiméront pouvoir lui soumettre de préférence leurs litiges". Cour Permanente de Justice 
Internationale, Comité Consultatif de Juristes. Procès-Verbaux des Séances du Comité, La Haye, 1920. p. 49. 
Loder of the Netherlands argued for the formation of chambers by saying: "Une Cour composée d'un nombre 
restreint de juges travaille mieux qu'un tribunal nombreux; les discussions sont plus serrées et les membres ont 
un sentiment plus net de leur responsabilité", Ibid. p. 172. 
6 Ibid. p. 719. 
7 Ibid. 
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for the distribution of work in the form of chambers.8 On the one hand, by virtue of 
Arts. 26 and 27 of the Statute, the Court may, at the request of the parties, appoint one 
or more special chambers, composed of five judges, and to be elected three years, for 
dealing with particular categories of cases, such as cases relating to transit and 
communications and labour cases.9 On the other hand, the Court had to form annual-
ly—and this was the second arrangement under Art. 29 of the Statute,—a so-called 
chamber of summary procedure, composed of three judges, for considering any 
category of disputes.10 For that matter, in the composition of the chambers it should 
be remembered that Art. 9 of the Statute states that the whole body should represent 
the main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of the world. This 
provision was obviously included in the Statute in order to meet the concerns expressed 
by the Committee of Lawyers in 1920 that the decisions in chambers would break the 
unity of the Court. 
During the more than two decades of existence of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, the provisions of the Statute concerning the chambers remained 
a dead letter for the most part because, although chambers of summary procedure were 
regularly appointed, summary procedure was applied only to a single case involving 
a dispute between Bulgaria and Turkey about the Peace Treaty of Neuilly in the 1920s 
and the interpretation of the judgement given by the Court." 
After World War Two the provisions of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice relating to chambers were doubtless influenced by the basically negative 
"experience" of the Permanent Court of International Justice in this respect. It is not 
an accident that the discussions about the provisions concerning chambers within the 
Court were rather short and, as mentioned by Shabtai Rosenne, the rapporteur of the 
item declared that the provisions on chambers were superfluous. Nevertheless, the 
participants in the discussions found it necessary to empower the Court to form, as it 
may deem fit, chambers for dealing with particular categories of cases or to form, at 
8 Cf. HUDSON, M.: The Permanent Court of International Justice 1920-1942. Arno Press, New York, 1972. 
pp. 345-348. 
9 Under the pertinent rules, two deputy judges had to be elected to these chambers and four technical 
assessors had to be appointed, without the right to vote, in those for labour cases. After 1922, chambers for 
labour cases and cases relating to transit and communications were appointed regularly, but no case was brought 
before them. 
10 In 1936 the number of judges to be elected to chambers of summary procedure was increased to five, 
thereby opening a possibility for the parties to appoint judges ad hoc, as it was thought that States had to 
recourse to chambers of summary procedure because they were not entitled to choose ad hoc judges. Cf. 
GUYOMAR, G.: Commentaire du Réglement de la Cour Internationale de Justice. Paris, Editions A. Pedone, 
1973. p. 98; and HUDSON: op. cit., p. 317. 
11 It should be noted that the possibility was also suggested for the case of Serb loans (1928) to be 
determined by a chamber of summary procedure, but the relevant plan was rejected by the Serb Government 
pleading the importance of the case. Cf. HUDSON: op. cit., p. 347. 
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the request of the parties, a special chamber to decide a particular dispute.12 For that 
matter, during the negotiations drafting the Statute, the idea arose of establishing 
regional chambers within the Court, but this was not accepted.13 Finally, with regard 
to the question of chambers, it was decided that the new Statute retained, with some 
minor modifications, the provisions of the old Statute on special chambers, but it 
introduced the institution of ad hoc chambers, empowering the Court to form, at the 
request of the parties, such chambers for dealing with particular cases. Against this 
background, the Court may, under the new Statute, constitute essentially three types 
of chambers.14 
(a) Article 26 also makes mention of special chambers but, unlike the earlier 
provisions, it leaves it to the Court to appoint them, the new Statute failing to specify 
various categories of special chambers and enumerating certain cases like labour cases 
and cases relating to transit and communications. Furthermore, the Statute does not 
determine the number of judges sitting in chambers, but states only that chambers may 
be composed of three or more judges. Such chambers have not yet been appointed by 
the Court. 
(b) As has been mentioned earlier, so-called ad hoc chambers, to which the Statute 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice made no reference, may also be formed 
under the new Statute. In this regard, Art. 26, para. 2 provides that "the Court may at 
any time form a chamber for dealing with a particular case. The number of judges to 
constitute such a chamber shall be determined by the Court with the approval of the 
parties". 
(c) Lastly, mention may be made of chambers of summary procedure as the third 
type provided for in Art. 29 of the new Statute reading: "With a view to the speedy 
dispatch of business, the Court shall form annually a chamber composed of five judges 
which, at the request of the parties, may hear and determine cases by summary 
procedure". 
The provisions of the new Statute on chambers reveal two more differences of 
importance from the relevant provisions of the Statute of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice. Art. 27 of the new Statute states in a separate provision that "a 
judgement given by any of the chambers provided for in Articles 26 and 29 shall be 
considered as rendered by the Court". This sentence is construed by the American 
Stephen M. Schwebel as being meant to make it clear that judgements delivered by a 
chamber cannot be appealed before the full court.15 Another difference between the 
two Statutes lies in Art. 9 of the new Statute stating that "At every election the electors 
12 Cf. SHABTAI, R.: The Law and Practice of the International Court. A. W. Sijthoff, Leyden, 1965, p. 201. 
13 Cf. GUYOMAR: Op. cit., p. 102. 
14 Cf. OSTRIHANSKY, R.: Chambers of the International Court of Justice, in: International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, 1988. pp. 31-36. 
15 See SCHWEBEL, S. M.: Ad Hoc Chambers of the International Court of Justice, in: American Journal 
of International Law, 1987. p. 833. 
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shall bear in mind ... that in the body as a whole the representation of the main forms 
of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world should be assured". 
During the two decades or so following the establishment of the International Court 
of Justice the question of distribution of work within the Court was not raised, to our 
knowledge, in relation either to some kind of specialization of judges or to reduction 
of their workload, for the Court annually took up as little as two or three contentious 
cases or requests for advisory opinions, which presented no real problem for the 
members of the Court to cope with. In point of fact the whole matter did not return to 
prominence until the late 1960s and the early 1970s, and even then the underlying 
reason was not any overload of work, but precisely the opposite as the Court was 
hardly seized of any case at the time, and in professional circles there was much talk 
about ways and means to increase the role of the International Court of Justice in the 
peaceful settlement of disputes and, first and foremost, to pull the Court out of its 
crisis. "Revival" of the chambers was seen by many as a possible way out of the crisis 
of those years. One of the pertinent proposals was put forward by Sir Robert Jennings 
at an international conference held at Heidelberg on judicial settlement of international 
disputes. The prominent British jurist was of the view that some system of chambers 
of the International Court of Justice should deal with lesser cases of first instance and 
that their judgement would be reviewed by the full Court. As is stated by Jennings 
himself, this arrangement is based on the machinery of the Human Rights Committee 
and the European Court of Human Rights, the substance of which lies in a process of 
conciliation, investigation and amicable suggestion, with a possibility of appeal to the 
Court upon points of law, not abstract, but related to the dispute in hand.16 Jenning's 
proposal found no echo, however, most probably because in interstate relations it is 
rather difficult to decide which matter is of importance or of lesser importance. 
Moreover, under the European system of human rights protection, it appears fully 
justifiable for the Committee to act as a forum of first instance, since that institution 
serves as a sort of "filter" before cases can be referred to the European Court of 
Human Rights. However, in the case of the International Court of Justice, there is no 
real need for such a preliminary filter, chiefly because the Court is not open to 
individuals. Otherwise there exists, in respect to the International Court of Justice as 
well, an institution acting as a filter just mentioned, and that function is performed by 
the Committee on Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgements with 
regard to certain categories of advisory opinions. Under Art. 11 of the Tribunal's 
Statute, a Member State, the Secretary-General or the person in respect of whom a 
judgement has been rendered by the Tribunal objects to the judgement on different 
grounds, may apply to the Committee asking to request an advisory opinion in the 
matter, and the Committee shall, within 30 days from receipt of the application, decide 
whether there is a substantial basis for such a request. 
16 See Judicial Settlement of International Disputes. Herausgegeben von Hermann Moslei—Rudolf Bernhardt, 
Berlin—Heidelbei—New York, Springer Verlag, 1974. p. 38. 
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Now, back to the "crisis" in which the administration of international justice had 
found itself by the early 1970s, there were many who saw a way out in making 
recourse to proceedings in chambers somehow "more attractive" for States. Ph. C. 
Jessup, a renowned American jurist in international law, who served on the Interna-
tional Court of Justice between 1961 and 1970, wrote "that recourse to ad hoc 
chambers would prove more attractive to potential litigants if the election of their 
members, were to be based on a consensus between the Court and the parties".17 
In revising its Rules in the early 1970s the International Court of Justice was 
mindful of this idea along with many other reflections and had regard to them in 
amending the Rules of the Court on the elections to chambers.18 
The substance of the amendments adopted in 1972 is that whereas under the 
previous Rules the parties had a voice only in determining the number of judges sitting 
in chambers, it being determined by the Court with the approval of the parties, the new 
Rules require the President of the Court to ascertain the views of the parties regarding 
the composition of chambers as well.19 
The new Rules of the Court elaborated in 1978 retained these provisions in essence 
and, under Art. 17, para. 2 the President of the Court "shall ascertain the views" of the 
parties "regarding the composition of the Chamber, and shall report to the Court 
accordingly". This, however, raises the question of what is to be meant by all the more 
so since, under Art. 26, para. 2 of the Statute, "the number of judges to constitute such 
a chamber shall be determined by the Court with the approval of the parties". 
Without going now into the related question of interpretation, of which more will 
be said later in this discussion, the amendments to the Rules of the Court have clearly 
increased the influence of States on the composition of chambers. In connection with 
the new Rules, Judge Petrén, a former member of the Court, noted at the time that 
"should the Court elect other judges than those suggested by the parties the latter could 
be expected to withdraw the dispute from the Court and set up an arbitral tribunal of 
their own as already happens in so many cases".20 
Despite the fact that, according to Hambro, the new rule on the election of 
members of chambers did not meet with the unanimous approval of the Court,21 the 
amendments to the Rules of Court referred to above received a favourable response 
both in literature and in Resolution 3232/XXIX adopted by the United Nations General 
17 Cf. JINÉMEZ DE ARÉCHAGE, E .: The Amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the International Court 
of Justice, in: American Journal of International Law, 1973. p. 2. 
18 See ibid., pp. 1-22; and GUYOMAR: Op. cit., pp. 101-103. 
19 Cf. Art. 17, para. 2 of the Rules of Procedure. 
20 PETRÉN, В. A. S.: Some Thoughts on the Future of the International Court of Justice, in: Netherland 
Yearbook of International Law, 1975. p. 64. 
21 Cf. HAMBRO, E.: Will the Revised Rules of Court Lead to Creater Willingness on the Part of Prospective 
Clients? In: The Future of the International Court of Justice, ed. by Leo Gross, Oceana Publications, Inc., New 
York, Dobbs. Ferry, 1984. p. 369. 
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Assembly on 22 November 1974 they were viewed as serving to facilitate recourse by 
States to chambers.22 
Of course, there were also less enthusiastic reactions to the amendments, many 
fearing again for the unity of the Court said that "Revitalizing the Court through the 
use of Chambers ad hoc composed in conformity with the wishes of the parties could, 
of course, be considered as a step backwards towards an older type of international 
adjudication of disputes implying viz. the setting up of arbitral tribunals for particular 
cases within the framework of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the wishes of the 
parties as to the composition of the tribunal being paramount".23 No doubt there is 
some truth to these observations in a certain aspect, but we must agree with Rosenne's 
apt remark that, as it is sometimes put, the Chambers are a bridge between the full 
Court and arbitration, they are on the Court end of the bridge.24 
As regards the practical application of the provisions on the formation of chambers, 
the related questions came into focus in the early 1980s, when it became known that 
after more than half a century two States, the United States and Canada, had agreed 
to submit their dispute on the delimitation of the maritime boundary in the Gulf of 
Maine area to a chamber composed of members of the International Court of Justice. 
The agreement was unanimously welcomed by experts, but enthusiasm about its 
implementation and the effect of the case on the future of the Court was far from 
shared by all. 
At any rate, recourse to chambers became popular soon after the Gulf of Maine 
case, and in September 1983, shortly after the American-Canadian agreement, a 
compromise was reached by two developing countries, Burkina Faso and Mali, on 
bringing their rather acrimonious land frontier dispute before a chamber composed of 
members of the Court.25 Shortly afterwards, the United States and Italy agreed to 
submit their dispute concerning the company Elettronica Sicula S. p. A. to a chamber 
and later, on 21 May 1986, El Salvador and Honduras signed a compromise on 
applying to a chamber composed of members of the International Court of Justice for 
the settlement of a land and maritime boundary dispute between them. 
As concerns more particularly the Gulf of Maine case, the problem was caused by 
the fact that the Treaty on the Gulf of Maine boundary dispute settlement signed by 
the parties on 29 March 1979 and communicated to the International Court of Justice 
on 25 November 1981 had stipulated not only that a chamber of five judges should be 
22 See, e.g., the opinion of Dupuy, who emphasizes, among others, the flexibility of the new rules. DUPUY, 
R. J.: La réforme du Réglement de la Cour Internationale de Justice, in: Annuaire Français de Droit 
Internationa], 1972. p. 274. 
23 Cf. PETRÉN: Op. cit., p. 64. 
24 SHABTAI, R.: The Role of the International Court of Justice in Inter-State Relations Today, in: Revue 
Belge de Droit International, 1987. p. 280. 
25 This compromise is given added value by the fact that Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta) and Mali had 
not ben involved previously in any dispute before the Court. 
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formed on the basis of consultations with the parties and in accordance with Art. 26, 
para. 2 and Art. 31 of the Statute, but also that either party might denounce the 
compromise if the chamber had not been formed within six months from the entry into 
force to the compromise. Parallel to the compromise, the parties signed another 
document providing that if a chamber composed of members of the International Court 
of Justice was not formed within the set time limit and in the manner stipulated by the 
parties, the two States should submit the dispute to an arbitral tribunal to be set up by 
them. The parties exercised a great measure of care in agreeing upon the compromise 
and even covered an eventual vacancy in the chamber, thereby trying to secure their 
influence in the election of the new member as well. In addition, in November 1991, 
the two States sent a letter to the Court emphasizing the need for the chamber to be 
formed prior the next election of the judges of the International Court of Justice, which 
was scheduled to take place on 6 February 1982. 
The view that the United States and Canada tried to take all necessary precautions 
against the Court appointing a chamber of a composition not to their satisfaction and, 
in case it should still happen, left the possibility open to withdraw the case from the 
Court can be said to be prevalent in literature on the compromise concerning the Gulf 
of Maine case.26 
Considering that, on the one hand, the Court was requested, for the first time in 
more than six decades, to sit in a chamber in the Gulf of Maine case and, on the other, 
the new Rules governing the formation of ad hoc chambers were applied for the first 
time in that period, one should not be surprised that a great storm broke forth around 
the appointment of the members of the chamber which was to deal with the case. There 
is no doubt that the storm was attributable to the fact that the provisions of both the 
Statute and the Rules of Court relating to the formation of chambers are rather 
ambiguous. However, an added source of problems was the endeavour, already 
mentioned, of the United States and Canada to secure, for reasons easy to understand, 
their own influence in the formation of the chamber. 
The passage in Art. 26, para. 2 of the Statute reading: "The number of judges to 
constitute such a chamber shall be determined by the Court with the approval of the 
parties" is susceptible of different interpretations. According to one version, the cited 
provision "does not in terms debar consultation by the Court with the parties as to 
which judges shall form the Chamber, and that there is no necessary implication of any 
such preclusion".27 Stephen Gorove asserts that the word "assertainment" does not 
imply anything more than a determination of the preferences of the parties concerning 
the composition of the chamber.28 In connection with the ad hoc chambers Judge Oda 
26 Cf. ZOLLER, E.: La constitution d'une chambre spéciale par la Cour Internationale de Justice, in: Revue 
Générale de Droit International Public, 1982. p. 311. 
27 Cf. SCHWEBEL: Op. cit., p. 852. 
28 See GOROVE, S.: Formation of Internal Subdivisions of International Tribunals—Some Comparative 
Highlights and Assessment, in: American Journal of Comparaitve Law, 1990. p. 357. 
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writes: "I myself cannot believe that anything other than the views of the parties can 
reasonably be taken into account by the Court in composing the Chamber".29 
Professor Gorove maintains that preferences may relate to the nationality or legal 
training or any other characteristic, without concrete names being mentioned.30 It 
should be noted that we do not find this reasoning to be very convincing, since 
insistence on such preferences almost always implies an allusion to a particular person. 
In connection with the compromise concerning the delimitation of the maritime 
boundary in the Gulf of Maine case and with the President of the Court's consultation 
with the parties about the composition of the chamber some members of the Court 
raised the problem whether this procedure was, as a whole, consistent with the Court's 
Statute and Rules. Working as it did under external and internal pressures, the 
International Court of Justice finally sent a letter to the parties in this matter. The reply 
and explanation given by the two parties apparently satisfied the Court and, by its 
decision of 20 January 1982, it formed a chamber of five members, the composition 
of which was fully in accordance with the wishes of the parties previously 
expressed.31 At the time Judges El-Khani of Syria and Morozov of the Soviet Union 
strongly disagreed with the content of the Court's decision. In his dissenting opinion 
attached to the decision, Morozov stated "... en substance le compromis entre les 
Etats-Unis d'Amérique et le Canada parait manifestement de l'idée erronée que, malgré 
les dispositions de l'article 26 paragraphe 2, du Statut, les Parties qui demandent la 
constitution d'une chambre chargés de connaître d'une affaire déterminée pouvaient 
non seulement décider du nombre des membres de la chambre, mais encore choisir et 
indiquer formellement les noms des juges à élire au scrutin secret, et même faire ces 
propositions à la Cour en leur donnant la forme d'une sorte d'ultimatum".32 
The composition of chambers apparently did not stir up so great a storm in the 
cases brought before the Court subsequently. 
In the Mali vs. Burkina Faso case, the compromise presented to the Court in 1983 
did not indicate the number of judges to sit in the chamber and, although the parties 
did not put, to our knowledge, any particular pressure on the Court, the composition 
of the chamber met their wishes.33 This time, however, all members of the Court 
agreed with the composition of the chamber. In the dispute between the United States 
and Italy concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. Washington started the proceedings 
under the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation signed between the two 
29 See ODA, S.: Further Thoughts on the Chambers Procedure of the International Court of Justice, in: 
American Journal of International Law, 1988. p. 553. 
30 Cf. GOROVE: Op. cit., p. 357. 
31 Sitting in the chamber for the Gulf of Maine case were Judges Ago, Gros, Mosler and Schwebel as well 
as judge ad hoc Cohen. 
32 See ICJ Reports, 1982. p. 11. 
33 This case was considered by a chamber of the following composition: Judges Ruda, Bedjaoui and Lachs 
as well as judges ad hoc Luchaire and Abi-Saab. 
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countries on 2 February 1948. After the submission of the application, in March 1987, 
the American Administration suggested to Italy that the Court should consider the case 
in a chamber. Italy agreed and, after the President of the Court had consulted with the 
parties, the chamber was formed with a composition conforming fully to the wishes of 
the parties.34 After El Salvador and Honduras had submitted their dispute to the Court 
on 11 December 1986, the two States sent a joint letter to the Court informing it of the 
desired composition of the chamber, namely they proposed three judges by name and 
reserved two seats for judges ad hoc to be appointed by them at a later date. The 
chamber was formed accordingly.35 
In connection with the cases decided in chambers to date, the point may perhaps 
be raised that it would not have been out of place for the Court to make some inquiry 
into the degree of influence the parties might exert on the Court in determining the 
composition of the chamber and to see whether the extent of the parties' involvement 
in some cases was acceptable at all. However, this aspect was disregarded by the Court 
and this high judicial forum was, as it had been in many other cases, very wise not to 
harp on apparently delicate issues such as these. In point of fact, had the Court refused 
the parties' wishes e.g. in the Gulf of Maine case, in the formation of chambers, which 
was excessive according to some views, such action would only have served to 
discourage States from having recourse to chambers and would doubtless have been 
conducive to the withdrawal of cases from the Court. This was alluded to also by 
Hambro in his article published in 1974, saying: "It would need very strong reasons 
indeed to set aside the formally expressed wish of the parties. If it should happen that 
wish is ignored the whole purpose of the procedure would fail".36 
For that matter, the attitude of the United States and Canada to the formation of 
the chamber can be justified by the fact that these two States virtually broke new 
ground by reviving, after more than half a century, proceedings before a chamber and, 
what is more, a variant thereof to which no guide is to be found in the practice of the 
two Courts. As is well known, ad hoc chambers of this type did not exist at the time 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice, and the only case, the one concerning 
the Peace Treaty of Neuilly, considered by a chamber between the two World Wars 
was determined by one of summary procedure, the formation of which was governed 
by rules different from those applicable to the appointment of ad hoc chambers. As the 
consistency of the procedure followed in determining the composition of ad hoc 
chambers with the Court's Statute and Rules has been much discussed in literature,37 
34 The judges originally elected to this chamber were Nagendra Singh, Oda, Ago, Schwebel and Jennings. 
Upon the death of President Nagendra Singh in December 1988, Judge Ruda was elected to the chamber after 
consultations with the parties. 
35 This chamber included, among the members of the International Court, Judges Sette-Camara, Oda and 
Jennings, with Valticos and Viral]y acting as Judges ad hoc. 
36 Cf. HAMBRO: Op. cit., p. 369. 
37 For more detail, see ZOLLER: Op. cit., pp. 312-322; and SCHWEBEL: Op. cit., pp. 813-818. 
Universalism vs. Regionalism 79 
we shall not dwell on it now. Much more interesting is the question concerning the 
effect which proceedings in ad hoc chambers have on the entire workings of the Court 
and, first and foremost, the extent to which they serve to enhance the cause of peaceful 
settlement of dispute. 
The formation of various chambers within an international judicial forum of a 
universal character was regarded by the Committee of Lawyers in 1920 as tending to 
jeopardize the unity of the Court. Such reservations were expressed about ad hoc 
chambers later on. It was widely held that the workings of these chambers would cause 
the International Court of Justice to fall into regional chambers sooner or later.38 The 
chief argument of the opponents of ad hoc chambers was that these operated to break 
the universality of the Court, for every State or group of States sought to form 
chambers of a composition likely to deliver judgements acceptable to them, and such 
judgements were most likely to be given by judges of friendly nations or of States with 
a similar political and economic system. The current practice under which judges of 
countries belonging to other political and economic groups have been conspicuously 
absent in the consideration of disputes between States of the same political and 
economic groupings is, in effect, related to this claim, which is borne out by the 
composition of the chambers established so far: in disputes between developed 
countries, viz. the American-Canadian border dispute in the Gulf of Maine and the 
American-Italian dispute concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A., the chambers were 
composed of judges of developed countries with only one expection. Accordingly, the 
case concerning the delimitation in the Gulf of Maine was decided by Italian, 
American, Canadian, French and West German judges39 whereas the case involving 
Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. was submitted to a chamber composed of American, Indian, 
Japanese, Italian and British judges. As can be seen, among the judges sitting in these 
two chambers, the Indian judge was the only non-national of a developed country. The 
border dispute between El Salvador and Honduras showed a wider dispersion as the 
chamber dealing with the case was composed of Brazilian, Japanese, British, Greek and 
French judges. In the formation of the chamber deciding the conflict between two 
African countries, Burkina Faso and Mali, preference was given mainly to experts from 
developing countries and, according to the wish of the parties, the chamber was 
composed of Argentine, Algerian and Polish judges as well as a French judge and a 
judge of Egyptian origin living in Switzerland, who acted as judges ad hoc. Thus no 
trend of regionalism in the classical sense of the term was present in any way in the 
formation of these four chambers and one may speak of chambers composed of judges 
from States belonging to some sort of a similar political and economic grouping rather 
38 Cf. GREEN, L. С.: Is There a Universal International Law? In: The Canadian Yearbook of International 
Law, 1985. p. 27. 
39 Originally elected to the chamber for the Gulf of Maine case were Judges Gros, Mosler, Ago and 
Schwebel, with Judge Ruda acting as President. Later, however, President Ruda yielded his seat to Judge ad 
hoc Cohen of Canada. 
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than of the emergence of regional chambers. More specifically, most members of ad 
hoc chambers made up of judges of the International Court of Justice were nationals 
of States belonging to the same political and economic grouping within the interna-
tional community to which the parties to the disputes also belonged.40 Expressly or 
by implication, what is lurking behind this practice is ultimately the fact that States 
sought to form chambers in which they had no reason to suppose bias or eventual 
enmity on the part of judges sitting therein. 
Writings on the workings of the International Court of Justice have often discussed 
the measure of impartiality or partiality displayed by members of the Court in practice, 
and some of them venture to state that, indeed, the views of members of the Court in 
reaching a decision were greatly influenced in some cases by the political and 
economic grouping to which the States of which they were nationals belonged.41 
Since a study of similar assertions, either confirming or refuting their truth, goes far 
beyond the scope of this discussion, we confine ourselves to pointing out that in 
practice States take great pains to ponder and weigh in the balance the chances of a 
judgement they can expect to be given by each member of the Court and the reason 
why more disputes than one were not brought to the International Court of Justice is 
to be seen undoubtedly in the fact that some States had had no great confidence in the 
impartiality of some members of the Court. It is to be noted that there is no real 
ground for proving such "fears" and that, as is stressed by the author of an excellent 
work analyzing the voting practice of members of the Court, the votes cast by 
members of the Court cannot really be said to show, on the whole, any particular 
measure of political or economic commitment and the majority of judgements reflected 
a high degree of consensus. According to that author, the most that can be stated is that 
in certain periods some judges cast similar votes more often than others, but in fact 
there can be detected no constant pattern of commitment in voting which would have 
exerted substantial influence on the judgements of the Court.42 
Returning to the problem concerning the possibility of the International Court of 
Justice falling into chambers composed of judges belonging to a certain similar 
political and economic grouping of States, one cannot apparently claim that this danger 
really exists. The reasons are several: 
Along with ad hoc chambers, the Court sits as a full court and, as is shown 
precisely by practice in the most recent period, among the cases currently before the 
40 Interestingly, this same phenomenon can be noticed in a case before an arbitral tribunal in the second part 
of the 1960s, namely the Beagle Channel dispute between Argentine and Chile, which is often referred to in 
connection with ad hoc chambers composed of members of the Internationa] Court of Justice. Cf. HAMBRO: 
Op. cit., p. 367. 
41 Cf. U. S. Terminates Acceptance of ICJ Compulsory Jurisdiction, in: Department of State Bulledn, January 
1986. pp. 69-71. 
42 Cf. BROWN WEISS, E.: Judicial Independence and Impartiality: A Preliminary Inquiry, in: The 
International Court at a Crossroad. Ed. by Lori F. Damrosch: Transnational Publishers, Inc., New York, Dobbs 
Ferry, 1987. p. 134. 
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Court, only one, the border dispute between El Salvador and Honduras, is being 
considered by a chamber, while the rest continue to be dealt with in a full court. The 
overstatement of the danger of the Court breaking into chambers is shown most clearly 
by the fact that since the first initiative for proceedings before an ad hoc chamber, 
namely the compromise in the Gulf of Maine case, States have requested the Court, 
in the majority of cases, to decide disputes in a full court and that only a small part 
of the disputes submitted to the Court are determined by ad hoc chambers. 
Another reason why one cannot speak of the Court falling into chambers composed 
of judges of States with some similar political and economic systems is that there is 
no question of stable chambers emerging within the Court and that each of the four 
chambers formed so far had a different composition. The four cases determined by 
chambers to date have been considered by a total of 11 judges from among the 
members of the Court.43 Of the 11 judges, six were elected to one chamber each, 
whereas 5 judges in all (Judge Ruda of the Argentine, Judge Oda of Japan, Judge 
Schwebel of the United States, Sir Robert Jennings of Britain, and Judge Ago of Italy) 
sat in two chambers. 
On the basis of the foregoing we, for our part, are of the view that what presents 
a danger to the universality of the Court is in effect not consideration of a particular 
case by a chamber of a composition desired by the parties, but formation of such 
chambers always by States belonging to certain political and economic groupings, with 
other groups of States staying clear of the Court, for, in the light of existing experience 
concerning the composition of chambers, the litigants have usually preferred judges of 
States belonging to the same political and economic grouping as they do and it must 
therefore be admitted that certain members of the Court might easily happen not to be 
elected to any chamber: States of the same political and economic grouping will not 
resort to the Court, while those that do will but choose "by way of demonstration" an 
"outsider", a judge from a State external to the given grouping. As early as the 1970s, 
in dealing with eventual objections Edvard Hambro adverted in effect to related 
problems by stating that there might arise a situation in which the International Court 
would break into two categories of judges, those who will often be asked to participate 
in such chambers and the others. Hambro sees no problem by this happening, which 
he says is quite the same as the practice under which some members of the Court are 
more often elected than others to be members of the drafting committee set up to 
formulate judgments or advisory opinions.44 
It would challenge this contention of Edvard Hambro by noting that these are 
aspects far from equal in importance, for if a member of the Court is not elected to the 
chamber wording the judgement or advisory opinion he nevertheless participates in 
43 Participating in the work of the four chambers were a total of 15 judges, but four of them acted as judges 
ad hoc, who are not members of the International Court of Justices, so they may be ignored in calculating the 
number of judges involved. 
44 HAMBRO: Op. cit , p. 369. 
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hearing the given case, votes on a decision and, if his opinion on a particular question 
differs from that stated in the Court's decision, may express his dissent in a 
separate—individual or dissenting—opinion attached to the decision or advisory opinion. 
By contrast, a judge not elected to the chamber is completely excluded from the 
consideration of the given dispute, no one is interested in his opinion, and the most he 
can do is formulate and publish his thoughts on the case in a scientific essay. 
Such "exclusion" from the work of chambers threatens in the first place judges of 
States, such as those in the region of Eastern-Central Europe, which have not yet 
applied to chambers composed of members of the world court. There is no doubt that 
the relationship of these States to the Court, and not only to chambers, was character-
ized by a certain kind of duality as, the International Court of Justice the principal 
judicial body, of the United Nations, judges of the states of that region are present in 
it, just as in other institutions of the United Nations, and some of them have taken a 
very active part in formulating judgements passed by the Court sitting as a full court 
as well as in giving advisory opinions. At the same time, however, these States were 
rather assiduous in avoiding the Court over the past decades and, until very recently, 
none of them made a declaration of submission to the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
world court, while the same States tried to prevent their disputes from being considered 
by the Court by making reservations to that effect in a whole range of treaties signed 
during the past 10 years. Recent years have undoubtedly seen significant changes in 
this field. In the past few years, most of the Eastern-Central European States, including 
Hungary, have revoked their reservations concerning the jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in declarations of acceptance of treaties and conventions, and, 
on 21 September 1990, Poland and on 1 August 1992, Hungary even made declarations 
of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. However, these develop-
ments do not alter the fact that the States of Eastern-Central Europe as litigants had 
no recourse to the Court down to the present. It is nevertheless to be feared that if 
these States maintain their previous attitude to the Court, they may in light of what has 
been stated before, be excluded from the work of the Court not only as litigants, but 
also as judges passing decisions on some of the cases brought before the Court. 
Akadémiai Kiadó, 
Budapest 
KALEIDOSCOPE 
Struggle for Democracy During 
the Weimar Republic 
(in Memory of Prof. J. V. Bredt of Marburg) 
1. Towards the end of the 1920s German domestic policy was moving deeper and deeper 
into troubled waters. The Parliament was faced with a crisis. Constant internal friction 
presented chancellor Hermann Müller's government with increasing difficulties of its 
ability to function. In regard to this, Hermann Müller (1876-1931) was Chairman of the 
Social Democratic Party and in 1919 served as Foreign Minister of the Reich. There were 
cries for a strong man from both the left and the right. At this time, however, Hitler still 
played no significant role. 
Owing to the Government's inaptitude, the Parliament's right of decision was vested 
mostly in the Reich President. The question arose concerning the structure of the Weimar 
Constitution's ability to measure up to the challenge of the time. The crisis was sparked 
off by an increase in taxes from 3.5 % to 4 % for unemployment insurance. Müller 
become weary of the Sisyphean task, was let down even by his own parliamentary 
faction, and therefore resigned his post on 27 March 1930. Then Heinrich Brünig 
(1885-1970), who serves as Chancellor from 31 March 1930 to 31 May 1932, was asked 
to form a government He established a "presidential cabinet", which was joined by all 
Social Democratic ministers of the previous Müller Cabinet. The new ministers included 
Victor Bredt (1879-1940) as Minister of Justice, Gottfried Treviranus (1871-1971) as 
Minister of the Rhineland under occupation, and Martin Schiele (1870-1939) as Minister 
of Public Welfare. The Brüning Cabinet issued emergency decrees whereby the Reich 
President was authorized by Art. 48 of the Weimar Constitution to give the force of law, 
but which the Reichstag had powers to reject. Such an incident occurred in July 1930 
when the Reichstag overruled one of the emergency decrees which had been put into 
force by the Reich President. After a lapse of 8 days the emergency decree was, with 
some modifications, again taken up by the Reichstag. The Social Democratic faction 
voted with the German National Party and the Communists, whereupon the Reichstag was 
84 Kaleidoscope 
dissolved. The new Reichstag elections were set for 14 September 1930. Included in the 
results of the elections, the number of National Socialist representatives jumped from 12 
to 114, the Communist representatives also grew in number, but votes were lost by the 
German Nationalists. At the first sitting of the Reichstag Brüning emphasized his 
intention to continue the Government's work along the previous lines, then the Reichstag 
adjourned its sessions for 4 months. 
In the spring of 1931 the government wanted to improve the economic situation by 
entering into a customs union with Austria France was opposed to the plan. The question 
was brought before the Permanent Court of International Justice, which ruled, by a vote 
of 8 to 7, that the customs union was incompatible with the existing treaties. Thereupon 
Foreign Minister Julius Curtius (1877-1948), who had succeeded Stresemann in that post, 
tendered his resignation. Early in October Brüning formed a new government, in which 
Interior Minister Joseph Wirth (1879-1956), a politician of the Centre Party, accepted no 
portfolio. The office of interior minister was taken over by Defence Minister Wilhelm 
Greener (1867-1939), who retained his existing post as well. 
From autumn of 1931 the political struggles came increasingly sharper, with heated 
debates revolving particularly around Hindenburg's reelection. Reelected after all, 
Hindenburg wanted Briining's Government to shift rightwards, but the latter refused to 
do so and resigned on 31 May 1932. He emigrated to the United States in 1934. One 
year earlier, former Interior Minister Wirth left for Switzerland, and J. V. Bredt returned 
to his university department at Marburg. 
All these developments are treated at greater length in J. Broermann: Als Presse-Chef 
bei Reichsminister Gröener (Der Staat, Nr. 2 of 1983, pp. 281-241). 
2. My job enabled me to take part in the winter semester of 1936, where I attended 
Prof. Bredt's lectures. During this time I was accompanied by Prof. Béla Kun Szentpéteri 
of Debrecen, who disseminated and highly appreciated Prof. Bredt's works. First I would 
like to note of few biographical facts about Prof. Bredt's life and works as are recorded 
in Reichshandbuch der Deutschen Gesellschaft, Vol. I (Berlin, 1930. p. 209), which was 
sent to me in a letter of 9 October 1989 by Prof. Werner Frotscher, latter-day successor 
to Prof. Bredt at Marburg University. 
J. V. Bredt was bom in Barmen on 2 March 1879. Between 1897 and 1898 he 
worked for Barmer Bankverein, then studied law and economics at Tübingen, Göttingen 
and Bonn Universities, and received his degree from the Faculty of Law in 1901. In 1903 
he was a junior clerk of public administration at Koblenz and in 1904 he became a doctor 
of philosophy. He took a state examination in public administration at Marburg, where 
he also qualified as a docent in 1909. In 1911 he left the domain of public administraüon 
and become an associate professor at Marburg University. During the World War he was 
lieutenant of the second infantry guards regiment and was severely wounded. From 1918 
he was professor at the Faculty of Law and Political Science of Marburg University. In 
addition, he held various public posts, secular as well as ecclesiastical. In 1924 he 
became a Reichstag member and during the period from 1924 to 1933 he serves as 
Chairman of the Wirtschaftspartei. As noted earlier, in March 1930 he accepted the post 
of Minister of Justice in the Brüning Government. 
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His scientific activities embraced economics, canon law and political law. His major 
works include Die Trennung von Kirche und Staat (1919), Die Rechte des Summus 
Episcopus (1919), Neues evangelisches Kirchenrecht ßr Preussen (two volumes, 
1921/22), Der Geist der deutschen Reichsverfassung (1924). He published a book on the 
constitutions of the Calvinist Church in Rhine-Westphalia, which is a unique collection 
of documents. The Faculty of Divinity of Bonn University conferred on him the title of 
Dr. theol. h. c. in 1925. He died on 1 December 1940. 
Bredt quotes the following phrase from Calvin's Institutes which serves as a motto 
of his work Der Geist der deutschen Reichsverfassung. The best form of government is 
determined by the prevailing circumstances. It would be a mistake and harmful to make 
light of applying a certain form of government to a different set of conditions (Institutes, 
IV. 20). 
The importance of Calvinism for constitutional development was also emphasized in 
several works by Academician István Kovács, one-time Director of the Institute of Legal 
and Administrative Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Here I would refer 
only to his introductory study entitled "Human Rights in Documents" (1976). As he 
wrote, the revolution and war of independence of the Netherlands inscribed on its banner 
the Calvinist ideology. The Calvinists of the 16th and 17th centuries, when proclaiming 
the equality of all men, as members of the Church, within the Church, contributed to 
laying the ideological foundations of civil equality (p. 23). Embodied in the Calvinist 
Council's presbyterian constitution, this notion prevailed only in the Rhineland and 
Westphalia until the French occupation, and is evident in Bredt's work as well. After the 
occupation, the Prussian rule introduced the consistorial system even in those regions. 
Düsseldorf was granted a consistory, which, however, was strongly resisted by the 
original Calvinist inhabitants. That years-long discord was then brought to an end by a 
compromise, with the King promising restoration of their councils provided that the town 
was willing to accept Frederick William Ill's rules regulating religious service (agenda). 
As the majority of Calvinists responded favourably to that offer, the councils were really 
re-established by the Rhine-Westphalian church constitution of 1835. Now they consisted 
of an entirely different character from that which they had borne in pre-Napoleonic times, 
when the councils functioned as governing bodies as well. That attribute was now lost, 
thus they virtually became representative bodies of the congregation beside the consistory. 
The establishment of councils in the old Prussian provincial churches is linked with the 
name of Bismarck, who thereby wanted to strengthen Protestantism in his kulturkampf 
against Catholicism. While the councils in the Rhineland were veritable strongholds of 
Protestantism, this institution was not able to entrench itself due to the lack of such a 
long-established tradition to support it. From Bredt's book it may be inferred that as late 
as during the fourth year of WWI the public opinion concerning any radical changes which 
were to occur in the state after the war were unable to be detected. This is the only 
explanation for the fact that general and equal suffrage was voted down in Prussia. Bredt 
writes that he, as a free conservative M. P., voted for general suffrage and therefore came 
under strong attack from his own Party and from the right-wing press. He concluded his 
speech, delivered on 6 May 1919, with these words: "If the gentlemen on the right 
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choose to reject general and equal suffrage, let us talk again ten years from now and ask 
who, you or I, has pursued a better policy in the conservative sense" (p. 23). Then, when 
on 5 October 1918 Imperial Chancellor Max von Baden stated in his policy speech that 
parliamentary government had been introduced in Germany, Adolf Hoffmann, a socialist 
member of the Reichstag, who stood by Bredt, stated the following: "It is late, late, for 
you should have done all this before this will be of no use to you any more" (p. 25). 
Bredt describes at great length the birth of the Weimar Constitution and the 
programmes of the parties which contributed to it (Democratic Party, Social Democratic 
Party and the Catholic Centre). Social Democracy implemented its programme to the 
extent that the Centre and the Democratic Party fulfilled theirs, whereas the Centre was 
likewise able to secure its positions in church and educational affairs to the degree 
attainable. In respect to economic policy, Social Democracy was the driving force, while 
the Centre and the Democratic Party acted as retarding factors, however in respect to 
cu'tural policy, the Centre was the driving force and Social Democracy the retarding 
factor. The Democratic Party outlined the groundworks for the structure of the 
Constitution and acted as a middleman between the Social Democratic Party and the 
Centre. 
Bredt raises the question of the position taken by the Lutheran Church, in drafting 
the Constitution and points out that the self-management of the Lutheran Church did not 
reach a degree of development which would allow the Lutheran population as such to 
take political action, omitting the fact that in Germany there were 37 different Lutheran 
provincial churches (Deutschkirche) which did not maintain any noteworthy contact with 
one another. The Lutheran Church adopted no position whatsoever on the change, there 
was no "Lutheran concept of the State". Organized Protestantism existed along with 
organized Catholicism at the time, political developments could have taken a different 
course. As it became entirely clear later, the ruling government coalition began breaking 
up as soon as church affairs were involved. A portion of the Lutherans supported the 
German National Party, representing the "positive trend", while the Liberals tilted toward 
the Democratic Party (p. 70). 
In illustration of the difficulties of the Weimar era, Bredt quotes from an article 
published in the 15 June 1922 issue of the periodical Der Arbeitgeber: "The Republic has 
been lacking power down to this day: the political parties wielding power are not acting 
constructively, but are agents and expressions of debates agitative in tone. Hence the 
desire for new forms of political life in which the healthy popular forces may be active 
and exercise their influence at the service of the community has developed" (p. 231). 
Soon after the publication of that article, the Party led by Hitler made its abortive attempt 
in Munich to seize power (known as the " beer hall putsch" on 8 and 9 November 1923), 
but at this time the putsch did not have any social base and was crushed by the army and 
the police, with Hitler condemned to confinement in a castle. 
In his work Bredt stresses the importance of tolerance and refers to the 1789 
Declaration of Human and Civil Rights, which found its way into nearly all newer 
constitutions. The provisions of the Weimar Constitution, too, rest on that Declaration, 
writes Bredt (p. 277). The imperishable value of the relevant provisions is amply 
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demonstrated by the inclusion of some of the (Arts. 136 to 139 and 141) even in the 
1949 Fundamental Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. Those are rules on the 
freedom of religion and form an integral part of the Fundamental Law. 
So, even though the Weimar Constitution was relatively short-lived, some of the 
principles it embodied were unquestionably progressive, representing an enduring 
value. For this very reason, its study through the work of a personality who was not 
only a scientist, but also an active politician of that era can serve a useful purpose even 
after a lapse of decades. 
László TRÓCSÁNYI Sr. 
Economic Criminal Law 
and Economy Policy1 
The connection between economy policy and criminal policy is studied by criminal 
sciences and the study of this connection allots criminal sciences special tasks. The 
tasks are special, since a more distant, usually indirect, interrelation of politics and law 
becomes a closer one here. It is natural that the direct interrelations of criminal policy 
and criminal law and that of economy policy and the law of economic administration 
are studied by the theory of law of the particular field, and the particular branches of 
legal sciences actually do study these relations. 
The task of criminal sciences is, in general, to study the relation between criminal 
policy and criminal law, but the problems of economic criminal law cannot be studied 
only in connection with general criminal policy. For, criminal policy concerning 
economic criminal offences is influenced by economic policy to such an extent that this 
influence appears directly in the specific rules of economic criminal law. The specific 
traits of economic criminal law, consequently, render the study of the interrelations of 
economic criminal law and economic policy an absolute necessity. 
The changes in economic policy influence not only criminal policy in connection 
with the determination of the act to be fought with the means of criminal law in order 
to serve economic policy but the relation between the organs of economic administra-
tion and enterprises exerts an influence on the scientific definition of the object of the 
protection of criminal law. 
1 Paper presented at the International Bar Association 3rd Eastern European Regional Conference on Trade 
and Finance in Central and Eastern Europe (Budapest, 21-24 June 1992). 
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In addition to the acts to be punished, the penalties that are to be applied are 
determined also by criminal policy. What sanctions should be employed is determined 
by the aspects of criminal policy. In the examined sphere, however, the most 
characteristic feature is that goals set up by economic policy are served by penal 
sanctions and administrative sanctions together. 
It is frequently economic policy considerations that determine whether administra-
tive or criminal law sanctions should be applied. 
Administrative sanctions can be used against legal entities (enterprises) as well. The 
close connection between the sanctions of criminal law and of administrative law 
brings about the criminal liability of legal entities, which seems to be contrary to the 
principles of criminal law in the continental legal systems. However, it is thought by 
some authors to be an effective means from the point of view of criminal policy. 
The state and social tasks of the struggle against crime are defined in the final 
analysis by the criminal policy of the state. It is criminal policy that decides what 
forms of behaviour should be declared criminal offences and how the provisions of 
criminal law should be applied. In the process of formulating the criminal policy 
principles of legislation and of the application of law, social, political and moral 
aspects should be considered, but the characteristic system of institutions of law and 
the mechanism of the traditional categories of criminal liability are not to be 
disregarded either. The expectations from criminal liability can be fulfilled only if the 
system of institutions of criminal law operate correctly. The system of the institutions 
of criminal law, the categories of liability, change only after tens of years, in certain 
parts they have the stability of centuries. 
The state has been using criminal law for the protection of the basis economic 
interests since its own appearance. The means of criminal law have been used for the 
protection of property relations as the basis of the economic order, but together with 
that, they have been used to ensure the income of the state, to ensure the revenues of 
the treasury. The provisions of criminal law that are to protect these fundamental 
economic and economic political interests have become a more or less harmonically 
integrated part of the system of criminal law. 
Although the rules of criminal law that are to protect the fundamental economic 
interests may be considered part of criminal law in the traditional sense, the theory of 
criminal law of the modern state has recognized that the principles of criminal policy 
do not prevail completely as far as offences committed in connection with economic 
activity are concerned. In connection with criminal offences related to economic 
activity, breaks have been demonstrated in the implementation of the criminal policy 
of both legislation and the application of law. The determination of the criminological 
category of white collar criminals is the result precisely of the recognition that there 
is a group of offencers against which the general aims of criminal policy are not 
effectuated. 
The prevalence of the principles of criminal policy is hindered in modem society 
not only by the social position of the perpetrators of economic offences and by the 
inter-blend of the high echelons of politics and economy but criminal policy in this 
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realm is necessarily influenced by the economic system and by economic policy 
interests. 
Antitrust laws show clearly the close interrelation between economic crime and 
views of economic policy and the system of management of the economy based on the 
latter. The prohibitions and the sanctions of their breaches show an extreme variety and 
there are countries that have no antitrust law. Even the countries that prohibit the 
formation of cartels allow various types of association if they are economically 
desirable or useful. Thus the prohibitions are enforced depending on economic policy 
evaluation because the formation of a cartel with the aim of dominating the market and 
various agreements aimed at surmounting an economic crisis should be judged 
differently. 
Other socio-economic considerations have effects, hindering the complete 
effectuation of the principles of criminal policy. The enterprise that causes damage to 
the national economy in a certain way, ensures, at the same time, benefits and if these 
benefits do not materialize, the loss will be more significant than the damage itself. For 
instance, the growth of unemployment is considered such a loss and if the sanctions 
of criminal law were applied consistently, more enterprises than one should be wound 
up and that would result in the growth of unemployment. 
Keen competition also may be a factor which compels whole branches of business 
to commit criminal offences so that they could stay in competition. 
When criminal sciences try to find the optimal way of conciliation between aspects 
of economic policy and criminal policy, it must always kept in mind that inappropriate 
measures might undermine the economy. 
For, in that system of a planned economy where the economic activities of the 
enterprises were controlled overwhelmingly through central state directives, the breach 
of the obligation prescribed by the directive could result in the establishment of 
criminal liability. In turn, in the economic policy of the economy that makes use of 
market relations and is based on independent economic decisions, central state 
directives have a much more limited role. The new forms of the economic activity of 
the enterprises do not drive out criminal law from the realm of the economy, but its 
role is much less significant. 
We can consider it a fact that criminal law is pushed to the back and the reasons 
of that should be found in the relation between economic policy requirements and the 
system of the institutions of criminal law, in addition to the change of economic policy. 
Following the economic policy that ensures a broad scope for independent decision-
making on the part of the enterprise, the economic management organs of the state use 
the method of incentives primarily to make the enterprise carry on operations which 
are useful to the whole national economy. And, economic incentives are precisely the 
opposite of punishment, thus criminal law prohibiting the action of the incentives, takes 
measures only against abuses. If the mechanism of economic management changes in 
accordance with changes of economic policy, the role of criminal law in the state 
control of the economy will also change by necessity. 
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Criminal law may not disregard the institutionalized distinction of economic policy 
between proprietary and public administrative economic management. It must be 
realized on the level of criminal policy that the independence of the enterprises, the 
right to make independent economic decisions is a proprietary right and not the right 
of public administration. Accordingly, the evaluation of the responsibility for 
independent economic decisions requires an approach of criminal law which is 
completely different from the one needed for the judgement of breaches of obligations 
included in directives. When criminal policy integrates economic risk-taking into the 
system of criminal responsibility it does nothing but admit the connection between 
economic policy and the criminal law protection of property. 
The acceptance of an economic policy under which independent decision-making 
at the enterprise is preferred does not mean that economic activity is not controlled 
through direct means at all. In addition to the exercise of its proprietary rights, the 
state uses also the public administration method of economic management... Public 
administrative economic management by the state takes, as a rule, the form of statutes 
of an economic administrative nature. These statutes either establish the duties of those 
who perform economic activity or authorize the organs of economic administration to 
prescribe various duties. The statutes of economy administration express the policy of 
the state and change together with the changes in economic policy. 
Finally, there are provisions of criminal law related to economic activity in the 
process of the application in which only criminal policy goals have to be pursued and 
the widespread use of the means of criminal law is only a signal for economy policy. 
As an example, economic corruption should be mentioned. It may happen that this type 
of corruption does not hinder, on the contrary, it enlivens economic activity, for it is 
able to put such forces into action that would not operate without corruption. 
Independently of the negative or positive consequences, criminal law fights against 
corruption. It may well be that the lack of certain goods is the consequence, of an 
"incorrect" economic policy and this situation gives birth to corruption. The increase 
in the number of the criminal offences, however, may be a signal for economic policy 
at most, the punishment of corruption is a traditional task of criminal law. 
Considering the impact of economic policy on criminal policy, offences committed 
in connection with economic activity may be classified into three groups. 
1. Criminal policy concerning offences violating property relations generally is 
independent of economic policy changes. However, a change in economic policy may 
have an impact on the forms of perpetration of certain traditional property offences. 
Experience shows that a changed economic policy may bring about new forms of fraud 
or emblezzlement. The change of economic policy, however, does not have such an 
impact in this field which would justify either the modification of the statutory 
provision or the alteration of the application of law or the interpretation of law. 
2. Contrary to the previous item, here we have to assert that criminal policy 
concerning offences violating the economy-regulating activity of the state has to give 
due consideration to the requirements of economic policy and that is the point where 
criminal law is closely connected to the statutes administration of the economy. 
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3. Finally, there are provisions of criminal law the application of which only calls 
our attention to the tensions of the economic criminal law, however, operates primarily 
for other social interests (such as the purity of public life, the protection of the 
environment, the protection of life and health) than that of economic policy. 
The three groups mentioned differ from each other not only in terms of their object 
of law but also because the economic policy considerations influence the selection of 
the sanctions used for the protection of the state's economy regulating activity. 
The connection of economic criminal law with public administration amounts to 
more than the evaluation of economic policy being relayed to criminal law by the 
norms of administrative law. For the punishment of unlawful acts perpetrated in 
economic life the administrative sanctions from economic policy aspects appear 
frequently much more effective than criminal punishment. 
The significance of administrative sanctions employed in economic life extends 
beyond the significance of administrative sanctions imposed by criminal courts. For 
example, in the USA, criminal sanctions are hardly used in the case of a number of 
fiscal offences. The significance of criminal sanctions is preceded by that of civil law 
suits by the injured parties and by the administrative proceedings conducted by the 
Federal agency which is to exercise supervision, or civil suit by that agency. There are 
provisions of criminal law which have not been in use for years, but scientific studies 
meet difficulties in this field because the federal agency empowered to proceed in such 
cases does not make the criteria public on the basis of which it is decided which one 
of the various sanctions would be selected. Administrative authorities investigating the 
violations of law committed in economic life have broad discretion also in other 
countries in deciding what sanctions they will apply or the application of what 
sanctions they will initiate. Among the possibilités, in addition to civil suit, there is the 
simple warning of the enterprise or financial settlement with the enterprises. 
One of the reasons why criminal sciences study the relation of criminal law and 
administrative law sanctions is that the same offence is punished with criminal 
sanctions in one country and with administrative sanctions in an other. Comparative 
studies are justified also by the fact that certain organs of the EEC also have the 
authorization to apply sanctions. In principle, it is possible to impose a fine for cartel 
agreements but the multinational companies usually prevent the application of such 
sanctions through their ability to alter costs and profits. 
The administrative measures that are to serve preventions appear to be more 
effective. For example, the Labour Government in Sweden introduced certain 
provisions, one of them entitling the representative of the police to sit on the boards 
of firms, other legislation obliged the management to keep workers in touch with 
various aspects of production. 
In economic systems based on private ownership the state can influence the 
exercise of proprietary rights only through the administrative measures of the public 
authorities; and sanctions, should they be either of criminal law or administrative law, 
are an important, if not the most important, element of the effectuation of that 
influence. 
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The use of the administrative sanction, i.e. fine for an infraction, is, on the one 
hand, in accordance with the general principles of decriminalization and, on the other 
hand, is in accordance with the practice of sentencing for economic offences. The 
borderline between administrative and criminal liability is not always clearly drawn, 
the demarcation is frequently based on relative criteria. 
Administrative sanctions are applied against such acts that violate or endanger the 
order of economic activity, but not in a realm or not to the extent that the application 
of a criminal sanctions would be justified. For this reason, behaviour serving as the 
basis of the establishment of liability is frequently similar in the case of application of 
a criminal or an administrative sanction. True, the theoretical criteria of the demarca-
tion of criminal and administrative liability does not mean, however, that the 
demarcation in the statutes is also unclear. Legislators, as a rule, draw the dividing line 
between the two forms of liability by criteria determined in sums of money. 
Administrative infractions are committed by economic organizations mostly in the 
course of their activities of production or service. The scope of violations of law 
committed in the course of economic activity and sanctioned by administrative law is 
extremely broad. It extends to the endangerment of all those interests that may enjoy 
the protection of criminal law. Yet, their characteristic trait is that they violate the 
norms of state administration (economy administration) relevant for the area and cause 
no violation of interest significant enough from the point of view of criminal law. The 
norms of administrative law regulate economic activity not only in a way related 
directly to this activity (i.e. to production, services etc.), they also include provisions 
that are to protect other important social interests such as health service, labour 
protection and fire regulations. If the violation of these regulations produces serious 
consequences, criminal sanctions may be applied. The offence committed by violating 
the mentioned administrative provisions is related to economic activity but it is not 
certain that it may be included in the sanctioned category of economic crime. 
The significance of fines employed against legal entities is explained by two 
circumstances. First, in economic life decisions violating the law are made on behalf 
of the enterprise in a system which makes it difficult, at least for the outsider, to 
establish individual liability. Within enterprises the system of decision-making may be 
built in a way allowing the distribution of responsibility among the individuals 
participating in decision-making, thus their punishment would not be compatible with 
the principle of culpability prevailing in criminal law and in the law of administrative 
infractions. Second, the fine is a detriment for the whole collective of the enterprise, 
thus it induces the collective to prevent the violations of law. Thus, fines imposed on 
legal entities is a form of liability which is directed at the collective and not at the 
individual. 
Such fines represent a financial loss which is to serve as a motivation of the 
activity of the organizations. If the activity of economic organs is evaluated from some 
point of view as socially or economically negative, the fine, as a sanction is connected 
to this evaluation independently from whether the economic organization can be 
blamed for the harmful result or not. For example, the fine for environmental pollution 
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has to be paid independently of whether the economic organ was not able to prevent 
the pollution of the environment. Fiscal organs also frequently impose fines if they 
establish that the enterprises do not perform their duty of paying taxes or obtained 
certain budgetary benefits unlawfully. 
The aims of criminal policy and economic policy are adequately served by 
individual criminal liability and by the administrative sanctions that may be used 
against both individuals and legal entities. 
Imre A. WIENER 
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Studies in Criminology and Criminalistics, Vol. 29. (Kriminológiai és Kriminalisztikai 
Tanulmányok). Budapest, 1992. OKKRI 
The long awaited publication of the 
yearbook of criminology and criminalistics 
is indeed a remarkable achievement. An 
examination of the essays contained in this 
volume which deal with the various aspects 
of this field of science would certainly 
prove to be worthwhile. 
First of all, let us consider the essay 
by László Pusztai, who has dealt with the 
development of modem criminal procedure 
law in Hungary. In this essay a balanced 
description of the procedural problems 
along with an appraisal from a professional 
viewpoint are presented. 
In his essay, Antal Patera addresses the 
proportionality between punishment and 
recidivism. The general views and regula-
tions on recidivism can be discussed only 
in close connection with the general legal 
responsibilities, moreover the penal and 
coercive measures determined by the poli-
tical, social and economic conditions at any 
given time in history. The research of the 
history of law proves that the institution 
of recidivism is a relatively recent phenom-
enon, established by the latest decades of 
the development of criminal justice. It was 
established mainly by the upcoming bour-
geoisie seeking equality before law. In the 
classical criminal justice system, which has 
concentrated on the deed, recidivism was 
considered extremely dangerous; this view 
is easily recognized by the severe actions 
taken against the perpetrators of repeated 
crime, in proportion with the deed. Every 
convict is considered to be a special 
subject of law, who "personally" and "in 
advance" is obliged to assume responsibil-
ity for the legal consequences of a repeated 
offence against legal regulations. Anyone 
in this legal position committing crime 
should be considered a recidivist. The 
punishment received by such an individual 
is proportionate to the deed itself and the 
crime, regardless of the potential danger 
this individual could present to society. 
According to László Tibor Nagy, who 
wrote about the sentencing of rowdy crimi-
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nais, there are specific penal measures to 
be taken against such persons in the 
judicial practice. Following a brief over-
view of the previous practices throughout 
legal history, the author examines the 
actual act of sentencing such deeds in 
accordance with the 1955 definition of 
rowdiness. He mentions the different types 
of sentencing and penal measures, and 
evaluates the sentences passed since that 
time. Furthermore he examines the effects 
of changes in both the legislative rules and 
the judicial practice. With the aid of 
several charts, the author demonstrates the 
various trends in the judicial statistics 
concerning the felons convicted for rowdi-
ness or crimes against the public. 
Another outstanding essay is written by 
András Csalay, which addresses the causes 
of robbery. This essay presents the various 
trends and the causes behind them which 
prevailed during the eighties. This was 
accomplished by using the data obtained as 
part of a long-term research project on 
robbery, materials of legal historical 
studies and the author's own research. In 
this essay special attention is given to 
those qualitative changes in crime present-
ly underway. 
Mariann Kránitz' essay focused on the 
international efforts to prevent prostitution, 
which is presently of great concern. Her 
paper gives an outline of those interna-
tional efforts aimed at preventing trading 
and exploiting prostitutes. The mere fact 
that the trends in Hungary are virtually the 
opposite of the international ones makes 
this subject matter unfortunately topical. 
The essay gives a brief historical review 
of the precedents, a detailed chronology 
of the last 100 years and presents the 
latest international measures taken by the 
different agencies and organisations of the 
United Nations and other international 
bodies. 
The volume contains an essay written 
by Antal Bakóczi on the "price" of viol-
ence. In this contribution the author 
investigates and describes the various 
effects and aspects of violent crime (i.e. 
social, political, moral, economic, etc.) He 
points out that these crimes take a heavy 
toll on society and ultimately contribute to 
very grave social consequences. After a 
thorough analysis of the subject Bakóczi 
draws a conclusion reaching beyond the 
realm of criminal law. 
Klára Kerezsi presents a comparative 
study entitled "The Legislation Concerning 
the Assistance of Victims of Crime in the 
U.S.A.". The essay examines the legal 
regulation of the services assisting victims 
of crime in the United States. The paper 
describes the way these services are 
organised, financed and run. Moreover it 
introduces the President's Task Force on 
Victims of Criminality (Grant Guidelines). 
It also characterizes the distribution of the 
so-called VOCA Fund by presenting the 
enforcement practices of three federal states 
and gives a detailed description of the legal 
regulation concerning victims' aid in the 
State of Maryland. 
Last but not at least it is necessary 
to mention András Vág's essay on the 
publicity of Satanism. The article gives 
an analysis of the content of the press 
conference following four murders and 
suicides which were allegedly motivated 
by Satanism and occurred during the 
same time period. Adding to his analysis 
the author makes comments on the 
relationship between the committed crime 
and its press coverage. 
Miklós UDVAROS 
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Ross K. BAKER: House and Senate, W. W. Norton and Company, New York—London 
1989. 236 pp. 
The author is a professor of political 
science at Rutgers University and a 
columnist for the Los Angeles Times, a 
frequent contributor to other popular and 
professional periodicals. A sustained 
comparison of the House and Senate is 
something that most people assume to 
exist. They are usually surprised that such 
book is not to be found. Professor Baker 
has filled this void. He conducted about 
sixty interviews in 1986-87 with four 
kinds of people: recent and former sena-
tors, among them such who were active 
earlier as representatives, with newsmen, 
who have covered both Houses of the 
Congress, the members of several different 
lobbies and employees of the Congress. 
He points out that while the senators 
represent their state for six years in the 
Senate, the members of House spend only 
two years in the benches of the House. 
This fact also put brakes on the character-
istics of their activities, characterizes to 
a certain extent their dealings with mat-
ters. Nobody doubts that the two bodies 
actually are so far from each other as they 
were two centuries ago, although the law 
promulgated in 1913 regulated that the 
senators are also elected directly by the 
people. The two bodies are not only far 
from each other but mutually very sensi-
tive and suspicious. They even avoid each 
other's premises though no law or regula-
tion would tell them to do so. The mem-
bers of the two—chamber Congress may 
be friends privately on Capitol Hill, they 
almost never socialize with each other. 
In the first chapter we see interesting 
matters about the changes and the 
struggles for prestige between the two 
bodies. Also this chapter informs us on the 
divided and the exclusive rights and 
licences of these two bodies. The follow-
ing two chapters deal with those character-
istic factors which contribute most to the 
divisions and struggles between the 
congressmen and the senators. Baker 
points out that the House chamber is the 
largest parliamentary room in the world, 
about three times larger than the English 
House of Commons upon which it was 
patterned. The Senate chamber is much 
different. It is a rather small and elegant 
place. The general rule is to go for the 
"prime real estate"-seats located on either 
side of the center aisle. Senators located 
here can gain recognition to speak some-
what more easily than those located on the 
flanks or at the rear. The relations between 
the leaders and followers are also differ-
ent. The large bodies are inclined to 
hierarchies and to accomplish the routine 
tasks in an effective way. The smaller 
bodies can utilize better the personal con-
tacts, where the individual moves are more 
tolerated or even encouraged. 
The American system of the legislature 
is based on the geographic representation, 
consequently no congressman was ever 
elected by present the whole nation. Only 
the voters of the fifty states or 435 con-
gressional districts possess any direct 
control on the composition of both Houses 
of the Congress. Several critics say that 
uncountable number of different and very 
partial interests collide and the process as 
a whole makes it impossible to select 
those persons, who would be the best for 
the legislature of the nation. If the national 
interest would be identical with the 
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accumulated interests of 153 congressional 
districts, the situation would be consider-
ably easier. In the next chapters we gain 
an inside look into the very complex 
system of relations of the Congress and 
the media. Nowadays none of them can 
live without the other; the television 
commentaries often have significant 
influence on the results of elections. The 
columnists and television anchormen 
actually do not deal with every member 
of the Congress, only those who are the 
most interesting, charismatic or controver-
sial personalities. It would be difficult to 
see who is really "mediaworthy" among 
the members of the legislative bodies. The 
House let the television cameras and 
reporters enter the chamber in 1979, the 
Senate permitted the same only in 1986. 
The senators debate sometimes for hours, 
the members of the House get only five 
minutes each. 
According to he lobbyists the personal 
contacts are very important, and the repre-
sentatives are generally more accessible 
than the senators. Sometimes the members 
of the lobby could convince the staff of 
a senator and this way the senator is more 
easily persuaded. Generally speaking the 
lobbyists try to convince the legislators to 
support or kill some amendments, make 
some announcement in the debate, which 
is favourable for some lobby. 
Another question appears, namely 
whether the Senate and the House come 
to look similar: whether the frequent 
changes in the institutional framework has 
caused a kind of convergence between the 
two bodies. According to some experts, 
the effectiveness of the House has 
decreased in the legislative process, 
meanwhile in the Senate the loyalty to the 
institution is in danger. 
Last but not least the volume deals 
with the problems caused by the different 
working styles of the senators and repre-
sentatives and the characteristics of 
election campaigns. The volume is supple-
mented by an extensive index. 
The volume by Professor Ross K. 
Baker can be used very well by those, who 
dwell into the legislative process of the 
greatest Western democracy and the 
activities of the U.S. Congress. 
Miklós UDVAROS 
Sanctus Stephanus et Europa—Saint Stephen and Europe. Szent István és 
Európa—Sanctus Stephanus et Europa. Ed.: HAMZA, Gábor, Művelődési és Közoktatási 
Minisztérium, Budapest, 1991. 140 pp. 
A volume of essays and studies has 
been published under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Culture and Education about 
the role St. Stephen played in Hungarian 
history, the foundation of the Hungarian 
legal system and its European connec-
tions. In this volume, essays, written by 
prominent figures in Hungarian cultural 
life and by a Spanish professor, can be 
read. Studies written in Hungarian are 
followed by summaries in French. The 
inscription in Latin to Pope John Paul II 
reminds the reader that the volume of 
essays was published on the occasion of 
"His Holiness" first apostolic visit to 
Hungary. 
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The first treatise of the volume is 
Professor Gábor Hamza's work, entitled 
Saint Stephen's Laws and Europe. Firstly, 
the author expounds the connection between 
state and religion in Europe during the 
period of Saint Stephen, presenting suprem-
acy of religion above the secular power 
during the reign of Otto III. This emperor 
set himself up for defensor fidei as imperá-
tor servus Jesu Christi and that is why he 
considered the foundation of the regnum Dei 
his sacred duty. In the spirit of this notion 
and Emperor Iustinian's Novella VI which 
emphasises the unit of the sacerdotium and 
the impérium, he felt called upon to develop 
the Church structure. The author lays stress 
on the fact that the first King of Hungary 
though had a great sway in the religious as 
well as in the secular sphere, still cannot be 
regarded as basileus autokrator, like the 
most rulers of eastern states of this period. 
The legal system set forth in the edicts 
of St. Stephen closely followed the preced-
ents set within the Byzantine system in 
harmonizing secular and ecclesiastical law 
with one another. With his Laws which drew 
upon both the secular and ecclesiastical 
sphere, he could not, of course, comprehend 
entirely the legal regulation of all the 
spheres of life. Finally Gábor Hamza 
emphasises the fact that Saint Stephen could 
functionally combine the universalismus of 
his Laws and the tradition of the Hungarian 
consuetude, whereby contributed a great 
deal to Hungary's integration into Europe. 
The next study is Professor Péter Erdő's 
work entitled Saint Stephen's Church 
Organisation and Europe. At first, the 
author introduces the conventions and the 
canonical regulation in Western Europe of 
that period. Then with stating the foundation 
of the Hungarian dioceses, proves that Saint 
Stephen following Western European 
models, established the Hungarian Church 
organisation legitimately. Its graphic evi-
dences are firstly that Saint Stephen worked 
on the Church's organisation as a ruler in 
compliance with the notion of the Caroline 
age that is symbolised by the crown, lance 
and benediction received from the Pope, and 
secondly the assistance of papal legates. The 
kingdom and the Church were intertwined 
according to the conventions in Western 
Europe and it is proved by the foundation 
of the royal chapel in the Hungarian 
Aachen, in Székesfehérvár. Finally, the 
author points out the success of the Pseudo 
Izidorian model in the domestic Church 
organisation which is indicated by the ten 
dioceses and the catching on the privilégium 
fori in Hungary. Saint Stephen's Church 
organisation activities were modern and 
European, even if the conditions of the 
country were not adequate to it in all, 
stresses the author at the end of his treatise. 
The next essay is written by Professor 
Angel Sanchez de la Torre (Madrid) in 
Spanish, entitled La simbologia de la 
Corona en los pueblos indoeuropeos. The 
author emphasises the significance of the 
crown as a symbol which had embodied the 
power and the presence of God on earth 
since the antiquity. He introduces the role 
of Hungarian Holy Crown in Europe and 
stresses its importance as the embodiment 
of the Hungarian independence. The etymo-
logical meaning of the crown is dealt with 
in details. The author sums up in the 
conclusion of his treatise that the notion of 
the crown symbolises the origin of the 
political power supported from numerous 
sources. 
The following study entitled European-
ism of Saint Stephen's Legends is written 
by Professor István Kállay. At first, the 
author introduces the religious movements 
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of that age and the effects of these move-
ments as reflected in the Hungarian 
historiography. Subsequently Saint Stephen's 
international appreciation who is presented 
in the title of apostle meritedly since he had 
helped the preachers of religion as their 
leader and supervisor. The cult of Saint 
Stephen had been developed before his 
canonisation for the lawful days labelled as 
leges beati Stephani at Székesfehérvár had 
been held on the anniversary day of his 
death. This was encouraged by the so-called 
great legend which had been written on the 
instructions of Saint Ladislaus. It emphasises 
the piety of Hungary's first king and his 
Church organizing work. This legend 
corresponds to the ideal of civitas Dei of 
Saint Agustin. The Hartvik legend which 
had been written on the instructions of the 
King Colomanus derives the origin of the 
crown directly from God and it means that 
our country is only in God's hands and it 
cannot be influenced by emperors or popes. 
The aim of writing legends was not only to 
glorify the first king of Hungary but also 
to give evidence about the independence 
from the Holy Empire as the legends 
emphasise the offering of Hungary for 
Virgin Mary, without mentioning Saint 
Peter. The author finishes his study with an 
appropriate quotation to Saint Stephen from 
the legends: "if a wise man listens to a 
lecture he enriches his knowledge, and the 
sensible man gets to know how to rule". 
The next study is Professor Iván 
Bertényi's work entitled Saint Stephen and 
the heraldry. The author presents the picture 
of Saint Stephen evolved in the Middle 
Ages from a new aspect. He expounds the 
various descriptions in the Chronicon Pictum 
and in Thuróczy's Chronicle and it was 
regarded as natural in that age that Saint 
Stephen had coat-of-arms as well, which 
according to the knowledge of heraldry of 
our time seems to be a mistake. Then the 
author deals with the appearances of Saint 
Stephen's portrait in certain arms of towns. 
In the end the writer emphasises the import-
ance of Saint Stephen's figure in Hungarian 
heraldry which have remained deserving of 
continuous respect for a thousand years. 
Thereafter Professor Ilona Sz. Jónás's 
work The development of the European 
Saint Stephen Image can be read. The author 
shows us the life of Europe at a time in 
which it is turning to God and through this 
the discovery of human dignity, the reaction 
of society in the struggle against fears and 
uncertainty. People needed God in everyday 
life and in progress, which was indicated 
by the pax Dei movements, the building 
of churches and the pilgrimages to 
Jerusalem. This meant the enlargement of 
the boundary of Christian Europe, the 
Europe which gave birth the Saint Stephen 
legends as its integral part. Saint Stephen 
supported Christianity not only in Hungary 
but also in Rome, Constantinople and 
Jerusalem by taking care of the Hungarian 
pilgrims at these holy places. He was a Rex 
corde magnus, rex pacificus and rex iustus 
whose name was known all over Europe, 
but was judged differently than his wan-
dering ancestors had been. At the end of the 
study the author emphasises that Europe 
remembers Saint Stephen as the king who 
kept up with Western Christianity and led 
his nation towards God's Kingdom's coming 
which was symbolised by embroidered Te 
Deum on the coronation mantle. 
Last treatise of the volume is Endre 
Tóth's work entitled Facts to the History 
of Christianity in the Province of Valeria. 
The author describes the Christianity of the 
Eastern-Transdanubian Province of Valeria 
supporting it with the results of archaeologi-
m a g y a r  
t u d o m á n y o s a k a d é m i a 
k ö n y v t a r a 
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cal researches. On the strength of discovered 
relics the existence of Pannonian Christian-
ity can be proved only from the beginning 
of the fourth century, first of all from the 
questioning records of the pursuits of 
Diocletian's age. Then the Transdanubian 
Church organisation is introduced on the 
basis of the sources available and the 
religious buildings of that time are 
described. Two types of buildings are 
distinguished according their function, the 
communal gathering-places and the mauso-
leums of cemeteries built in towns. The 
author emphasises that as the eucharistie 
gatherings were endured or pursued an 
unvaried structure which could be called 
God's House could not be established. A 
very important archaeological relic from that 
age is the fibula of Hetény which was made 
for gathering up and ornamenting the 
pallium which forms the bishops' badges. 
Through the written and material relics the 
reader can get an authentic picture of the 
early history of Christianity of Hungary. 
This well-compiled multilingual volume 
of essays and studies illustrated with numer-
ous photos deservedly demands the interest 
of the Hungarian and foreign professional 
public as well as the interest of the educated 
public in general. 
István SÁNDOR 
Thomas OPPERMANN: Europarecht: ein Studienbuch. München, Beck Verl., 1991. 
787 pp. 
If one classifies the member states of 
the European Community (hereinafter EC, 
formerly European Economic Community) 
in terms of contribution to the literature on 
the "Law of Europe", the Germans un-
doubtedly rank first: in 1990 there appeared 
three books on the subject (by Bleckmann, 
Oppermann and Moersch, Schweitzer and 
Hummer), while in 1991 Th. Oppermann, 
Professor of Tübingen University, published 
his book indicated in the title, summing up 
the results of several decades of work in this 
domain. The latter writing falls into 6 
sections: European organizations; European 
Community; Common Market; traffic of 
people; external relations; new challenges. 
Clearly worded in the way of a syllabus, 
this book has the benefit of offering the 
reader concise answers to, and some clear 
guidance on, the points discussed. Such is 
the basic question concerning the nature of 
the Law of Europe, which is defined as the 
sum of legal norms interlinking and binding 
not only the member states, but also the 
subjects at law living or operating in them. 
The law of Europe is one "intervening" 
between international law and the national 
laws of member states and, as regards its 
legal nature, standing closer to the national 
laws than to the classical international law 
(Rz 1). 
Of course, the law of Europe should be 
understood to mean not only the so-called 
primary law (EC-Rome Treaty, EURATOM 
Treaty, Treaty Constituting the European 
Coal and Steel Committee), but also the so-
called secondary sources of law (decrees, 
guidelines and resolutions of the Committee 
of the European Community and the Council 
of Europe as well as legal principles ex-
pressed in the legal practice of the European 
Court). 
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In cases of conflict between the Law of 
Europe and the national laws of member 
states, the former has supremacy over the 
latter, as has been consistently manifested 
in the practice of the European Court since 
1963. This supremacy is both ex tunc and 
ex nunc in effect, meaning that the rules of 
lex posterior (national law of later date) do 
not prevail over earlier provisions of the 
Law of Europe (Rz 528). 
This doctrine of "genuine Law of 
Europe" upheld by the European Court has 
been adopted over time by the courts of EC 
member states (the FRG's Verfassungs-
gericht in the late 1960s, the French Cour 
de Cassation in 1975, and the British House 
of Lords in 1980). The supremacy of the 
Law of Europe over internal law has in fact 
never been called into question in the 
smaller member states of EC (Rz 531). 
A practical implication of the doctrine 
of supremacy of the law of Europe is that 
the internal laws of member states contrary 
to it are inapplicable ("ohne weiteres un-
anwendbar"), as has been stated in several 
decisions of the European Court (Rz 540). 
The EC, consisting of 12 member states 
at present, virtually rests on 3 different 
systems of law: the Roman and German (the 
two may be seen as one unit), the Anglo-
Saxon, and the Skandinavian. The dissimi-
larity of these systems of law is not con-
Fined to essential differences between legal 
norms, but has far deeper roots in the nature 
of legal thinking: continental legal thinking 
is characterized by abstraction, whereas in-
sular Anglo-Saxon) legal thinking is marked 
by a pragmatic approach getting down to 
specifics. Seen from another angle, conti-
nental law may be said to be characterized 
by the supremacy of written law, while 
insular (Anglo-Saxon) law by the application 
of unwritten law. 
Precisely in the face of these essential 
differences, economic integration can hardly 
be conceived of without an approximation 
between the widely differing national laws 
of member states. Therefore, under Articles 
3 (h) and 100 to 102 of the EC Treaty, in-
tensive efforts have been launched towards 
harmonization of laws in furtherance of 
concrete goals of economic integration. 
Of course, the work aimed at the har-
monization of laws has primarily embraced 
the areas where legal norms tend to impede 
economic integration (customs regulations, 
regulations on agriculture, legislations on 
settlement and change of residence, legal 
norms of a technical nature). However, in 
accordance with Art. 220 of the EC Treaty, 
harmonization of laws has recently been 
extended beyond the above "priority" areas 
to domains of relevance to economic or 
social development. Under this dynamic 
approach the EC is seeking harmonization, 
even if not unification, of the most import-
ant legal norms in the European region in 
an effort to lay the groundwork for a law 
of the European region (Europäischer 
Rechtsraum) (Rz 1067, 1126). 
The technical feature of harmonization 
of laws is that a law harmonized remains 
national (Rz 1092) and that direct uniform 
norms of law are established by member 
states in exceptional cases only. 
The chapter on external relations deals 
with questions of accession to the EC. 
Understandably, the reader's attention is 
aroused by this part of the book in the first 
place. Under Art. 237 of the EC Treaty, any 
European State may apply for admission to 
membership in the EC. Since the EC Treaty 
was concluded, however, practice has es-
tablished but two basic conditions for ac-
cession: (a) democratic social order and (b) 
market economy and free competition. 
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The accessions so far have increased the 
number of member states, originally consist-
ing of 6 founders, to 12, with the admission 
of Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland in 
1970-72, Greece in 1975-81, Spain and 
Portugal in 1977-76. 
The applications for membership 
currently under consideration include those 
of Turkey, Austria and Cyprus submitted 
in 1987, 1989 and 1990, respectively. An 
application was also submitted by Morocco 
in 1987, but it has little chance of accept-
ance as the country cannot be considered 
European either geographically or socio-
logically. The author refers to Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, which are also 
seriously considering accession. 
As regards applications for accession, 
submitted and to be submitted, the author 
says that probably there will be no new 
accession until 1993, when a single Euro-
pean inner market is expected to be estab-
lished. By that time, however, the EC will 
have to have its own concept elaborated 
concerning the conditions to be met by new 
applicants, if it is to arrive at the European 
Union envisaged in the long-term plans (Rz 
1883, 1910). 
A loser form of association was used 
by the EC for Greece (before accession), 
Turkey, Malta and Cyprus, which, under 
Art. 238 of the EC Treaty, conclude each 
a treaty of association with the EC estab-
lishing "special and privileged links" and, 
in terms of international law, bilateral 
relations securing formal parity for them. 
Of particular interest is Chapter VI of 
the book, which gives account of the 
extension of the law of Europe to new 
areas and of new challenges like education 
and training, research and technology, 
culture, environmental and consumer 
protection. By way of illustration, we shall 
highlight here the development of environ-
mental law. 
Legal development in this area was 
underpinned by four programmes of action 
for environmental protection which, 
adopted by the EC in the period 1973-
1987, called for the elaboration and publi-
cation of some 200 legal norms, mainly EC 
guidelines. The major aspects covered by 
legal regulation include study of the 
carrying capacity of the environment, 
elimination and reduction of environmental 
degradation (protection of water, of air, 
regulations on wastes, hazardous wastes, 
grave accidents polluting the environment) 
and conservation of nature. 
It is a fact that member states are con-
stantly sued for breach of contract relating 
to inappropriate compliance with EC guide-
lines for environmental protection. This 
prompted EC member states to add a new 
chapter (VII), entitled "Environment", to 
the EC Treaty [Art. 130 (r) to (t)]. Its 
provisions are governed by two general 
principles: principle of prevention ( Vorbeu-
gungsprinzip), according to which pollution 
harm to, and behaviour damaging, the envi-
ronment should be addressed at the source 
(Ursprungsprinzip), and principle of 
liability for damage (Verurdsacherprinzip). 
Although EC member states are of one 
mind about the importance of regulating 
environmental protection, their legislations 
show considerable differences in establish-
ing priorities between other tasks of public 
concern and the requirements of environ-
mental protection, which in turn warrant 
efforts at an approximation between the 
environmental laws of member states (Rz 
2027), because conflicts of interests of 
industry, transport and agriculture with 
those of environmental protection are an 
everyday occurrence. At the same time, 
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opinion polls show that in Europe environ-
mental protection is precisely the area 
where, in contrast to other spheres of life, 
all-European measures are held desirable 
and accepted by the peoples (Rz 2032). 
In summary, I confine myself to noting 
that for jurists outside the EC but taking 
an interest in its activity and legislative 
pursuits this work is a wealth of compre-
hensive knowledge, with its bibliographical 
references providing useful guidance for 
continued indepth research. 
Alexander VIDA 
Vanda LAMM: A History of Judicial Settlement of Disputes Between States 
[Jogtudományi értekezések (Studies in International Law), Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 
1990, 163 pp. ISBN 963 05 5612 X] 
This study of the author is an attempt to 
present the historical development of a 
highly important institution of international 
law. International arbitration is perhaps one 
of the most controversial and yet one of 
the most interesting issues of international 
law. Behind the related set of problems are 
century-old disputes, and there are still 
divergent and often conflicting views on 
the role and possibilities of arbitration in 
the settlement of disputes between States. 
The study traces both the practice of 
international arbitration as a means of 
settlement of international disputes from 
ancient times to the early years of the 20th 
century, when the question of institutionali-
zation of judicial settlement of international 
disputes came to prevalence in interstate 
relations. In other words, the author 
inquires into the practices of epochs in 
which the introduction of institutionalized 
arbitration in the judicial settlement of 
disputes between States was not the order 
of the day. As a matter of fact, the present 
volume seeks to fill the vacuum left by the 
author in the domain of this subject in her 
earlier book published in 1984, a mono-
graph dealing with the role and develop-
ment of the institution of permanent arbitra-
tion and analyzing the relevant caselaw. 
[See Vanda Lamm: A hágai Nemzetközi 
Bíróság döntései, 1957-1982 (Decisions of 
the International Court of Justice in The 
Hague, 1957-1982), Gondolat, Budapest, 
1984, 340 pp.] The two publications are 
mutually complementary and provide the 
reader with a coherent picture of experi-
ments in the domain of international justice. 
The writing under review consists of 
six chapters, with brief concluding com-
ments by the author and with abstracts of 
arbitral awards handed down in the best 
known cases. 
Chapter I deals with the historical 
antecedents to arbitration or, more specifi-
cally, with the emergence and progressive 
spread of this institution in the practice of 
States in ancient times and in the Middle 
Ages. An analysis of the relevant case-law 
reveals that while in earlier periods arbitra-
tion was often used to adjust differences 
concerning struggles for the throne by 
having recourse to the good offices of 
mediation of a third person, traces can also 
be found of the typical elements of interna-
tional arbitration, particularly in the prac-
tices of the ancient Greek city-states. 
Moreover, there is clear evidence that the 
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international so-called clauses of compromis 
were present in international contractual 
practice (pp. 13-14). This cannot be said of 
the practice of the Roman Empire, where 
arbitration in private-law cases was rather 
widespread. However, that arrangement was 
not frequently resorted to in international 
relations at the time, as Rome had no need 
of it nor had it any particular interest in the 
"internationalization" of the institution. The 
Empire considered its eventual international 
disputes from the angle of its indisputable 
superior strength and "tried to put even the 
institution of arbitration at the service of its 
expansionism" (p. 17). Medieval arbitration 
bore the stamp of the Catholic Church 
aspiring to administer justice. Given the 
extremely strong influence of the Church, 
the Popes sought to make the head of the 
Church the chief arbiter of the Christian 
world. With the decline in papal power, 
rulers and certain institutions, including even 
private persons came to be involved in 
arbitration. Among the latter cases, awards 
of relevance to Hungary are also discussed 
at length by the author. Problems of legal 
delimitation of arbitration and mediation as 
well as definitions of categories like arbiter, 
arbitrator and amicabilis compositor are 
likewise enlarged upon in the same chapter. 
Chapter II of the book gives a brief 
survey of arbitration in the post-Westphalian 
Peace period, explaining in the form of 
thesis the causes of this practice of dispute 
settlement slipping to the background in the 
17th and 18th centuries. The declining role 
of the institution was a surprising and 
unexpected tendency, because the peace 
treaty had contributed greatly to stabilizing 
the balance of forces in Europe and had 
practically led to the creation of a favour-
able climate for the development of arbitra-
tion. This short chapter helps the reader 
trace the reasons—explaining the historical 
background looming behind them—why 
States made no use of this possibility. 
In Chapter III the author deals with 
earlier ideas that emerged in different 
epochs as part of various scientific and 
political proposals for the peaceful settle-
ment of disputes between States. A con-
siderable part of such proposals had its roots 
in the illusion of European States about their 
verification in some sort of federation, and 
it is therefore not surprising at all that the 
related ideas stood little real chance of 
practical implementation. The proposals as 
outlined in this chapter carry rather instruc-
tive lessons about present-day aspirations 
to European unity as some elements of the 
essentially medieval proposals appear to 
attract a high interest in our days again. 
Among the proposals examined by the 
author, mention may be made of the plans 
of Pierre Dubois, György Podebrád, Émeric 
Cruse, William Penn, and Saint Pierre. 
Chapter IV presents the theory and 
practice of international arbitration from the 
end of the 18th century to the First Hague 
Conference. This is perhaps the most 
interesting chapter of the volume, as it not 
only highlights the causes of revival of the 
institution of arbitration, but also subjects 
to precise and thorough analyses of concrete 
(and successful) case-law arrangements 
which in the second part of the 19th century 
played a so important role in promoting 
processes of judicial settlement of interna-
tional disputes. The advance of the entire 
process is illustrated by a detailed analysis 
of statistical figures on experiments in 
international justice at the time. A sub-
section is devoted to an analysis of arbitral 
practice under international treaties as well 
as of the forms of compromise embodied 
in bilateral and multilateral treaties. Another 
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sub-section covers the related positions of 
national parliaments, world peace move-
ments and scientific institutions as well as 
the views which were set out in international 
legal literature during the 19th century. 
Chapter V of the volume discusses the 
decisions of the Hague Peace Conferences 
of 1989 and 1907, which were epoch-
making, at least from the point of view of 
arbitration. The author highlights the basic 
motive behind the convening of the Con-
ferences as well as the interesting and unex-
pected shift of emphasis from disarmament 
issues, which had figured as the original 
subject for consideration, to questions of 
peaceful settlement of disputes. After a 
thematic presentation of the proposals made 
and the ideas raised at the two Conferences, 
the author concludes that "the greatest 
accomplishment of the First Hague Peace 
Conference was the establishment of a 
Permanent Court of Arbitration", implying 
that "international justice had grown from 
a sporadic phenomenon of international 
relations into a permanent institution of 
international law" (p. 99). Of particular 
interest in the sub-section on the results of 
the Second Hague Peace Conference is the 
author's discussion of reactions by States 
to the introduction of compulsory interna-
tional adjudication. Along with reviewing 
the achievements of the Conference, the 
author analyzes the so-called Drago-Porter 
Agreement (Convention II of the Second 
Hague Conference) and Convention XII 
creating the International Prize Court (pp. 
106-110). 
Chapter VI is a summary account of 
arbitral practice during the period following 
the Peace Conferences up to the outbreak 
of World War One. The author devotes 
special attention to evaluating the activity 
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. An 
analysis of its practice leads Vanda Lamm 
to disagree with views that questioned the 
positive effects of the achievements of the 
Hague Peace Conferences, or rather tried 
to prove that the States which were fraught 
with political tensions as well as the States 
which were bound by alliance had not re-
sorted to arbitration despite the Hague 
conventions. In the author's view, the fig-
ures prove just the contrary. Her reasoning 
is supported by the added fact that, under 
the impact of the documents adopted at 
the Hague Conferences, there was set up 
a permanent international judicial forum 
in the American continent in 1907. The 
work of the Central American Court of 
Justice is likewise analyzed in this Chap-
ter. 
As I have noted earlier, the author has 
provided her study with an appendix 
giving a brief review of arbitral awards 
on the major subject-matters. Interested 
readers may gain an insight into the cases 
often referred to in special literature, such 
as the Alabama Claims, the matter relating 
to the fish-pond of Tátra, the Venezuelan 
Preferenciái Claims, etc. Lack of space 
has not naturally permitted but a general 
outline of this work, but the volume 
contains a plethora of other information 
which I have not covered and which 
interested readers and university students 
alike will find it useful to consult. The 
inclusion in the Appendix of the case-law 
in the Hungarian language offers a highly 
useful source material especially for 
university students. 
Viktor M AVI 
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STUDIES 
Zoltán Novotni New Trends in Hungarian Company Law 
Hungary is currently going through a period of change. The transformations are 
characterized by permeating all spheres of the economy and society and are aimed, as is 
also spelled out in die Constitution, at creating an independent and democratic state 
governed by the rule of law. For a state of law to be established, it is necessary to build 
a system of institutions under a well-thought-out and comprehensive concept articulated 
for that purpose. All this, however, calls for a thorough revision of our legal system. The 
legal order should be in keeping with the actual economic and social reality and the law 
should reflect and regulate the real sets of existing relations for, in the words of Gusztáv 
Szászy-Schwarz,"Law is the sciences of practical life, the only criterion of which is its 
practical serviceability". 
In evolving the institutional system of a law-governed state the following criteria 
should be met: 
1. This country needs a fundamental law, a Constitution, to provide a lasting legal 
regulation of power and political relations, and, along with laying down the rules 
governing the structure and functioning of the state organization, to set forth the 
fundamental human and civil rights and duties, while devising guarantees for the exercise 
of these rights. 
2. There is a need, in the first place, for an enactment to regulate the levels of law-
making, ensuring that the basic principles of legislation are no mere declarations present 
in the background, but rather are actually observed in the process, and to govern the 
different sets of socio-economic relations on a lasting basis, while preserving the 
consistency of the legal order. 
3. The most comprehensive reform is called for by the administration of justice, an 
area where, in several aspects, there are but mere concepts regarding the direction of 
128 Zoltán Novotni 
change. The foremost goal is to establish a judicial system which is independent of every 
other branch of power and in which the avenues of legal remedy, acting as a control 
mechanism, remain within the frameworks of an independent judicial organization. 
Additionally, legal remedy is provided by ways and means other than protests lodged and 
fines imposed. 
4. It is necessary for a Constitutional Court to be set up and to function effectively 
in order to revise, by acting as an organization of control, the legality of the legislative 
process and to interpret the provisions of the Constitution. 
5. It is necessary to set up, within the judicial organization, a registry court which 
would act as an instrument giving effect to the legal order securing the frameworks of 
economic life. 
6. Establishment of a "new" type of court, an administrative court, its functioning 
serving to secure a balanced harmony between central state administration and local self-
government. This would exercise control over decisions of administrative, or executive 
organs on the one hand and would afford protection for the rights and lawful interests of 
citizens and other subjects of law on the other. 
7. The Constitution and legislative enactments should determine the ways and means 
of, and eventual restrictions on, the exercise of human and civil rights. An appropriate 
regime of legal remedies should be evolved to provide for citizens legal means against 
violations of their rights. Devising a real system of legal assistance to citizens would 
make it possible to abandon the existing Hungarian practice, namely the systems of 
complaints, notifications of public interest, and recourse to the press. It is necessary to 
create frameworks for the representation of interests by the ombudsman and for the 
realization of public interests. 
It is worthwhile, however, to compare the status and modalities of implementation 
against these goals as outlined above. 
First, this country has no stable fundamental law, as the Constitutional is amended 
by the ruling parties to suit the power relationships existing from time to time. What is 
needed is a comprehensive and well-considered concept to replace patchwork and 
modifications. The prevailing legal system is anything but a "system"; rather it is a mass 
of competing and contradictory laws and regulations made in disregard of the basic 
principles of legislation. 
Second, the Constitutional Court has become first and foremost a general forum of 
complaints, which litigants and complainants look on as the last resort in seeking remedy 
to their grievances, real or perceived. 
And third, the reform of the judicial system, or the judicature has been broadly 
outlined, but certain institutions already established under the relevant concept do not 
have the substance as planned and expected. Cases in point are the introduction of 
authorities of an administrative type and the functioning of registry court in a way that 
betrays a smuggled-in state recognition of legal personality. 
This leads us to ask what a registry court should be like and what kind of activity it 
should carry out, as there are various solutions at hand. Thus, for instance, the registry 
court may take over the role of die economic police, may act as an organ of supervision 
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over competition, or, as a guardian catering to the needs of the state, may be assigned 
responsibilities similar to those of a lawyer or a property agency. 
The registry court should function first of all as a court, because the latter is 
independent, watches over nothing but the enforcement of law, is capable of generating 
recognition, constitutivity by its decisions, shapes the mould of legal relations between 
parties, and establishes and terminates such relations. 
The registry court is not necessarily a separate part, with an independent status, of 
the judicial organization. In empowering the law-courts or the country courts to perform 
the functions of a registry court, the practice of earlier decades was intended to ensure 
that the responsibilities of the registry court would not be separated from the other 
activities of the court. In all states where registration of firms is assigned to the court, 
that responsibility is not carried out by a separate organization. 
Under the special system now prevailing, the tasks of the registry court can be 
divided into 4 categories: 
a) keeping a register (of firms) is either compulsory or non-compulsory with respect 
to certain economic actors; 
b) the performance of acts is of constitutive nature, including recognition by the state, 
with rights created or shaped, with respect to corporations with or without legal 
personality, state enterprises, cooperatives, other undertakings or businesses; 
c) the exercise of judicial powers serves to shape the pattern of legal relations 
exclusively with respect to economic corporations; 
d) "legality control" is exercised with respect to economic corporations. Associations 
and foundations aie registered and cancelled, by way of exercising functions of the 
country court, in extrajudicial proceedings. In addition to its responsibilities as a court of 
registration, the court's tasks in lawsuits include dealing with conflicts arising out of legal 
relations between associations, more specifically legal actions involving impugnment of 
decisions, enforcement of rules on minority protection, suits against senior officers, etc. 
Concerns and problems encountered with respect to specific tasks of the registry court 
will be: 
a) keeping the register of firms. The register of firms is a public and authoritative 
institution requiring security of business and information on the market. Keeping it is a 
task for the court in the laws of several states (Germany, France). But, even in countries 
where registration is assigned to another institution, an enterprise registry office (e.g. in 
Great Britain), the head of that institution is vested with quasi judicial powers, such as 
control over suspension and termination of enterprise activities, ex officio cancellation 
of firms, and the like. 
The register of firms derives its character as a public record from the protected status 
of firms in business transactions (competitive position, goodwill), the documentation of 
their operations and the declaration of firm property. 
In our judicial practice of old, a main purpose of a commercial firm was to provide 
an opportunity for anyone wishing to contact a particular firm to obtain reliable 
information about, e.g., the ownership of the finn (Kuria, 21.778/1893), from the register 
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of firms and other documents serving as the basis for registration. Judicial practice 
established the documentary principle along with those of public authenticity and 
publicity ("the court shall enter into the register nothing but facts supported by 
declarations made in legal form by persons entitled thereto"; Kuria, 322/1887). On the 
other hand, publicity is also limitative of the contents of the register of firms, because 
internal transactions not destined for the public must not be entered (Bpesti Tábla, 
2101/1883). 
In connection with conflicts between the protection of business secrets, publicity, and 
the need for market information, the question is this: what can be made public? Under 
our old law, the data in the register of firms was open to inspection, and copies thereof 
as well as of other documents kept in the archives could be issued. Among them was the 
official certificate of annotations in the register with an indication of their dates of 
validity, and the negative certificate to the effect that a particular annotation did not 
figure in die register of firms. 
Our present-day law embodies all of the principles and rules mentioned above, but 
it also refers to the possibility of excluding publicity, laying down rules relative to non-
public registration. At the same time, it combines the documentary principle with a 
peculiar misconceived notion, also evidencing the professional standard of law-makers, 
inasmuch as both the relevant Law-Decree and Decree are consistent in referring to void 
documents. This reference is ignorant of the fact that the document itself is not rendered 
null and void by simply putting a void legal transaction into writing, particularly when 
nullity, for instance, results from a failure to meet the requirement of written form. 
The whole body of current regulations allows the conclusion that the Gazette of 
Incorporated Finns is the primary source of information, whereas inspection of firm-
related data and die possibility of applying for certificates of incorporation or copies 
thereof are subsidiary to the fonner. 
Basically, despite its socio-economic significance, registration of fmns is no function 
of the court, but rather an activity subject to supervision by the court, while examination 
of the validity of legal transactions and facts of law serving as a basis for incorporation 
clearly presuppose possession of special legal and judicial knowledge and powers. 
Nevertheless there arise a few ideas, with some conclusions to be drawn. 
A) It is insufficient to examine legal transactions connected with and supporting 
incorporation in die domain of invalidity, because public authendcity and presumption of 
good faith exhibited by new legal transactions in honouring the facts registered also 
require examination of inapplicability (not only of the rules governing conditions as to 
time, but also of inapplicability to persons, e.g. the existence of contracts draining away 
resources for debt coverage). The examination of inapplicability is of particular 
importance since more and more frequent of transactions and contracts "founding 
incorporations" designed, along with documenting extension of fictitious credit, to divert 
sizable enterprise assets from satisfying proprietary claims of the state, on apparendy 
valid and even legisladve authorization (e.g. by resembling arrangements as regulated by 
Art. 23 of Act X of 1988). 
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B) Nullity as an incident of invalidity is hard to recognize merely by examination of 
documents. Also needed are background information, knowledge of materials pertaining 
to other transactions, and disclosure of the foundation process. Here are some cases in 
point: 
— A contract is null and void if contrary to law, e.g. when it was made it was done 
so through abuse of economic superiority and contains unilateral advantages (Art. 20 of 
Act LXXXVII of 1990 on Competition). A host of corporations which had forced 
workers of certain workshops, sections, and shops to join them were formed under the 
pressure of economic superiority, exposing workers to unemployment. Unfortunately the 
registry court is hardly in a position to recognize, in the light of what has been stated 
above, the unlawfulness of such contracts and the fact of economic superiority; 
— A contract is null and void if made by evading the law. Such is the case, for 
instance, of founding a joint venture when, for the purpose of manipulating Hungarian 
interests and voting power, half the property is shown to be other than contributed 
capital, or paruiership fund. Rather the founders agreed that the Hungarian partner should 
grant the use thereof the corporation to be established, whereby that share of capital 
would not embody Hungarian participation, but instead would become common property 
of the venture with different property shares. This arrangement apparently conforms to 
the law, but what else is it if no evasion of statutory regulations? Yet how can such 
designs be detected in the foundation deeds that appear to satisfy the rules? 
— A contract is also null and void if it obviously runs counter to social interests. 
Any commercial or service activity which cannot meet compulsory and accepted 
guarantee and Warranty liabilities because, given the lack of capital and the declaration 
of limited liability, no funds are available for satisfying such claims is obviously contrary 
to the interests of society. Any undertaking constituting a source of increased hazards and 
capable of causing large-scale or massive damage, is subject to unlimited liability by 
operation of law. But of this undertaking is being prevented by its minimum original 
registered capital from satisfying claims against it, is likewise contrary to all interests of 
society. 
In such situations, the court acting as a registry court could in principle establish the 
nature of limited liability as contrary to social interest and hence its nullity, but only if 
it were able to see and determine the real field of operation, the actual economic activity 
of an incorporation or a fmn. However, instead of regulating matters in this direction, 
Decree No. 13/1989 (XII. 16) of the Minister of Justice currently in force is based on 
formalism, a system of statistical figures, and its set of requirements, completely veiling 
as it does real and shared goals and spheres of activity, does not enable, nor can it 
enable, the court to establish nullity; 
— Also to be regarded as null and void is a fictitious or a concealing contract, 
namely a transaction stipulating rules instead of specifying a result really intended by the 
parties. Accordingly, any contract of corporation concealing agreements embodied in 
contracts of the parties that refer in name to syndicates (consortia, firms of like nature, 
etc.), but have not been presented and actually govern and organize relationships between 
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parties in respect of, e.g., assessment of contributed capital, extend and countervalue of 
accessory collateral services, and stipulation of pre-emptive rights is null and void. 
However, disclosure of an intent to conceal and full knowledge of pertinent facts are 
impossible precisely because of the nature of concealment and the hidden content of 
concealed contracts. 
It remains to be pointed out that invalidity and hence nullity can often be corrected, 
the cause of invalidity can be removed a posteriori. The fact of subsequent remedy is 
nevertheless impossible to clarify by examination of a single document, so a declaration 
at law which has already become invalid is seemingly void. 
b) Constitutive acts of the state as facts generative, formative and terminative of 
rights are consequences and manifestations of state power, more particularly of judicial 
power. 
In exercise of his/her power the judge creates and terminates subjects at law, creates, 
modifies, enforces, and dissipates rights and obligations. This series of actions results in 
recognition by the state, namely in approval by the state of the shaping, existence and 
operation (economic activity) of social formations instituted by human will. 
Judicial decisions are based on the public interest. State acts of recognition, 
performed to protect and apply the law, may be instrumental in and supportive of 
establishing economic organizations, associations, and foundations that are useful to 
society as a whole, embody social interests, are capable of economic operation, are of 
advantage to the community, and are within permissible limits according to criteria of 
community service and interests. 
The boundaries of judicial acts are demarcated by specific provisions of law as well 
as by constitutional principles, accepted principles of civil law, and norms of public 
policy known to and accepted by all (good morals, honesty). 
However, judicial recognition presupposes: 
(aa) appropriate expression of the parties' real common will (consensus); 
(bb) clear and unambiguous statement of common goals; 
(cc) putting all this into writing (deed); and 
(dd) choice of the appropriate mode of legal recognition (e.g. fmn with legal 
personality) and indication of operational conditions. 
Add. a) Often, the real will of the parties is by no means to set up an economic 
corporation; they are prompted to do so by tax rules, available credit lines, new benefits 
extended to entrepreneurs, because a new undertaking is granted special tax exemptions 
as the former restarting credit was intended for new "forms of undertaking". 
The model of one-person limited liability company, with no conditions and guarantees 
attached to its establishment, has led to the mass emergence of irresponsible, nominal 
organizations as against the preferable real individual firm. Along those same lines, 
derogative treatment of general partnerships as a form of incorporation, retention of the 
denomination "economic partnership", and absence of actual partnerships have tended to 
produce a dumping of limited liability companies established without effective capital, 
with declaration of formal contributed capital, in quest of benefits, economic and 
financial support from foreign participants. The establishment of one-person joint stock 
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companies and ones limited to a narrow range of formally several shareholders covers 
no real partnership and no effort at pooling of capital, but implies an endeavour to escape 
burdens, to secure managers' livelihood and to increase their income unrelated to 
performance, while keeping in existence state enterprises doomed to bankruptcy. 
The necessary attributes of a real incorporation include: 
1) corporate property—independent, or separate common property—resulting from 
partners' voluntary limitation of their respective shares in property, 
2) a corporate goal, as a determinant factor of activity, set by common accord and 
motivated by shared interest; 
3) aspirations for lasting cooperation, for lasting economic and organizational links; 
4) the principle of shared risk-, and 
5) a hope for common economic gain to be acquired through joint efforts. 
In the absence of these criteria one cannot speak of any association, of any common 
will. 
Add. b) A common goal is an indispensable notional element of association and 
should therefore be expressly stated. 
A common goal should be realistic, permissible, and accepted by every partner, so, . 
in building relationships of partners, it is necessary to appraise economic preconditions, 
the property background, immaterial factors, market opportunities and operating 
conditions in order to ensure that the corporate goal is not contrary to the legal order and 
the accepted rules of the market and competition, is not prejudicial to the interests of the 
external market, to the environment, etc. 
As our current law of procedure dispensed, as it were, with the requirement of fairly 
clarifying the said goal in all these aspects and actually expressing it, it does not provide 
for registration of real possibilities open to business activity and hence rules out a priori 
the possibility of real judicial recognition as well. 
Add. c) The actual will to establish an association (society, foundation) and the actual 
goal of a new organization can only be stated in an appropriate document, usually in 
contract form. 
The decline of our contractual culture during the past decades, as is manifested in the 
stereotype filling up of formal documents, has reduced the effort at raising to the 
legislative level the free self-regulatory will of the parties—one of the greatest achieve-
ments in modern times of mankind in the process of embourgeoisement and liberaliz-
ation—to a bureaucratic act, to paperwork, to the status of a worthless file to be disposed 
of. In the contract, the rule of the Code Civil—in keeping with the doctrine of Kelsenian 
legal positivism as well—raises in fact to the status of enforceable law a legal norm or 
a norm of conduct established by the free will of interested parties rather than under 
compulsion by the state. Of particular relevance is the recognition of the parties' 
contribution to norm creation in respect of complex contracts of incorporation, the 
function of which consists not only in regulating individual (single) legal relationships, 
but also in governing and settling on a lasting basis a mass of diverse and complicated 
legal relations overlaying one another. Indeed, such contracts are supposed to be able to 
do so, but not under the relevant Hungarian legislative concept and established practice. 
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Self-regulation covers the lasting system of relations, the permissible courses of conduct 
and their effects, trying to eliminate the impact of possible conflicts, disputes and diverse 
interests as, in addition to laying down stipulations, it determines legal consequences as 
well. 
However, the Company Act, not even referring to the possible content and function 
of contract of corporation, enumerates, as it were, the compulsory and occasionally 
necessary elements thereof. Related practice is of no value as it has created patterns in 
a process which, not conforming to reality and the needs of parties, has been further 
strengthened by the formalist rules of the registration procedure and practice of registry 
courts keeping closely to the requisites determined by law, although the question is there 
of: 
— how to transfer the ownership of any property to the corporation without the 
contract regulating in detail the transfer and acceptance of things, the contribution of 
immovable property and the mode of acquiring property, stipulating guarantees for proper 
use, indicators of suitability, etc.; 
— how to contribute legally protected intellectual property (patent, trademark, know-
how, etc.) without regulating all questions concerning the scope of and restrictions on 
licence, the protection of secrets, the modalities of royalty payment, and the conveyance 
of rights; 
— how an "accessory" service becomes part of a business share without the contract 
which determines a partnership interest laying down the relevant rules (e.g. for the use 
of municipal services, warranty of quality, sharing of obligations for maintenance and 
repair, rent, and claims for reimbursement of expenses in the case of business premises 
made available). 
I should add that the problems concerning the inheritance of business shares, stocks 
and property shares, and the joint membership of co-heirs are unregulated, and the rules 
governing the exercise of corporate rights held by co-owners go unformulated in the 
system of stereotype regulations centred on the filling up of printed forms. 
Add. d) A judicial decision creates a new subject at law or modifies the status of an 
existing one. 
In the majority of cases, the constitutive decision of the judge creates legal persons, 
i.e. organizations separated from the founders, capable of independent transactions, and 
having names and personalities of their own, which, under the specific solution devised 
by the Hungarian legal system, possess absolute legal capacity. This means that, with the 
exception of prohibited activities, they may acquire any right, may undertake any 
obligation, and may conclude legal transactions without restrictions. If such is the case, 
the question arises of why it is so important to have the scope of activity strictly 
specified, to view with suspicion any operations outside that scope, and to threaten them 
with prejudice and sanction. 
A review of European changes in the conceptual approach to the status of 
corporation as subjects at law permits us to state that, apart from the break in the 
previous rigid doctrine of ultra vires, inner restrictions on the activity of economic 
corporation and on the rights of representation in the directives of the European 
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Community and the legislations of the Communities based thereon do not generally 
obtain in relation to bona fide third persons, but the limitations on the scope of activity 
as recognized by the state determine a priori the room of economic corporation for 
manoeuvre. 
Despite the conceptual regulation by the Civil Code, Hungarian legislation and legal 
practice have so far failed to effectively recognize the validity of actions by legal persons 
overstepping the boundaries to the scope of activity. Suffice it to refer here to the 
substance of the relevant provisions of law and to judicial practice concerning economic 
fines. As matters stand, it appears justified to effect some change in the concept of the 
Civil Code regarding economic corporations with legal personality, to devise a system 
that will recognize, as a general principle, the registered scope of activity, but will, as an 
exception, allow activities beyond that scope. 
It is absolutely warranted to widen the range of registered firms without legal 
personality. An individual firm can be conceived of in the form of either limited or 
unlimited liability (the latter would eliminate the notional absurdity manifest today in the 
formation of one-man "corporations"). It would be necessary to grant recognition to 
partnerships, an internationally known form of corporation, which means no separate 
subject at law (proprietory organization operating under its own name and capable of 
suing and being sued), but only a legal relationship between its members in the nature 
of mutual representation, which is characterized by a shared goal of profit-making and 
shared risk-taking. On the other hand, as concerns the legal capacity of incorporated firms 
without legal personality, it is desirable and practicable to apply the doctrine of ultra 
vires, to declare the scope of such firms do not appear warranted and lawful except 
within bounds accepted by the court. 
c) Shaping the legal relationships of corporations within frameworks authorized by 
the court. The settlement of conflicts arising between partners or between members and 
an incorporation in the course of legal relations is divided, with or without reason, by our 
Company Act between the court acting in contentious proceedings and the registry court 
performing extra-judicial functions. The Act also assigns responsibilities of registration 
and record-keeping in general, in relation to firms (incorporation, supervision, 
cancellation). 
Whereas it is a task for the court acting in lawsuits: 
— to supervise decisions of an economic corporation at the request of any member 
(Art. 44); 
— to consider unlawful decisions of the corporation (Arts. 45, 116, 139, 279); 
— to settle disputes between the person in charge of final settlement and members 
of the corporation (Art. 53); 
— to establish the validity of exclusion (Arts. 78, 122, 150, 182); 
— to settle legal disputes between corporations and senior officers (Art. 290;) and 
— to establish the unlimited liability of a majority-share joint stock company in 
favour of the creditors of an corporation subjected to control (Art. 326), 
it is the function of the registry court: 
— to have the decision-making body of the corporation convened (Art 42); 
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— to have the person in charge of final settlement designated, in the case of an 
corporation dissolved, at the request of members representing not less than one-tenth of 
the votes (Arts. 48, 318); 
— to order, in exercise of the prerogative of the general assembly and at the request 
of members representing not less than one-tenth of the original capital, expert inquiry into 
the balance-sheet of a limited liability company and other aspects of its activity (Art. 
195); 
— to instruct managers to provide information for members of incorporations and 
to allow them to inspect the books and documents (Art. 203); 
— failing a manager, to convene the general assembly of a limited liability company 
(Art. 206) and 
— to convene the general assembly of a joint stock company in exercise of the 
management's prerogative (Art. 273), acting instead of members and according to their 
status. 
The above rules empower the registry court to perform legal acts which are supposed 
to belong to the province of members or organs of an incorporation. However, the 
function of the registry court here is to remedy missing legal declarations by the parties. 
The registry court comes to play a role in setding disputes on their merits when it orders 
senior officers (managers) of an association to pursue a specified course of conduct 
within the frameworks of the corporation's legal relations, namely of the underlying legal 
relationship between a member and the association. This function in dispute settlement 
is very similar to a situation in which the validity of a decision of the corporation is 
considered in a lawsuit or which involves judicial settlement of a conflict arising in 
charge of final settlement and members. As can be seen, the Act is inconsistent in the 
separation and distribution of functions, particularly so when it treats the registry court 
as a unit separate from the judicature, from the organization exercising judicial functions. 
d) Some questions of legality control. Once the system of a law-governed state has 
been fully established, so-called legality control cannot be upheld as a special concept. 
It is for state organs, primarily the courts, to secure the operation of the legal system, 
whereas the responsibility to enforce certain rights in the public interest may be assigned 
to spokesmen and perhaps to the procuratorial organization. 
It is known in the modem capitalist economy that the right of supervision of 
organizations which control like a holding for the economic or internal activity of 
corporations operates as a regulatory and moulding factor capable of working efficiently 
and successfully. The right of judicial organizations or registry offices functioning also 
as registry courts to exercise supervision and to take measures is an important state 
prerogative recognized throughout the world, but continuous supervision over the 
operation and decisions of firms cannot be a task reserved for the court. (It was only the 
system of direct guidance over the planned economy that sought to impose similar 
responsibilities on members of arbitral tribunals which existed to decide economic 
disputes.) In any case, as we have seen, random examination of documents, submitted or 
ordered to be sent in, can hardly give an idea of the validity, defects and nature of a legal 
transaction. 
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There can be no doubl that the court (not necessarily the registry court) may, at 
request or on motion, take appropriate measures to see that the operation and decisions 
of a particular economic organization conform to the provisions of law. However, it is 
unwarranted, and incompatible with judicial power, to hint at the possibility open to 
action ex officio (Sect. 19, para. 2 of Law-Decree No. 23 of 1989). It is a different matter 
that if supervision by the tax office over the economy, supervision over the market and 
supervision over securities as well as the avenues of prosecutor's action appear to be 
insufficient beside the system of internal supervision as required by a market economy, 
the need may also arise for introduction of an insurance regime for firms. 
Today the development of our legal system is marked primarily by an unsystematic 
process of adopting an unbelievable mass of incoherent enacments scientifically 
unsubstantiated and not based on the fundamental law, a process which produces a 
congeries of confused norms admitting of no scientific analysis and systematization, its 
features recalling the extent and incoherence of administration by decree. Our laws and 
regulations are characterized not only by confusing legal relations with their external 
form in respect of nullity, but also by adoption of Acts in which the notional elements 
of voidableness and nullity are intermingled like a mazy tangle impossible to disengage 
(see Art. 84 of the Securities Act). 
It is a most important professional task of judges dealing with firm-related matters 
to apply the law in its interrelationships and in accordance with its basic principles, 
subordinating the letter of the law to the principles of the legal system. On this score, it 
is well worth bearing in mind the words of Gusztáv Szászy-Schwarz: "The less we 
understand the law the more laws we need. Jurisprudence is the science of how to do 
without laws. Had Nature as many laws as the State, not even God would be able to 
govern with them". 
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Csaba Varga t» Law", or "More or Less Legal"? 
1. Law as Interaction 
In Greek legal culture, justice as manifested in actual cases was called dikaion, and this 
became the basis of the concept of ius in Rome (VILLEY 1967, p. 11). On the ground 
of such a tradition, the change from the jurisconsults' and the praetors' personal and 
individual contribution to the rigidifying codification of case-law during Justinian's rule 
was radical indeed. But it is even more radical a change that, from the teachings of 
Christianity and only in the West, under the influence of the Evangelists' parable-like 
writings and St Augustine's brooding Confessions, a St Thomasian Summa Theologica 
could evolve, that is, an idea of the establishment of a system of thought, which was of 
an axiomatic character and which made an attempt more geometrico at providing social 
and moral ideas with scientific foundations and with the pretension of consequentiality, 
deriving from a kind of abstract internal necessity or the logic of a system—as it was 
apparent in Grotius, Hobbes, Spinoza, or Leibniz (VARGA 1979, section 3). 
Judaism in the form of Tahnudism, orthodox Christianity in the fonn of theological 
development, Islam in the fonn of rites marking off from one another in accordance with 
different interpretations—well, all of them followed a pattern both in religious thinking 
and law that was striving for generalization but did not attempt at deductive establishment 
of a system. Their norm-statements were always embedded in inductive contextures: they 
were to guide and not to conclude the course of thinking. The binding force of such a 
mental tradition can be well illustrated by the example of China. Not even in time of 
socialist revolution did minds of China cease wavering between ancient traditions and the 
European way of thinking; they only broke off with traditions for the period 
when—depending on Soviet-Chinese relationship—the adoption of foreign patterns 
predominated internal development (VARGA 1975, pp. 129-132). 
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"Abstract rules" can only be regarded as the characteristically Western "folk category 
of law" (POSPISIL 1971, p. 20) in the context of modern formal law. For it is only at 
this very stage that modern statehood lays the foundations of a bureaucratically organized 
and operated system of legal institutions. As regards the law's formation, it is being done 
by the criterion of formal validity (attributing legal quality to the outcome of definite 
procedures of definite state organs instead of criteria of contents); as regards the law's 
functioning, by the criterion of formal legality (attributing legal quality of derivation to 
the outcome of definite procedures which do observe definite rules laid down by definite 
state organs, instead of criteria of contents or the social justness of the case). This is the 
contexture in which, in the spirit of formal rationalization, formalization is carried to the 
extreme in respect of both the reduction of law to mere rules and its operation, and, as 
an ideology of the professional practising of the law, the juristic world concept that 
postulates the principles of fonnál validity and fonnal legality to become determinant 
factors in the law's actual life, gets also institutionalized. In a legal system like this, the 
own system of fulfilment (that is, die postulated requirement according to which social 
goals are to be attained through the execution of legal enactments) necessarily develops 
its own incongruencies (that is, the disparities between the requirements of the system 
and their realization in practice) and dysfunctions (that is, the presence of effects counter-
acting and even spoiling the value of expected social effects), too (VARGA 1983). 
It is obviously unjustified to call upon foreign cultures in accounting for a given 
(legal) ideal, as both cultures and ideals are definite products of historically concrete 
social and historical developments. 
This is, however, no reason for another polarization, e.g. for Pospisil's question 
(POSPISIL 1971, chapter 2) whether the law is composed of "abstract rules", "abstracts 
from actual behaviour", or of "principles upheld by legal decisions". It is widely agreed 
upon that the set of actual behaviours is to be considered a sheer facticity, not law. But 
if legal decisions are nothing else but manifestations of power without is and ought being 
contrasted in them, they are matters of sheer facticity, tcxi, that can only arbitrarily be 
called legal decisions. 
Thus, the question ; irises: what is normativity involved in? If it is either in social 
evaluation or in the influence evaluation exerts with a certain regularity on practice that 
we are identifying its essence, we are relied exclusively on facts as subjects of 
investigation. For endowing either some features of actions or of institutions with the 
quality 'legal', it results in a theoretical reduction, since we will not arrive at a 
substantial answer in return for postponing the problem itself. Any solution chosen, we 
do rely on facts so that we should be able to infer an evaluation or to reveal a regularity 
that allows for fonnal institutionalization or plays the part of an institutional system, or 
is capable of playing it without being fonnalized and institutionalized. 
In my opinion, in the case of communities identifying the law with rules, an ideo-
logical concept of the law can be outlined, which conceives of the boundaries of the law 
as delimiting one area which is covered by legal regulation, and of the two areas which 
are covered by actual behaviours and authority decisions "realizing" the law respectively, 
as domains within the former one. As it is a matter of the ideology of an institutional 
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system and of the profession called to its operation, this is an ideal that gets reflected in 
it. Theoretically, the realization of that ideal is not impossible but in practice—due to the 
more complex definitions prevailing in life—most frequently only its approximations can 
be materialized. Thus, in communities identifying the law with rules, norms established 
and fixed in a given way are the predominant vehicles of legal normativity (Figure 1). 
The solution of conflicts is said to be of crucial importance in the existence of law. Not 
simply because it stirs all the forces of society, but because it is a test of practice that 
might or might not prove that the alleged vehicle of normativity is the actual vehicle. 
Notwithstanding, one can ask what does it happen if there is no conflict in the area 
covered by the law, if the conflict evades legal decision, or if the decision departs from 
the rules identified with the law? Would it be a genuine solution with the effect of all 
such cases getting excluded from the domain of law? Certainly not. And, what is more, 
it is not altogether unlikely that a practice departing from the rule is nevertheless 
regarded as legal by the community; it may even occur that the authority makes a 
decision concerning such a practice and the decision, although refuting actual practice, 
will be arbitrary, not following from the rule. 
142 Csaba Varga 
Thus, as regards its ontological existence, law is a complex phenomenon composed of 
interactions, interpretations and temporary separations, that is, the complex motion is made 
up of at least three factors, namely, rule, authority's decision, and actual behaviour. 
Anyway, law is not homogeneous or with itself statically identical a phenomenon. It may 
be reinforced or weakened equally, that is to say, rendered more or less legal by the 
intertwining and separation of its components, since, ontologically speaking, the 
phenomenon which gets supported not only by its enacted nature, but also by the practice 
of the coercive measures by the state (taken in the name of the law and, eventually, also 
made accepted by society), is obviously "more legal". That is, the more completely it 
comprises the three components, the more completely it will display the features of law. 
At the same time, law is dynamic a factor of reality; its components respond to external 
challanges in an ever renewing manner, and this brings about internal shifts of emphasis, 
too. On the one hand, this approach avoids the danger of replacing one simplification with 
another: the reduction to rules with the reduction to conflicts. On the other, it tries to make 
it clear that the rule is by far not simply an incidental element of the law. Not so much its 
presence as its part played in the complex called 'law' is liable to change (Figure 2). 
RULE 
/dead/ 
D E C I S I O N 
01 
A U T I I O R Í I V 
practice 
followed as legal 
and reinforced 
by authority's decision 
as law/ P R A C T I C E 
Figure 2. The ontological concept of law 
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2. Law as a Social Function 
"Both states and chiefdoms have the most necessary ingredient of law, a central authority 
that can create rules of behaviour, enforce them, and judge the breaches of them" 
(SERVICE 1975, p. 90). It may, however, be objected to the statement above that a 
simple identification leads to a sham historicity only, since it neglects just the facts 
arrived at by several thousand years of civilizational developments. In connection with 
Bachofen's "Mother Right", Engels wrote the following: "I retain this term for the sake 
of brevity. It is, however, an unhappy choice, for at this social stage, there is as yet no 
such thing as right in the legal sense (Recht im juristischen Sinne)" (ENGELS 1884, p. 
476). 
Notwithstanding, both theoretical analysis and conceptual classification need at least 
attempts at the law's social functional definition. Allowing for sociological and 
anthropological considerations, I propose concluding the following criteria: 
(1) law is a global phenomenon integrating society as a whole. According to this, 
criminal gangs (mafia Cosa Nostra), economic associations (guilds), secret societies 
(religious or political: early Christians, Garibaldists) and other club- and party-like 
organizations fall outside the domain of the law in so far as society is territorially 
organized. Providing that social organization is still personal, the ground of separation 
is whether a given organization is exclusive or it theoretically involves all in compliance 
with the personal categories. The next consideration is that 
(2) law is a phenomenon settling conflicts of interests that emerge in social 
practice as fundamental. Law is expected to regulate relations which are sufficiently 
fundamental so that it can establish a society (e.g. by drawing its boundaries). In 
European urban development, this can be claimed for the regulations in and by a guild 
in case they acquire a universality embracing society as a whole. If regulations remain 
restricted to partial relations (life within the guild, or the order of external relation-
ships relevant to guild activity), they can as best be regarded as a system of rules 
integrated into the law or parallel with it, but, anyhow, to be of a different kind. In 
situations of transition, i.e., in times of the dissolution of state-organized power 
machinery, political associations and parties can become the main regulating factors 
of society which fill in the vacuum that has arisen. In religious communities, 
characterized by sect-like claims of exclusiveness and aiming at the assertion of their 
own commands in all fields of life, it may occur that, by organizing themselves as self-
supporting communities, they make use of their respective norm-systems as legal 
systems. This was attempted, e.g., by the Quaker communities either in their 
withdrawal from civilization (as in case of 18—19th centuries' British emigrants) or by 
their separation within civilization (as in case of 19-20th centuries' settlements in 
America). Finally, 
(3) law is a phenomenon possessing the supreme regulating and influencing power 
in a given society. When several systems of norms assert themselves in society, the legal 
norm-system is the one whose procedure may in situations of conflict be resorted to in 
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order to enforce the ultimate solution in the expectation of a success. Naturally enough, 
procedural efficacy cannot assert itself in a pure and directly legally relevant fonn. 
Therefore, a number of questions arise. Is the legal character of Estonian or Texas 
law derived from the superimposition of USSR or USA law on them respectively? How 
is the supremacy of national procedure to be interpreted if we may have a direct recourse 
to international legal authorities in minority or human rights affairs? What if criminal 
gangs, secret societies, political or religious organizations attempt to win acceptance for 
their claims by coercively (e.g. by assassinations) preventing their conflicts from being 
presented to external authorities? 
The significance of all social considerations like the ones exemplified above may at 
the most be that of mutually reinforcing components of a cluster. Or, the more 
completely they are manifested, the more probably we may talk about law in a 
sociological and in an anthropological sense. 
Marginal cases are, however, to be found not only among past instances; they have 
also presented themselves more recently. How shall we interpret Eugen Ehrlich's 
experience at the turn of the century of the customary law of Galician ethnic groups that, 
reinforced by century-old traditions, reproduced itself as the community's own 
comprehensive, fundamental and supreme regulating system—since, due to the sovereign 
power's lack of either strength or interest, while they became politically subdued, their 
life remained intact from re-organization based on the law of the sovereign power? The 
fact, therefore, that in Czernowitz Ehrlich, founder of legal sociology by his Grundlegung 
der Soziologie des Rechts (1913), could see the court of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
and the Austrian General Civil Code applied in questions brought before them was (apart 
from some urban centres) insufficient for him to discard the traditional arrangements as 
the actual legal regulating power of the communities of several hundred thousand people. 
Or, how shall we think about a sovereign power exercising a sham rule, with his 
activities confined to issuing mere laws of phantasy! There are, e.g. in Ethiopia, stone 
age tribes still untouched by anything like state power. Moreover, due to the primitive 
nature of the established state power, the illiteracy of population, and the religious and 
ethnic divisions within the population, the legal reforms of the last Emperor only proved 
effecting in the capital. Well, has the promulgation of their own imposed Civil Code 
abolished the legal character of the tribal laws that have predominated for thousands of 
years? Or, can the survival of these customary laws prevent the same Civil Code in 
Addis Abeba from being a law? Or, how shall we understand gypsies regarding 
themselves as forming their own society, ignoring stately given law and refusing to be 
considered subject to that law since they have their own magistrate in the person of the 
voivod and also further authorities that inflict punishment on them and provide for the 
prevelance of justice? On the grounds of any stately formed law it is obviously 
impossible to question whether such a thing as gypsy law can exist or not. Still, 
sometimes there may be even more than that at issue, that is, such a degree of conscious 
separatism that groups are not simply endeavouring to evade state law, but they take 
cognizance of it as a merely incidental phenomenon in their environment that threatens 
and may even bring pressure on them to bear, precisely like other environmental 
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conditions that they must take cognizance of in order to be able to live their lives, but 
with no more personal attachment and identification than, say, the fundamental laws of 
physics? Military occupation may provide us with a further case history. How are we to 
qualify the results, when an occupation, successful in terms of operation, is met by (or 
produces as a counter-effect) the activity of powerful guerilla communities that exerts a 
pressure on the whole population so that the latter, in their abhorrence of collaboration, 
will not even in their affairs of the most civilian nature rely on the authorities of the 
occupying (or the co-operating) state-machinery (as in the case of the Ukraine or Serbia 
during World War Two years)? 
Anthropological approach to law attempts to grasp the core of the phenomenon 'law' 
by treating each organization as having the open chance of entering the competition for 
creating a society by ensuring, within its framework, the supremacy to its own regulating 
system. 
3. Conclusion 
Now, if as a recapitulation we conclude that both the written and normative text-
enactment bearing the seal of "juridicity" and the results of the state authority's 
adjudication practice performed in the name of the law with certain permanence, and also 
the communal practice considered legal and enforced as legal, are to qualify as viable 
forms of the appearance of the law, we arrive at a concept of law that is grounded on the 
interaction of various sides and presupposes an uninterrupted dynamism. Its distinctive 
feature lies in its genuinely heuristic nature. It cannot be identified through fonnal 
definitions to tell which structure is "distinctively legal"; nor are definitions of the law 
divided sharply from the non-legal, calling for a definition of similar rigidity. 
The characteristically 'legal' is from the outset regarded as a product of interactions, 
of a complex process in the. course of which it is always from the mutually reinforc-
ing/weakening interactions of the "more" and the "less" legal (and, at the same time, as 
seen from differing points of view, "the" legal according to the selected point of view) 
that a kind of core phenomenon starts developing which will finally be, in one given 
society at one given time, considered the "most", or, the "par excellence", legal. 
In addition to conceivable theoretical impacts, such a conclusion may have an effect 
on actions of legal policy as well. For instance, if the use of the law as an instrument for 
social change is at issue now, it is by no means without interest to know whether law is 
to be understood as a choiceless process with the clue of change in the legislator's hands 
(with all other factors playing a subordinate role at the most), or there is an alternative 
strategy in reserve displaying the legislatory law reform as one among several ways that 
can be equally chosen; for it is always available to initiate and/or provoke social change 
through influencing either the authority's practice of adjudication or the communal and 
individual ways of using and practicing the law as well. 
The possibility of an alternative strategy in law has already been revealed by the 
ontological reconstruction of legal processes that has attempted to analyze law as a text 
146 Csaba Varga 
in the given contexture, that is, in the linguistic and socio-political settings of its 
interpretation. The recognition of the law's own complexity enhances the potentialities 
of how to make use of it. Or, in the ontological process of social motion, developing 
within the frame of the social total complex through its partial complexes featuring ever 
increasing particularities and interactions, it is those and only those teleological 
projections of man, consciously preparing for social transformation, that can most 
influentially integrate into these processes, which are well adapted to the particularities 
and actual motions of the complexes participating in interaction at any given time, that 
is, which are most organically integrated into the processes of social (self)delermination, 
of which all we tire authors and vehicles at the same time (VARGA 1985, chapter V and, 
as to the topic in a broad general context, VARGA 1986). 
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Attila Rácz Contemporary European Constitutional 
Development and the Hungarian 
Public-Law Legislation in 1848 
1. In these years, when framing a modem system of public law indispensable also for 
economic recovery has been a foremost aim of Hungarian society, it does worth the 
attention to recall those times when in 1848 a successful attempt was made, with its 
influence felt foi long decades even after the Compromise with the Hapsburg Monarch 
in 1867, to bring the Hungarian constitutional system into line with the developed part 
of contemporary Europe. 
2. In the middle of the last century the Hungarian reform endeavours in public law 
drew their nourishment primarily from the ideas which in the course of bourgeois 
transformation had appeared in British constitutional practice and, despite frequent 
changes over time, in the French Constitution of 1791, the first constitutional charter of 
Western Europe, and later in the Belgian Constitution of 1831 in particular, setting the 
most important examples, through German theory in some of their elements, for laying 
the public-law foundations of a bourgeois society. 
(a) The bourgeois constitutional system of England, which had established itself at the 
end of the 17th and during the 18th century, indisputably exercised a decisive influence on 
public-law thinking in Europe, chiefly because the Bill of Rights adopted in the wake of 
the bourgeois revolution and the subsequent restoration, after the parliamentary coup (the 
bloodless or, as is referred to in England, "glorious revolution") dethroning James II, threw 
overboard the absolute monarchy and introduced such a new system of power under which 
the Parliament, an elected representative organ, took precedence over the king in legislation. 
And in fact that Parliament had been functioning already in earlier times as a general 
representative organ rather than a representative body of Estates, though given the strongly 
limited franchise, one could hardly speak of actual popular representation before and even 
well after the Representation of the People Act of 1832. 
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In connection with ministerial countersignature, which had emerged in previous 
centuries, also the constitutional custom became established in England under a House 
of Commons charge the House of Lords, i.e. a parliamentary court, could condemn, in 
a quasi criminal procedure, a minister for offences and later for grave errors causing 
damage to the country, and indeed, the Parliament had frequent recourse to that procedure 
as a weapon against unpopular royal policies during the 17th century. So this process 
gave birth to the institution of ministerial responsibility put into effect by Parliament 
through responsibility under the criminal law. Moreover, from the 1780s onwards, the 
constitutional practice grew up that the king did not participate personally in government 
activity, the governance and the execution of the laws were the functions of the cabinet, 
which in tum bore collective political responsibility to Parliament, meaning that 
Parliament might withdraw confidence from the cabinet, which had to resign in such a 
case. It was for the first time in 1782 that a cabinet resigned for an obvious failure to 
enjoy the Parliament's confidence. 
The process of bourgeois transformation witnessed significant changes in the 
British administration of justice, too. It deserves, e.g., attention that the independence 
of judges was institutionally guaranteed through safeguards against removal in 1701. 
Trial by jury in criminal cases became practically general from the end of the 17th 
century. It is very interesting to note that in estimating the importance of that develop-
ment William Blackstone, a contemporary jurist, went so far as to say that the jury 
preserved in the hands of the people that share which they ought to have in the 
administration of public justice, and prevented the enekroachments of the more powerful 
and wealthy citizens. 
However, among the forward-oriented elements of the contemporary British 
constitutional system, mention should also be made of the fact that the Bill of Rights of 
1689 attached fundamental importance to the assurance of human rights and freedoms. 
(b) Legislation by the French revolution relied upon the sets of ideas of the 
Renaissance and the French enlightenment as well as upon the experience of British 
constitutional practice for outlining the public-law foundations of a new social order in 
the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen and in the Constitution of 
1791, setting an example for continental Europe as a whole. Outstanding among the 
central ideas of the Declaration and the Constitution were these: 
— clearing away the trammels of feudalism, they proclaimed, in accordance with the 
system of liberal ideas, the equality at the law of individuals as well as their rights to 
property and to personal and political liberty; 
— as against the sovereignty of the absolute monarch, they proclaimed the sovereignty 
of the nation, spelling out that exercise of political power derived from the nation alone; 
— embracing Montesquieu's, theory based on the British constitutional practice, they 
introduced a strict separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers with a view to 
prevention of arbitrary rale and assurance of freedom; 
— abolishing the representation of Estates, they declared legislation to be an 
expression of the public will and proclaimed the right of all citizens to participate in 
legislation personally or through elected representatives (popular representation), even if 
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the franchise was limited, for it was confined by property and other qualifications to a 
relatively narrow range of "active" citizens; 
— the form of government was monarchical, the executive power was exercised under 
delegated authority by the king or, on his behalf, by ministers and other officials bearing 
criminal responsibility (without, however, being politically responsible to the National 
Assembly); 
— they abolished the manorial courts and introduced a uniform system of state courts, 
while putting trial by jury in criminal cases into general use; 
— they enunciated the basic principle of legality, according to which "nothing shall 
be prohibited except by law and no person shall be obliged to do what is not ordered by 
law". 
After the abolition of the monarchy in August 1792 the frequent political changes 
were followed by new constitutions adopted at relatively short intervals, namely the 
Jacobin Constitution of 1793, the constitutions of the Directoire and the Consulate, and, 
following upon the fall of imperial rule, the constitutions of the restoration, i.e. the 
constitutional charters of 1814 and 1830, which, however, could no longer return to the 
power system of the ancien régime, but rather institutionalized some sort of a limited-
constitutional—monarchy. Back on the throne, the monarch himself was constrained to 
acknowledge that assurance of certain fundamental rights and constitutional limitation of 
the power of the Head of State constituted an inevitable reality of the new bourgeois 
society. 
(c) Also, attaining independence in the most industrialized region of Europe, 
Belgium's Constitution of 1831, which was liberal in guaranteeing human rights on a 
wide scale, reconciled national sovereignty with the monarchical form of government but 
rejected "excessive" demands prejudicial to the interests of the bourgeoisie in power, 
proceeded from that reality and postulate. For this very reason, that Constitution was long 
regarded as the "model constitution", or " constitutional standard" of a constitutional state 
by contemporary Europe in the process of embourgeoisement, including reformists in 
Hungary, keeping uppermost in mind that, within the meaning of the Constitution: 
— the monarch does not rule by divine right and enjoys no privileges, but is only 
vested with such rights as the Constitution or enactments based thereon may confer on 
him; that monarchical system differed only formally from the republic in that the post of 
head of state was for life and hereditary; 
— all power derives from the nation (people), and the bicameral legislature (both 
chambers, unusually at the time) is elected on the basis of popular representation, 
although the franchise was strongly limited by rather strict property ;md other 
qualifications; 
— effect is given to the principle of separation or, more accurately, division of 
powers; 
— the king is formally the head of executive power, but may not act except through 
his responsible ministers impeachable by the representative organ; 
— the term of office of judges if for life, and a judge may not be divested of his 
office or suspended in the exercise of his functions except by court order; all crimes, 
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including political misdemeanours and those of against press-laws, are cognizable by the 
jury; 
— as against attempts at centralization typical of France, emphasis is placed on 
recognition of rights for local self-government organs elected on the basis of popular 
representation. 
3. The spring of 1848 afforded opportunities for thorough-going constitutional 
changes in numerous countries of Europe. Owing to the revolutionary movements, the 
public-law system in virtually the whole of Western and Central Europe appeared to 
change in keeping with the postulates of bourgeois constitutionalism, as was also 
indicated by the European wave of constitutional legislation in 1848^49, just as by 
Hungarian legislation in March 1848. 
(a) In France, the revolutionary struggle of workers, petty bourgeois, and students 
against the bourgeois monarchy in open crisis and for their rights—which was seen by 
Tocqueville as the continuation of the struggle launched in 1789 for liberty, equality and 
fraternity and by Marx as the beginning of the revolutionary class struggle of 
workers—was the general signal in the enfolding revolutionary movement of Europe. The 
Second Republic was bom on 24 February. Then, already in the days of the "low ebb" 
of the revolution, but, in several aspects, still under the impact of the previous 
achievements of the bourgeois democratic revolution, the Constitution of 4 November 
was adopted laying down the republican form of government, the principle of sovereignty 
of the totality of citizens, and the universal suffrage of citizens over 21 years of age in 
possession of political and civil rights. For a long time that was seen as a unique 
development in France, if only for the reason that, in contrast to the Jacobin Constitution, 
the elections to the National Assembly based on universal suffrage were really held in 
1848. The Constitution provided for the separation of powers and recognized certain 
economic and social rights also (e.g. rights relating to work) among the civic rights, 
which, however, were "more moderate" compared to those set forth in the legislation 
enacted in the first days of the revolution. The Constitution ultimately shared the fate of 
the Republic when Louis Bonaparte made himself dictator by his coup of 2 December 
1851. 
(b) In the divided Italy the most important of the constitutions adopted under the 
impulse of the Italian révolutionary movements in 1848 is perhaps the Constitution 
imposed on Piemont-Sardinia by Charles Albert on 4 March 1848, if for no other reason 
than that it survived the reaction of 1849 and became the Constitution of the united 
Italian State in 1870 and remained one practically until 1947. By the way, this 
constitution followed only the model of the French constitutional charters of 1814 and 
1830, since Louis Philip had not been dethroned until 24 February 1848. Nevertheless, 
it did not proceed from the sovereignty of the monarch, but rather rested, implicitly, on 
the principles of national sovereignty and the responsibility of the executive power. It 
bore the stamp of the influence of the Belgian Constitution of 1831 as well, first of all 
in the regulation of citizens' rights and duties. It is perhaps equally noteworthy that the 
Constitution of Piémont reflected a rather flexible concept of constitutional legislation in 
that it made its amendment subject to no specific conditions and allowed amendment 
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through ordinary legislation at any time, just as the British or the Hungarian "historical" 
constitution did, whereas the French constitutional charter of 1814, which it followed as 
an example, was framed for all times to come and virtually was not to be modified 
except under pressure of revolution or in case of change in the dynasty, and other 
constitutions, e.g., the Belgian Constitution, generally required a special procedure for 
their amendment. It was precisely for this reason that the Constitution of 1848, amended 
many times by ordinary legislation, could formally remain Italy's constitution down to 
the adoption of the Constitution of 1947. 
(c) A confederation, a loose union of states, for long centuries, Switzerland was 
forced by Napoleon to adopt a federative state structure. After Napoleon's defeat, the 
cantons first sought to restore the old confederation. The Congress of Vienna, which 
guaranteed Switzerland's neutrality as well, approved the new pact of confederation under 
which the cantons regained full sovereignty. Although there emerged a common Diet, the 
institution of common executive power was abolished. Then, during the '30s, certain 
cantons underwent significant democratic transformations, but a similar constitution 
embracing the whole confederation—just as close cooperation (e.g. the establishment of 
common currency, customs system, post), which was increasingly urged for by economic 
reasons—was as yet prevented by the resistance of conservative cantons. With the 
ascendancy of liberal forces, such a change occurred in the spring of 1848 when, in the 
era of the French, Austrian and German revolutionary movements, intervention was 
impossible even by the foreign powers formerly "tutoring" Switzerland. Although the 
cantons with different nationalities, tongues and traditions retained their sovereignty by 
virtue of a decision of the great majority of cantons represented in the Diet, they 
relinquished, under the federal Constitution of September 1848, a measure of sovereignty 
to allow the rise of a genuine federal state with an effective bicameral legislature (one 
house of which was to be elected on the basis of popular representation) and an effective 
federal executive power. Notwithstanding that foreign examples had not been studied as 
thoroughly as they had been by the German Parliament of Frankfurt, they were taken into 
account in framing the new constitutional system. So were in the first place the federal 
state structure as established by the USA Constitution of 1787, the first constitutional 
charter, and, despite its monarchical form of government, Belgium's Constitution, which 
was relied upon particularly for formulating the rights of citizens. Yet framers of the 
Constitution could not remain insensitive to the revolutionary development of contempor-
ary France either. For instance, the effect of the Decree of 5 March 1848, which 
introduced universal suffrage in France, was obviously felt. The September Constitution 
of Switzerland relied on it, too, for introducing the universal suffrage of Swiss citizens 
or, more accurately, men. Such reserve, however, was no surprise at the time, since 
Wyoming State of the USA was the first in the world to recognize women's suffrage as 
late as 1869. 
(d) The spring of 1848 opened a hopeful possibility for the creation of a constitu-
tional national state in divided Germany as well. Under the impact of the July 1830 
revolution in Paris, the liberal movements pressing for constitutional change had grown 
in strength in several German states, but a real breakthrough did not occur until February 
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1848, when, in response to an initiative of Baden, demands for popular representation and 
a federation on the American model gained currency, as if by magic, in the German 
states. It was not until after two weeks that the first news came of Louis Philip's fall in 
France, but they gave rise within a week to a revolutionary situation throughout 
Germany. Programmes for transformation of the constitutional system were drawn up 
under the leadership of Karl Theodor Welcker and Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann. By the 
way, it was also Welcker who had previously propagated the term "state of law" 
(Rechtsstaat), so frequently used in Central and Eastern Europe nowadays, and the 
demand for a state of law or, more precisely, constitutional state, then, in the spring of 
1848, the Vorparlament of Germany envisaged convening, in May 1848, the National 
Assembly based on universal suffrage for men. Indeed, the famous Parliament, 
assembling "professors" (or, more accurately, lawyers), met in Frankfurt and framed 
Germany's Constitution in 10 months, placing the country's state structure on a federal 
basis similar to that of USA and Switzerland. The federal executive power was vested 
in the Emperor, who, however, was to act through responsible ministers. The representa-
tive system (Lower House) rested on popular representation, i.e. election on the basis of 
universal suffrage for men. On the Belgian model, fundamental civic rights were widely 
recognized. However, the delay of 10 months in drafting the constitution by March 1849 
was fatal for the implementation thereof. The reaction had by then regained strength in 
Germany, as in Europe in general, and the resistance of monarchical forces prevented the 
Constitution from going into effect. 
4. Unlike several countries, Hungary adopted no constitutional charter or "written" 
constitution even during the period of the revolutionary movements of 1848-49, but the 
system of public-law ideas which had undergone a radical change in Europe in the wake 
of the French bourgeois revolution of 1789 had exercised a decisive influence on 
constitutional thinking already during the reform era preceding the revolution. It was in 
that range of ideas that the draft criminal laws were discussed in 1843, when in the 
dissenting opinions expressed on the bills the Opposition led by Ferenc Deák practically 
outlined its entire programme for evolving a bourgeois state organization. The Manifesto 
of the Opposition adopted on 5 June 1847 as well as the Address by the Parliament of 
Estates which was worded by Lajos Kossuth and presented to the monarch on 3 March 
'48, were conceived in the same sphere of thought. 
When at the news of the French revolution in Paris the situation had become strained 
also in Vienna and the revolution had broken out there on 13 March, the meeting of the 
Parliament at Pozsony in an agitated aünosphere decided on a motion by Kossuth to have 
the Address of 3 March taken by a delegation to the monarch. On 11 March the demands 
of radical youth, drawn up in 12 articles by Sándor Petőfi, Pál Vasvári, József Irinyi, Mór 
Jókai, and Gyula Bulyovszky, were also published in Pest. The demands included freedom 
of the press, responsible ministry, annual sessions of Parliament convened on the basis 
of popular representation, equality of religions, equality before the law, common sharing 
of taxation, abolition of serfdom, release of political prisoners, establishment of national 
guards, reunion with Transylvania, and swearing of the army to the constitution. The 
revolution broke out in Pest on 15 March. 
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The fate of national independence and the planned public-law reforms was decisively 
influenced by the revolutionary events in Hungary and the support by revolutionary 
Vienna. Under the pressure of these developments the king accepted the demands 
contained in the Address on 17 March, and revolutionary legislation began in Pozsony 
the following day. 
When in November 1847 the last session of the Parliament of Estates assembled in 
Pozsony, hardly any of the deputies would have thought that the legislative programme 
for bourgeois transformation was to be implemented by that session, which would draft 
and adopt a whole series of the necessary enactments in a few days of "shock-work" 
during March 1848. In the same way as the old-type Parliament, sitting in a new 
international and internal situation, had laid the basic for a comprehensive transformation 
of the constitutional system in a rather short time in 1989 and 1990. 
Of outstanding importance among the legislative enactments aiming to evolve a new 
public-law system was the adoption of Act III on the establishment of an independent 
Hungarian responsible ministry, with the relevant bill worded by Kossuth, Bertalan 
Szemere, and Palatine Prothonotary Kálmán Ghyczy between 20 and 22 March, drawing 
chiefly upon the British practice, the Belgian and French constitutions previous to the 
revolution of 1848, and the parliamentary debate of 1843-44 on ministerial responsibility 
in connection with the bill on substantive criminal law. Following the dramatic disputes 
with the royal Court and the subsequent modifications, the Act of the National Assembly 
was approved by the monarch on 8 April. It provided that the king was to exercise the 
executive power through an independent Hungarian responsible ministry and that the 
validity of decrees, orders and decisions of, as well as appointments by, the king and 
his regent (palatine) was subject to the signature of one of the ministers having his 
headoffice in Pest-Buda. For that matter, the responsibility of the ministry (govern-
ment) or ministers meant, under the regulations then common in Western Europe as 
well, the minister's special "criminal" responsibility to a parliamentary "court". The 
government's political responsibility to Parliament was not governed by the Act. But 
it is necessary to note that the principle, later considered as a fundamental one of 
parliamentarism, according to which a government not enjoying the Parliament's 
confidence has to resign was not formally provided for by any basic law in the 
European continent up to 1875. 
Under Hungarian legislation, ministers were accountable for any act or decree 
prejudicial to national independence, constitutional safeguards, existing laws, personal 
freedom or the sanctity of property, if committed or issued in their official capacity, as 
well as for misappropriation or unlawful utilization of funds and other values entrusted 
to them, and for omissions in the enforcement of law, provided that these ones could be 
prevented by the enforcement devices made available to them by law. Impeachment of 
ministers was to be ordered by a general majority of votes in the Lower House. Justice 
was to be administered in open procedure by a court which was to be elected by secret 
ballot by the Upper House from among its own members and was to mete out 
punishment proportionate to the offence committed. Ministers were subject to the droit 
commun in respect of other offences committed in other than their official capacity. 
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Act V on the election of deputies to Parliament on the basis of popular representation, 
another essential law concerning the new constitutional order, was probably based on a 
draft by Ghyczy, Kossuth and Szeme re, although according to sources of the royal Court 
it was explicitly the result of Kossuth's drafting work. By virtue of the Act, the Lower 
House resolved itself into a National Assembly of popular representation. The Act, 
nevertheless, recognized suffrage only for men and even subjected it to either property 
or income or educational qualifications. Suffrage was thus extended to as little as 800,000 
persons out of Hungary's 11 million or so inhabitants, forming 7.3% of the population. 
It should be kept in mind, however, that, apart from universal suffrage recognized for 
men by the French and Swiss Constitutions of 1848, the afore-mentioned extent made 
ours perhaps one of the most democratic suffrage in Europe, since e.g. in the same period 
of time the corresponding ratio was about 4% for England, 2.5% for Piémont, and as low 
as 1.5% for Belgium. 
Together with the establishment of a Parliament of new type and a ministry 
responsible to it, transformation of the county and local organizations became a central 
concern of legislation. In the end, the relevant Acts (XVI, XXIII and XXIV), responsive 
to István Széchenyi's fears of a baleful penetration of nationalities, provisionally 
maintained the county organization of nobility, but placed election of the organs of royal 
free boroughs and corporate towns on a basis of popular representation. It is to be noted, 
however, that views on the question of maintaining the old county system were in sharp 
conflict at the sittings of Parliament between 28 March and 3 April. Kossuth, who as a 
bourgeois municipalist said he preferred the British and American solutions to French 
centralization, pointed out the incompatibility of a parliament of popular representation 
with a county system based on the nobility's privileges. Moreover, just as during the 
debate on the draft criminal laws of 1843, the issue was also raised, in the context of the 
long dispute between municipalists and centrists, whether the autonomy of the county and 
local organs was reconciliable with the government's responsibility. Kossuth reasoned 
along these lines: there were matters which it behoved the local authorities to decide and 
there were others within the competence of central power, the ministers' responsibility 
extending to the latter, not to the former. There was a dividing line to be drawn between 
the two kinds of relationship. Then, in reply to the Speaker's question whether to give 
up the municipal structure or to stop efforts at introducing the institution of responsibility, 
he said that, since he did not find the two to be incompatible, the county structure could be 
upheld as it had for long centuries served as a guarantee of our freedom, while the case for 
the government's responsibility could also be won as there are bounds to everything. 
The legislative process in March envisaged a few reforms also in the administration 
of justice to lay the foundations of a new bourgeois judicial organization. Act IX 
abolished the manorial courts, Act XXIX provided for removal of judges only by virtue 
of law, and Act XVIII made offences against press-laws subject to trial by jury. For that 
matter, Deák came out strongly for introduction on the French model of trial by jury in 
criminal cases as early as the preparation of the draft criminal laws in 1843. 
Among the legislative enactments of 1848 we find no separate declaration, common 
in contemporary bourgeois legislations, on the rights of man and citizens, but several 
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enactments such as those on general sharing of taxation and abolition of tithes and 
manorial courts spelled out in clear terms the equality at the law of the citizens, the most 
important of such rights. A separate Act covered the freedom of thought and the press, 
the freedom of academic teaching and learning, and free exercise of the legally 
recognized religions. 
For all these reasons, when the last Parliament of Estates concluded its work on 16 
April 1848, Móric Szentkirályi and Lajos Kossuth, two deputies of Pest County, rightly 
stated, in reference to the attainments of the revolutionary transformation as embodied 
in statutes, that "this is not all, enough to govern the future of the entire nation, but the 
foundation of our future development". Indeed, this became the benchmark for creating 
a modem Hungary. 
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Márta Bittó- Crimes Against the Environment 
Sándor Fülöp in the Hungarian Criminal Law1 
2 
I. Environmental Law in General" 
1. Provisions in Hungarian law protecting the environment 
In Hungary today the legal rules of environmental protection are being revised since the 
valid system of rules was formed in the last decades of the past regime. 
In this system a basic act was used to lay down the legal principles and the main 
general rules of environmental protection as well as to set the legislative directions of the 
particular rules. To enforce the basic rules many legal provisions on the lower level of 
the central legislative power (government, ministries) were brought regulating in detail 
the particular legal objects. 
Act II of 1976 on the Protection of the Human Environment is the basic act of the 
Environmental Law. The Act concerns the human environment in general. It also 
stipulates the elements of the environment to be legally protected: land, waters, air, flora 
and fauna, landscape and the settlement environment. "Settlement environment" is an 
environment created by man in an artificial way while other environmental objects consist 
of the natural environment. Any environmental object worthy of protection may be 
included in one of these general categories. 
1 Hungarian National Report to the XVth Congress of the A.I.D.P. 
2 by M. BITTÓ 
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Protection of environmental objects is necessary for preserving the human 
environment. The purpose of the Act is to lay down the fundamental rules relating to the 
protection, preservation and planned shaping of the human environment in order to 
protect human health and improve systematically the living conditions of the present and 
future generations. Accordingly, human health and living conditions of the present and 
future generations are such interests that should also be protected. Yet, certain 
considerations take priority under the Act to the detriment of environmental interests. It 
is declared that the tasks of environment protection shall be accomplished gradually in 
accordance with the national economic plan, the order of their social importance, and in 
proportion to the development and capabilities of the national economy. Accomplishment 
of tasks of environment protection shall be coordinated with the increase of production 
and the systematic improvement of living standards. However tasks of environment 
protection, having a favourable effect on the condition of man's life and health, shall be 
accomplished in the first place. These provisions made it legally possible in the last 
decades that the interests of environmental protection were systematically pushed to the 
background by economy and agouty. Even human health as an interest having 
unconditional priority, was defined in a manner that gave unlimited possibilities to 
enforce evaluating aspects. 
Environmental objects are protected by the Act against actual as well as threatened 
harm. Regarding environmental objects, it is difficult to disünguish between harming or 
endangering them. One can state in general that the endangering of legally protected 
objects of the environment can be realized by actually harming, or destroying physical 
objects in the environment. In exceptionally serious cases such as total destruction of a 
protected landscape one can speak about the actual harm of the legally protected object 
as well. Undoubtedly, in the case of the pollution of a river, the damage relevant in die 
application of the Environmental Act does not equate with the value of, say, some 
perished fishes. 
Here the harming result to be taken into consideration is the endangering of waters 
as the legal object that can be characterized by the degree of pollution. For instance a 
question arises in this case as to what degree of detrimental effect qualifies as pollution. 
Here the limiting values defined in the different environmental standards must be 
considered. The Act declares that for its purpose, pollution or harm shall be considered 
damaging or dangerous if it exceeds the limiting values defined in special statutory 
standard provisions. 
The Act specifies that the environment is defended against the following incidents: 
— pollution, damage or other harmful effect altering natural properties adversely 
or deteriorating human living conditions, 
— damage due to natural forces, 
— generating vibrations, oscillations and radiations as well as making activities 
connected to biological, chemical or radiating substances in such a manner that 
they may damage or endanger man or protected objects of the human environ-
ment. 
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2. Penal and administrative provisions in the environmental law 
The Act and the other legal rules related to the environment are of an administrative 
nature. Violation of prohibitions and obligations protecting the environment results in the 
application of legal consequences according to different branches of the applied law. The 
provisions of the Act regulate the legal consequences of an administrative nature only. 
Penal provisions protecting the enviroiunent can be found in the Criminal Law and also 
in the Contravention Law. 
In the Hungarian Law all crimes are embodied in the Criminal Code (Act IV of 1978, 
C.C. hereinafter), so environmental crimes are regulated also in this Code. For the time 
being a single disposition punishes the environmental crimes in the Criminal Code. 
"Damaging Environments" (Section 280 of C.C.) is regulated among the offences against 
Public Health. It is committed by the person who, to a significant degree, spoils, deterio-
rates or destroys an object under protection of the natural environment. The punishment 
is deprivation of liberty of up to three years. It is an aggravating circumstance if the 
damage gives rise of a danger to life. Then punishment is deprivation of liberty of up to 
five years. A person who commits "damaging of environments" through negligence, is 
punishable for a misdemeanour, with deprivation of liberty of up to one year, or with 
reformatory and educative labour, or with a fine, in case of aggravating circumstances 
with deprivation of liberty of up to three years. 
The Hungarian Criminal Law does not recognise the category of regulatory (quasi-
criminal) offences. All the crimes in the Criminal Code are regulated by the reason of 
the same principles, regardless whether they are traditional offences or administrative 
offences (i.e. the violation of an administrative rule is one of the elements of the criminal 
disposition). Our legal system is characterized by the existence of Contravention Law or 
Administrative Criminal Law which is separate from the Criminal Law. As a result of 
decriminalisation, the Contravention Law comprehends contraventions, the minor and 
bagatell-crimes as well as other law violations. Consequently, the contraventions may 
have the nature either of traditional crimes or of mere violations of administrative law. 
The sanction of the contravention is a fine in general which is not imposed by criminal 
courts but by administrative authorities. Bypassing the courts is the main reason why the 
Contravention Law must not be considered part of the Criminal Law but that of the 
Administrative Law. The contraventions are regulated in the Act I of 1968 on 
Contraventions and in the Order of the Government 17/1968 (IV. 17.) on the Particular 
Contraventions. The latter includes several Environmental Contraventions which punish 
the breaching of the administrative provisions on the protection of the particular 
environmental objects. 
Environmental administrative provisions are enforced by special administrative 
agencies. Authorities of environmental administration control compliance with the 
environmental prohibitions and obligations. When exposing omissions these authorities 
may apply legal sanctions against the failing person: the obligation to limit or put an end 
to the pollution, harm or damage caused by him, or the obligation to provide for adequate 
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protection, restriction or prohibition of the activity causing pollution, harm or damage. 
Since 1991 an action before the court may be taken against the order of the authority 
(establishment of jusüce in administrative cases). The authorities of environmental 
administration may also apply sanctions of a penal nature, i.e. different kinds of 
environmental fines (sewage, air pollution, noise, vibration etc. interdicts). The payment 
of a penalty for environmental protection shall not exempt anyone from further criminal 
or contravention liability. 
3. Legislating level of environmental penal provisions 
Since Hungary is not a federal republic we do not have any federal arrangements. From 
this point of view there is no reason to make a difference between central and regional 
legislation. However, there is a certain hierarchy of legal rules which are issued by 
different levels of the legislature. On the top of that hierarchy acts are issued and on the 
lowest level the orders of local authorities can be found. There are fundamental questions 
that may be regulated on the top level only, by the Acts of Parliament. Regarding 
Environmental Law, one can find a number of legal rules issued by the Government and 
tlie responsible Ministries. The governmental orders and those of ministries, although 
made by central legisladng powers, are below the acts in the hierarchy of legal rules. The 
legislative actions of a local authority (municipality) are valid only in their region of 
competence. In the matters of environmental protection the local orders may regulate 
questions of local importance. The socially important matters of environmental protection 
are not given a large scope for local legislative acüon, since the legal provisions on these 
matters are regulated in the legislative actions at the central level. 
In the sphere of the penal provisions it is necessary to differentiate between Criminal 
Law and Contravention Law from the point of view of the legislating level. It must be 
guaranted that criminal offences shall be defined by act exclusively. Consequently, the 
acting power belongs to the Parliament as far as criminal offences are concerned. The act 
is the primary source of law regarding the contraventions as well, but, the particular 
contraventions may also be defined by the order of the Government and local (municipal) 
authorities. The Special P;irt of the Contravention Act includes few dispositions, since 
most of them are to be found in a governmental order. All environmental contraventions 
are in die latter. 
4. Protection of the environment in the constitutional provisions 
The constitution of the Republic of Hungary declares in its general part that the Republic 
recognizes and validates the rights of everyone to a healthy environment. Apart from 
declaradve statements the Consutution also formulates the essence of environment 
protection as a human right. It declares in the chapter of basic rights and duties that those 
living in the Republic have the right to the highest possible health of body and soul. 
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Indirectly, as a part of the right to physical and mental health on the highest level, this 
provision recognizes the right to a decent environment. 
The next paragraph leaves no doubt when it enumerates constitutional tools for 
enacting these rights. Accordingly, the rights to the best physical and mental health are 
realized through labour safety, public welfare organizations, health services, body culture 
and through a quality natural and artificial environment as well in the Republic of 
Hungary. 
Another constitutional provision may be mentioned here which includes the right to 
a decent environment. The Constitution mentions among the basic rights that in the 
Republic of Hungary people have the right to life and to human dignity from which no 
one can be deprived of. Realization of this statue can be perceived through the disposition 
of die Environmental Act that all citizens have the right to live in a decent environment 
for man. 
Albeit constitutional disposition it is still in the Environmental Act that die Republic 
of Hungary promotes the defence of the human environment in the framework of 
cooperation in international treaties, too. 
Our constitutional provisions do not recognize the right to any property that may limit 
legal protection of the environment. On the contrary, a property right or elements of it 
in defined acts (e.g. in the interest of environment protection), can be restricted. The 
Constitution gives such power for the expropriation of property which ensures that an act 
from die point of view of the public interest, under strict conditions, commands expropri-
ation. It is a general law principle laid down in the Civil Code that rights be exercised 
as to their disposition and cannot be misused. 
By prescribing obligations in the interest of the protecdon of land the Environmental 
Act limits die users or owners in their land-using. Accordingly, every user of land shall 
maintain and improve the productive capacity of the soil, and further shall provide and 
apply soil-protective methods, means for preventing damage caused by natural forces. 
The lines and methods of cultivation shall be selected and employed accordingly. In the 
protection of the living environment forests may be reduced, cleared or liquidated in 
cases and ways defined by statutory provision. 
5. The review of the current Hungarian environmental law 
Recent Environmental Law is under totally new codification. The outlines of the new 
Enviromnental Code (EC hereinafter) are ready and is being discussed by the proper 
commission of the Parliament. The new EC intends to record as a basic principle 
humans' right to a healthy environment and the duty of saving irrecoverable natural 
resources. Conditions of the elements and of the effects of the environment are defined 
accordingly. Emissions and their limits, compulsory environment effect studies are 
prescribed before governmental, administrative and economic decisions which exert 
substantial effects on the environment can be made. 
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The planned code strives at making punitive sanctions more effective. For the time 
being neither contravention nor criminal responsibility are effective enough to fight 
injustice to the objects of milieu. Contravention fines being extremely low are unusable 
to prevent violations of environmental rules. Environmental infringements are usually 
committed by an employee of a company, exercising some business. In the costs of a 
venture administrative fines are easily included. 
The application of criminal responsibility has practical and verification drawbacks. 
An important element of the criminal disposition is a "substantial damage" to the 
environment. Substantionality has to be proven and the procedure requires costly expert 
examinations. An expert's opinion has to be appended to the report by the rapporteur 
since this is the basis of the sound suspicion of the crime, which in tum is a prerequisite 
to launching an investigation. Attorney's offices are deprived of material tools usually, 
so they do not initiate expert examinations, and the rapporteur, especially if private, has 
even less budget for such purposes. Furthermore it is a practical problem where the 
precise limit of a serious measure of pollution that can be judged as a criminal offence 
is. It is a relatively simpler case when emission limits define the quantity of polluting 
material emittable in the surroundings. 
But an effective call to account is hampered by the problems of proving the other 
elements of disposition. Primarily we aim at aggravating cases here. This can be realized 
if as a consequence of an offence where one or more person's life is endangered. Here 
the proof of causality and the evaluation thereof might be raised, which shall be discussed 
later on in detail. Criminal responsibility will be ab ovo meaningless since by the 
application of ruling culpability dogmatics, the responsibility of the criminal can be 
established in a careless commission mostly. 
II. Criminal Law: General Part Considerations' 
A. Liability 
1. Subject of criminal liability 
Following the practice of the Continental Law our Criminal Law cannot handle the enter-
prises or other groups, associations, collectives with or without legal personality as liable 
for a crime. This would not only fit to history of our criminal law but also to the whole 
recent structure of law. All elements of a crime are tailored for a natural individual. For 
instance the definitions of the perpetrators, the offence and the culpability refer to a real 
person and his actual mind set. There are not only historical and structural argue merits 
against the imputability of the corporate personalities. Let us recall the ancient roots of 
the criminal law mentioned in the foreword of the questionnaire. They include traits 
fitting only to an individual person. This individual having infringed the absolute orders 
3 by M. Bittó: 5 and 6; by S. Fülöp: 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8. 
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of the community has to face a ritual proceeding in which the society expels or at least 
stigmatizes him. This process is not full of our primordial common psychological entities 
called archetypes. The common archetypical unscientific plays not a diminishing role in 
our recent societies as the historical ethics seem to be weakened and are becoming more 
and more relative. Bringing in the imputability of enterprises could eliminate this 
psychological factor of the criminal law as do other steps that shift it closer to the civil 
law; a crime has to remain a real sin so as not to change to a business transaction. 
Accordingly, the psychological essence of a criminal procedure is the tragical collision 
of die lonely person and the whole of concerned society. This drama cannot take place 
in the case of an offender who represents a community, too. 
Which are the legal problems urging the imputability of the corporations and whether 
we have no other solutions for them? 
In a "corporate committed crime" sometimes one can hardly find any liable person 
amongst the managers or other employees. In some instances one employee represents 
the mental elements of the crime and another person the material ones; that is the first 
person has ordered and the other person executed the harmful conduct. This is not a 
difficult problem even in the old legal framework. If the executive person knows about 
the harmful effects of his conduct at least partly, or should know, he will be a joint actor 
or an independent negligent actor. If he does not know about the effects or other essential 
circumstances, he will be an innocent agent that a crime is committed with. 
On the other hand the person giving the order usually has committed a crime through 
an innocent agent, in our terminology as an indirect offender, and he represents a prime 
offender or a fui dierer. If this person does not know about all the important details of the 
consequences, the negligent form of the crime will take place on his side. Finally if this 
person does not order but only suggests the harmful conduct to the other employees or 
simply accepts the benefits from such a (usually regular) conduct, he will be a furtherer 
of the crime in issue, or in a case where the conduct is exceptionally singular, his 
responsibility will be based on the connection to the crime. 
In other cases we could find a very sophisticated structure in a corporation, organised 
so shrewdly that nobody has immediately a meaningful personal connection to the crime 
"committed by the corporation". 
For quite different reasons our criminal law literature has already worked out the 
basic principals of the manager's responsibility. For instance as early as the sixties dr. 
Miklós Kádár stated that everybody is subject to responsibility in a corporate offence who 
is entided to take measures with independent liability, that is the leaders of those 
departments who perform qualitative control otherwise. 
This is why it is crucial in the draft of the new overall environmental code to 
determine in every corporation the person of the environmental officer. The draft rules 
detail that case when the firm fails to appoint this officer, and who will standby for him. 
In a way the draft makes it clear in the forward who will take the final responsibility for 
violating the environmental rules. It is not a legal presumption, but creates a legal duty 
for controlling the environmentally important steps of the facility, and the later criminal 
liability will be clear on the basis of the omission of this duty. 
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The next argument for enterprise liability is that once we have imprisoned a 
couple of the managers or other employees of the corporation, the corporation itself 
will continue the pollution of the environment. This problem leads us to the question 
of the interdisciplinary nature of the environmental law. Not the criminal nor the 
civil or administrative law can achieve by self the goals of the protection of the 
environment in the legal system. The new overall environmental code regulates 
parallelly all the legal consequences of the encroachment of the environmental laws 
and regulations. The interdisciplinary nature of the environmental enforcement 
involves structural and procedural aspects, too. There has to be an organisation with 
authority to develop or initiate administrative, civil and criminal cases at the same 
time if it is necessary. 
Consequently, we would rather change a few decades old legal situation of the 
environmental law and its enforcement, than to give up the several centuries old legal 
practice of the Continental System of personal responsibility in the criminal law. Once 
we are in the position to enable us to begin sound civil law cases against the leaders, it 
could be deterring enough and would prevent the further pollution efficially. The less 
strict rules of liability, the eventual reversal of the burden of proof, the different view of 
causation, the possibilities for the absolute or absolute-like responsibility and others make 
the civil law a very useful tool in those environmental cases where the strict personal 
responsibility of the criminal law has met with difficulties. 
In the legal practice of those countries like the United States of America which 
assume criminal liability of corporations we can experience that this type of responsibility 
frequently seems to be too strong means against them: the stigmatized finn tends to loose 
its "good will" almost totally, that its industrial, commercial and consumer connections 
are broken and the firm is headed to bankruptcy. 
This is what was pointed out to be avoided in the European Community Recommen-
dation which otherwise proposes the instalment of corporate liability. 
Let us add that by punishing an enterprise in such a way we are punishing a lot of 
innocent employees with the loss of work and the social surroundings, with loosing tax 
revenue and other allied advantages. 
Another American experience is warning us to be very cautious with this type of 
criminal liability. Although it is required, there are a lot of cases in which the individuals 
of the corporation can escape responsibility through corporate liability. In the plea 
bargaining between the prosecutors and corporations there is a frequent point which 
excludes the further, individual investigations of the managers or any other employees 
of the corporations. This phenomenon also underlines the importance of having separate 
clear-cut levels of civil and administrative law steps in the same case. 
2. Can criminal liability be imputed to persons other than prime offenders? 
Under our law criminal liability can be imputed to persons other than prime offenders, 
according to the General Part rules, which constitutes a whole system, so—with the help 
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of the legal practice—all the socially dangerous conduct connected with the special stages 
of a crime can be punished. 
In the categories of perpetrators there are the principals (the actor and the accom-
plices) and the accessories (the instigator and the aider). The difference between them is 
ruled by the legally defined elements of the crime. Accordingly, the actor is the one who, 
and the solely, accomplices or one who jointly, accomplishes these elements. Accessorie 
are those taking part in the causal chain of the crime by promoting or persuading. The 
promotion can take place by physical or psychical aid. 
The several phases of committing a crime are punishable in our Criminal С о ф as 
follows. The definition of preparation is given in the General Part, but the cases where 
it is punishable and the punishment itself are embodied in the Special Part. 
As concerns the attempt, it is fully punishable in all crimes by the force of the 
General Part. In the legal literature it is criticised that the total amount of punishment is 
applied to the attempt, too, because this seems to be less of an incentive for not finishing 
the crime, although the voluntary desistance (in the case of so-called not finished 
attempts) and avoiding the occurrence of the result (in the case of perfect attempts) 
cannot be punished. 
It is also criticised that committing through an innocent agent is not regulated in the 
Code, although the criminal law practice is unambiguous in this question, that it 
represents not a furtherer but an independent actor, likewise in other cases when the 
offender uses any unanimate tools. 
Conspirators are regulated within the framework of preparation. The Organisator of 
a crime does not have a distinct role amongst the perpetrators but it is not a problem for 
even if he is only an accessory, the same punishment is available, as that for principals, 
and in the individual cases the judge will assess the heightened role of an Organisator of 
a crime although he is only an accessory. 
All the mentioned types of offences are available for crimes against the environment, 
except regarding "preparation". It is not excluded theoretically and later, when legislation 
will realise the overwhelming importance of the environmental crimes, their preparation 
will be also punishable. The importance of the well worked out legal institutes of perpet-
rators and stages of a crime could be seen in Point 1, where we tried to clarify the 
possible individual responsibilities in a sophisticated decision and execution structure of 
an enterprise. 
B. The Material Elements 
3. Requisites of material element (actus reus) of a crime 
Our criminal law does not contain written General Part conditions for the excluding or 
allowing of responsibility for an omission. In our law a crime can be committed by 
positive conduct and by inactivity as well. The omission can be specially criminalised in 
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the Special Part in cases of the so-called "openly defined crimes", there is only a result 
in the definition of the crime and one can commit it by an act or omission previously 
undetermined by the law. In this case there has to be a definite "legal duty" which picks 
out the offender from die mass of persons not having prevented the harmful event. 
These legal duties comprise: 
(a) legal rules other than criminal law ones 
(b) civil law contracts 
(c) labour law or professional rules 
(d) responsibility for diird persons, like children, mentally handicapped persons in 
a family etc. 
(e) undertaking a protection function, like fireman, etc. 
(f) a behaviour or act before facts. 
Point (f) may need a further explanation: somebody who placed himself on the field 
of illegality, is himself required to avert the consequences of his conduct. The action 
which placed him in this position in some instances can be negligent, or even can happen 
by chance, like in Unlawful Appropriaüons, where the person appropriates the property 
of another which has coinc into his hand by chance or by error and fails to return it in 
eight days, following the proper procedure as it is written in the administrative law rules 
regulating the case of lost properties. 
From our viewpoint, points (a) and (0 are of especial interest. Seeing that our 
environmental crimes belong to the groups of openly defined crimes, the harmful result 
can derive from action and also from any omission. The necessary "legal duties" are 
represented mainly by the rules of administrative law, first of all the recent Environ-
mental Code. The details are given by the widespread administrative law rules for each 
media. This recent overwhelming mass of environmental rules raises the question as to 
whether somebody is able to know all of them. In such cases the legal practice turns for 
help to other rules of "general reason" or of ethics. This situation brings us to less certain 
territories than the criminal law standards would require. The new overall environmental 
code containing all basic duties will help to solve this problem. 
Point (f) is important because some previous conduct, having been harmful or 
perilous to the environment, can bring one to the situation in which new duücs are owed 
by him. Their omission will heighten his responsibility added to the responsibility for the 
original conduct. 
As concents the systematic activity, there are three legal solutions to this problem: 
The first and second ones are regulated in Section 12 of the Criminal Code. As it is 
seen both the cumulation of the offences and the continuousness of offences, have their 
material and procedural conditions. The third solution frequently takes place in the case 
of the openly defined harm causing crimes. In such crimes the systematic activity can 
count to be a natural unit, that is a single crime. The border between the continuous 
offences and this natural unit is not clear-cut so it is decided by the judges case by 
case. 
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4. Causation in the Hungarian criminal law 
Our criminal law does not contain special rules on causation, but the criminal law 
practice seems to stand on the base of the "sine qua non" theory, that is we tend to accept 
all the possible causes which have influenced the result in a meaningful amount. It is 
already the question of the mental elements which will give rise to responsibility or not. 
As concents intervening factors we could hardly derive general statements from the 
practice of the environmental crimes, since our police has developed extremely few of 
such cases for reasons we cannot detail here. The few environmental criminal cases have 
been clearly proven and have no causational problems. 
As the causational problems arise from the "modem crimes" connected somehow with 
the technical developments of our age, we could gain relevant findings in the traffic 
crimes, a much more widespread crime recently. It is unequivocal in the practice of the 
traffic crimes that no intervening factor snaps the causational chain once the offender's 
act is available itself to trigger the harmful event, and it would not have been the same 
without the offenders activity. 
Furthermore the strict casual chain seems to be loosened in the traffic crimes cases, 
when the judge sometimes decides the driver, using that civil law like argument that he 
should have known all the important parameters, the actual state of his car, and should 
have made it secure once he had undertaken the driving. Yet we cannot agree with the 
modification of the causal view of the criminal law although it is true that it mirrors the 
last century understanding of causality. As we argued in point 1, we prefer the civil law 
solutions of the cases in the civil law itself. 
C. The Mental Element 
5. Requisites of mental element (mens rea j of a crime in Hungarian law 
Hungarian criminal law always strictly refused the idea of crime without culpability. It 
is related to this that the Hungarian criminal law does not recognize the responsibility of 
legal persons. Accordingly only natural persons can act guilty, and the mental element 
is one of the necessary elements of crime. It can be stated that criminal lawyers here 
agree that criminal responsibility without culpability would take our criminal law back 
to a barbarian medieval state. The appearance of regulatory offences in modem criminal 
law in many countries blew a hole in the application of the classic principles of criminal 
responsibility and led to the formation of unconventional regulatory criminal laws. This 
did not happen here but the doctrine of careless criminality went through certain changes 
in that context that the professional regulations attained a decisive role in determining 
culpability through negligence. 
The disposition of damaging the environment does not hint to the breach of environ-
mental protection regulation. Environmental protection rules prohibit contamination, 
damaging, and demolition of objects under environmental protection (which are the actus 
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reus of crime) and also prescribe safety rules which have to be obeyed in practicing a 
milieu of endangering activities. These activities, especially if they result in such 
negative consequences which reach the measure of crime, are usually production, 
business and management related. The environmental protection regulations do not 
usually address private persons but the one in the capacity of carrying out a given 
activity. In the criminal law this appears such that the perpetrator violates professional 
regulations. 
There are two types of mental elements: criminal intent and carelessness. An offence 
can be committed through carelessness only if the disposition of the offence also punishes 
careless perpetration, as for instance the disposition for damaging of the environment. 
According to the C.C. an offence is committed through carelessness if the perpetrator 
foresees the consequences of his conduct, but is recklessly confident that they will fail 
to occur, or if he fails to foresee such consequences because of a lack of care and 
circumspection that may reasonably be expected. Thus, recklessness is one kind of 
carelessness and negligence is the other one. 
In the case of recklessness the perpetrator takes an impermissible risk. He foresees 
the consequences of his conduct but is recklessly confident that they will fail to occur. 
If he were confident without foundation, his culpability could be determined as intention 
in the form of eventuality (it means that he resigned himself to such consequences). If 
he was confident with solid reasons, he was not careless, consequently he did not commit 
a crime. You can see that in practice it cannot be too frequent that damaging of 
environment will be committed by recklessness. The one, who foresaw that e.g. tire dust 
emitted by his chimney-stack working without filter pollutes the air, was aware of the 
fact that he does not comply with the statutory provisions defining the standards of the 
air-polluting works. Being aware of those provisions, by what reasons is he confident that 
tire consequences will fail to occur? Theoretically die only acceptable viewpoint is diat 
no one may take any risk against professional regulations. Recklessness can be realized 
virtually in such instances when provisions of the Environmental Law allow consider-
ation, e.g. they do not specify the proper measures for protecting the environment, tuid 
the perpetrator wrongly estimates the effectiveness of the measures taken by him for 
protecting die environment. 
Recklessnes is first of all a question of producing evidence in the Hungarian 
criminal law. The perpetrator may declare that he did not know the legal rules or did 
not properly know them. Then the prosecutor must prove the opposite, at least diat the 
perpetrator foresaw die consequences of his conduct (e.g. the industrial investment 
altered detrimentally the character of the protected landscape, or the industrial dust 
emitted to the river harmfully pollutes the waters). The problem of proving die 
recklessness is that the operation of industrial and other enterprises go together with 
the use of the environment and so they pollute, by definition the environment. The law 
has to tolerate this to a certain degree defining the limits in statutory provision 
(standards). The perpetrator has a good chance to defend himself if he did not foresee 
the consequences beyond the tolerated, admissible ones. Even negligence is confined 
by reasonable expectation. It means, that anyone who acts dangerously may not be 
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called to account for "everything that happens" on the ground that in theory "every-
thing can be foreseen". 
The Hungarian criminal law does not differentiate between the degrees of negligence 
(.culpa lata, levis, levissima) so it does not make a difference between gross and ordinary 
civil negligence. The ordinary civil negligence faces the professional (occupational) 
negligence and logically the professional negligence qualified as gross negligence in the 
old criminal law in Hungary. It was the basis of the more serious qualification that the 
professional has to give more diligence by his special knowledge than the ordinary civil 
man without expertise and by this reason the specialist has to bear more serious 
responsibility for lacking that special care. But there were only two cases noting the 
difference (i.e. homicide and bodily harm). 
Professional negligence as grave culpa was not valid too long. It was recognised 
that professional regulations not only create the obligation of exercising special care 
but their knowledge also provides the capability to do so. And this means that raising 
the requirements of care in itself is not to be equated with putting a more severe 
liability on the person practising an occupation. Criminal law requires average care 
only of lay persons, it requires the care that the average person is able to display on 
the bases of general experience of life, while the practitioner of an occupation is required 
to show the average care he is able to meet on the basis of the professional regulations. 
It was unjust that professional negligence carried a heavier punishment than common 
negligence, although the basis of punishment for both cases was the violation of the duty 
to take care. 
Different kinds of professional regulations (environmental law regulations among 
them) represent that only the spheres of obligation are different, but not the degree of 
culpability. The professionals responsibility is increased since he may be called to 
account for his negligence when a layman would not be liable. All this does not 
necessarily mean that his culpability should be considered automatically to be higher than 
the common (ordinary) degree. 
Common (ordinary) experience imposes a minor duty of circumspection than does 
special expertise, but the minor duty does not mean that the person having it is in a privi-
leged position. He may show gross negligence in the same way as it is impossible to 
exclude the perpetrator's slight negligence in the case of his failure to fulfil special or 
increased care. Even today public opinion regards the negligence on the part of a 
practitioner of an occupation as being more serious and condemnable. This belief gives 
ground to the view that recklessness, as compared to negligence, is grave form of 
carelessness. It is in general special expertise or special training that renders the 
perpetrator able to foresee what the layman is not able to. However, acting in spite of 
anticipated the consequences (i.e. risking the outcome ) does not increase negligence by 
necessity. On the contrary, it may involve circumspection and consideration. 
It must be emphasized that non-compliance with due diligence does not automati-
cally mean culpability of the perpetrator because his negligence is well-founded 
only on the condition that he in person would have been able to comply with due 
diligence. 
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D. Defences 
6. About some defences in connection with the environmental crimes 
Environmental crimes must be judged by the application of the provisions, including 
defences of the general Criminal Law, so there are no separate defences. Physical 
impossibility is unknown in the Hungarian C.C. Here one can imagine the consideration 
of other defences (such as necessity) instead of physical impossibility. Over and above 
those there is no reason to exclude punishability because the possibility exists for anyone 
not to commit any crime. Regarding environmental crimes some exceptional cases can 
be mentioned if the legal or statutorial orders to protect the environment are impossible 
to be realized in a given case, or the given industrial enterprise would not be able to 
work if the operation satisfied the environmental requirements. One can hardly imagine, 
nevertheless, in the mentioned cases that technological or other solution to protect the 
environment could not be found. Inasmuch as needed expenses would be out of all 
proportion, the given case can be judged considering the justifiable risk as a defence. 
Mistake or ignorance of fact is defined in the Criminal Code as follows: No perpetra-
tor can be punished for a fact he was not in knowledge of at the time of the commission 
of the offence. Error does not exclude punishability where it is produced by negligence 
and the law also punishes commission through negligence. On the side of perpetrators of 
environmental crimes error in causality occurs most frequently in practice. In that case 
die perpetrator was not aw tire that his activity caused the damaging of the environment 
or he did not know that the steps made by him in order to protect the environment were 
not sufficient. It is also an error in causality if the perpetrator did not know that the 
measure of his damage to the environment was significant or unlawful. 
The mistake or ignorance of fact excludes automatically intention (wilfulness). The 
intention (wilfulness) is excluded even if the knowledge of the environmental regulations 
was a professional, occupational duty of the perpetrator. Anyone may excuse himself by 
mistake or ignorance of the environmental regulations and if he does so, the intention 
must be proven against his defence. Any presumption concerning the mental element 
(mens rea) is unlawful in the Hungarian criminal law. 
Mistake or ignorance of fact does not exclude the negligence. The violation of due 
diligence is proven by the violation of the environmental regulations if the knowledge of 
these regulations was considered to be professional duty of the perpetrator. But diere is 
another element of the negligence and that must yet be proven. Namely, it is to be proven 
that the given perpetrator was in the position of knowing the professional rule in 
question, in other words, whether it could be expected from the given perpetrator as well 
the due diligence. In practice, it is the perpetrator who is forced to prove that he was not 
in the position to know the rule or to know it properly, respectively, the due diligence 
could not be expected from him (for instance he was informed erronously, he was kept 
from important documents etc.). In my opinion proving will only be exceptionally 
successful. 
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Mistake or ignorance of fact should be examined from one more aspect, i.e. if the 
perpetrator was mistaken in the legal object: He did not know that the objects of the 
environments are protected by criminal law. This kind of mistakes resembles the error 
in law. The error in law is called error in social danger in the Hungarian criminal law 
and is regulated the same way as the error in facts. Accordingly a perpetrator who 
commits the act under an erroneous assumption that it is not dangerous to the society, 
and has solid reasons to belive it so, is not punishable. Error does not exclude 
punishability when it is produced by negligence and the law also punishes commission 
through negligence. The knowledge of socially dangerous exists if the perpetrator is 
aware of being prohibited his activity whether the law and in detail the criminal law or 
only the administrative law prohibits it, or it is a moral ban, or he knows only about the 
dangerous nature of his activity, all these are the same. Since everyone is supposed to 
know about the danger of the damaging of the environment, that the pollution of the 
environment is not allowed, one can hardly prove the contrary of that presume, namely 
that he has solid reasons to believe that the damaging of the environment is allowed, is 
not wrong, so do not present a danger to the society. 
Regarding the environmental crimes all this explanation is more complicated because 
the pollution of the environment is allowed or tolerated to a certain degree. Limiting 
values in the standards of environmental protection define the limit of the emission not 
to be exceeded. It raises the question of the erroneous knowledge of the legal rules and 
statutory provisions again, which shall be judged according to the discussed rules of the 
mistake or ignorance of facts. I mention here one more defence which is accepted by our 
criminal law, although is not regulated in the C.C., i.e. the justifiable risk. 
For instance in a village the people are supplied with bread by the only bakery and 
its smoke pollutes seriously the air. Or for instance dust emission of a giant cement 
factory destroys the environment around the plant. Closing the factory would yield in loss 
of jobs for the town and the economy of the country would have no cement. It arises in 
this context the issue of physical impossibility mentioned in the introduction. Though 
these examples one may illustrate the lack of financial conditions rather which can be 
evaluated in terms of different defences. 
In Hungary according to the C.C. necessity is restricted to emergency situations. 
Accordingly, a person who acts to save his own person or property, or other persons or 
their property, from a danger directly imminent that could not possibly be averted by any 
other way, or does so in the protection of public interest, provided that causing of danger 
cannot be imputed to him, and his act produces slighter harm than which he tried to 
avert, is not punishable. It is to decide, therefore, that by causing the damaging of the 
environment the person averted an even more serious danger than that or he did not. If 
the person intended to avert only damage in property, the post-comparing with it is not 
easy since the damaging of the environment to a significant degree cannot always be 
expressed in money. The judging is much easier if in an emergency situation the person 
had to decide on the damaging of the environment against of endangering human life. If, 
in the extraordinary situation requiring immediate decision, the person considered 
wrongly, still he can be excused from liability as the C.C. says: a person, who produces 
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a harm equal to, or in excess of, that which he tried to avert, for he is unable to 
recognize the extent of the harm, due to fear or to excusable emoüonal agitation, is not 
punishable either. 
The permission for the polluting activity based on statutory provisions or given by 
public authorities is a reason to exclude punishability although the Criminal Code does 
not define it.The limiting values of emission which are defined in environment standards 
represent such a legal permission, though it must be added that there is no way to 
visualize provisions which would enable such amount of pollution that would reach the 
level of environment crime. The same applies for the permission of authorities which is 
a prerequisite of all acüvities spoiling the environment. 
Superiors' orders is a recognized excuse only in military crime, but even there it has 
strong restrictions. No one can be instructed to commit any other crime. Labour law 
regulations subordinate has to deny a superiors order if it is for committing crime. It is 
a different situation when a subordinate has to fear the loss of job when contradicting. 
Threat is a proper defence, i.e. it means holding out the prospect of a grave detriment, 
fit to arouse serious fear in the threatened person. It is questionable that the fear from 
loss of job complies with these criteria. The instruction giving superior is held responsible 
anyway for perpetrating the environment pollution. 
E. Sanctions 
7. Sanctions available for crimes against the environment 
The two environmental crimes in our C.C. under Sections 280 and 281 involve practically 
all general sanctions we can find in the Code. The intended forms of the crime 
"Damaging Environment" are punished with deprivation of liberty up to three or in the 
case when the damage of the environment is associated with endangering life, too, up to 
five years. The crime of "Damaging Nature" shall be punished with imprisonment up to 
one year or with reformatory and educational labour or with fine. The more dangerous 
form of this crime shall be punished only with imprisonment up to three years. The 
negligent forms are punished in both crimes with all the three main types of the general 
sanctions. 
In the cases when in the Special Part there is only imprisonment as sancüon, the 
court can use the reformatory labour and fine too, according to the so-called alleviating 
section of our Code. In the few recent environmental criminal cases we have, this section 
is mostly employed, because our judges are reluctant to punish white collar criminals 
with imprisonment nor with its suspended form. 
There are not any special forms of sanctions available for the environmental crimes. 
Amongst the secondary punishments the interdiction from exercising a profession seems 
to fit specially to our cases but recently the court experience has not developed yet in this 
direction. 
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There are several measurements, too, which would be specially available for environ-
mental crimes, like the confiscation of the properties having been used for purpose of a 
crime. When the court wants not only to prevent the further crimes but in the same time 
to cause a meaningful economic harm to the defendant, it will confistance a part of his 
property as a secondary punishment. Our Code practically enables both ways of 
sentencing in the environmental cases as well. 
By the time we will have more broader environmental criminal practice, it will be 
quite necessary to have further special sanctions against this type of crimes. Some of 
them will be connected with the restoration of the previous state of the damaged 
environment and with the compensation of those who has suffered harm by the 
environmental crime. This purpose of restitution could be served well by a very light 
modification of the recent rules of the suspending of the execution of the punishments. 
It would be useful to broaden the possibilities of the imposing of the behaviour rules 
during the time of the suspended loss of liberty or fine. The unwillingness of doing the 
restitution works, or not proper finishing could be regarded as the trespassing of these 
rules. 
The aim of restitution could be promoted in a more earlier phase of the criminal 
procedure as the sentencing. In other place of the Criminal Code there is a very useful 
solution, at the crime of Unlawful Missing of Maintenance. Until the sentencing stage, 
the father could pay the sum having been missed, and so creates a Special Part form of 
the causes ceasing the responsibility, or in the more severe case, of unlimited mitigation 
of the punishment. This idea would be very useful in the case of the environmental 
crimes too. The ceasing of the pollutioning conduct, or the serious evidences in the 
behaviour of the perpetrator for the change in his environmental policy and important 
steps towards the restitution, all could serve as reasons for the exclusion or the 
diminishing of the punishment. 
F. Jurisdiction 
8. Crimes under courts' jurisdiction 
The courts exercise jurisdiction to all criminal offences committed in Hungary and in 
special zones adjoining it (aircraft, ship) , and to all offences committed by Hungarian 
citizens anywhere. The Hungarian Chief Public Prosecutor has the right above these for 
the institution of criminal proceedings against aliens having perpetrated crimes abroad, 
mainly in the cases against mankind, or Hungarian State, or in the case of crimes that has 
to be prosecuted under international conventions. (The first chapter of the Code). This 
last mentioned rule raises the thoughts concerning the future tasks of the cooperation of 
the Central and Eastern European countries. The environmental situation of these little 
sized countries highly demands cooperation in the field of the environmental protection. 
The new wave of the economic alliance has to accompany with the international environ-
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mental regulation even in the field or the environmental criminal law as well. The scope 
of our criminal jurisdiction already enables this. 
Summary4 
The legal provisions of administrative nature related to environment protection have been 
laid down in several legislative actions with the principal Act II of 1976. Environmental 
crimes are embodied in the C.C. while petty offences in the Contravention Code. The 
Constitution declares the rights of everyone to the healthy enviromnent and formulates 
the essence of enviromnent protection as a human right. Recent Environmental Law is 
under totally new codification. The planned code strives at making punitive sanction more 
effective. Hungarian criminal law does not recognise legal persons as liable for a crime 
since all elements of a crime are tailored for a natural individual. Everybody is subjected 
to the responsibility in a corporate offence who are entitled to take measures with 
independent liability, i.e. leaders of those departments who perform qualitative control 
otherwise. 
The C.C. constitutes a whole system making possible to punish all socially dangerous 
conduct connected with the special stages of a crime. In the company of perpetrators 
there are the principals (the actor and the accomplices) and the accessories (the instigator 
and the helper). The attempt is fully punishable in all crimes, while the preparation is 
punished if it is ordered in the Special Part (preparation of environmental crimes is not 
punishable). 
The environmental crime can be committed either by activity or by inactivity. In both 
cases any breaching of legal duties has to be found which picks out the offender from 
the mass of j rsons not having prevented the harmful event. The relevant legal duties are 
defined (outlined or detailed) in the provisions related environment protection of legal 
and administrative authorities. 
The C.C. does not contain special rules on causation, but die practice seems to stand 
on the base of the "sine qua non" theory accepting all the possible causes which has 
influenced the result in a meaningful amount. In the practice the few environmental 
criminal cases are plain in the proving matters and have no casuistical problems. 
Hungarian criminal law refuses the idea of crime without culpability. Environmental 
crimes are committed mainly in the fonn of carelessness moreover by negligence in most 
cases. If somebody violates his legal duties knowing to inducing environmental damage, 
practically it may qualify as a crime by intention in the fonn of eventuality. The reason 
is, that no one may take any risk against professional regulations. 
The C.C. does not make difference between gross and ordinary civil negligence. 
Different kinds of professional regulations (environmental law regulations among them) 
4 by M. Bittó 
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represent that only the spheres of obligation are different, but not the degree of 
culpability. A professional may be called to account for his negligence when a layman 
would not be liable. 
Regarding environmental crimes there are no separate defences in the C.C. Instead 
of physical impossibility we may consider other defences such as the necessity. The 
mistake or ignorance of fact excludes intention even if the knowledge of the environ-
mental regulation was a professional duty of the perpetrator, but does not exclude 
automatically the negligence. The mistake in the legal object resembles the error in law 
which does not exclude punishability excepting if the perpetrator has solid reasons to 
believe that the damaging of the environment is allowed, is not wrong, do not present a 
danger to the society. In the C.C. necessity is restricted to emergency situations. 

Acta Juridica Hungarica 
1992 34 № 3-4, pp. 177-194 
Akadémiai Kiadó, 
Budapest 
Endre Ferenczy Financial and Statutory Constraints 
on Public Administration 
Introduction 
Science is averse to addressing topical issues. In our days, however, there are few subject 
areas that command so much attention as provision of finance for public administration 
(its different branches) does. Here we have in mind not only the case of Hungarian 
Television,1 but—since they have reached the stage of regulation by respective draft laws 
or concepts thereof—higher education,2 research (HAS),3 communal development.4 and 
1 The term case (/ 'affaire in French) is of so many aspects (applicable law in force; substance of legislation 
by Parliament concerning the media and its legal implications for financing the operation of the institutions in 
question; substantive content of supervision over the media; whether blocking of appropriations for the mass 
communication media is violative of the freedom of the press, etc.) that we feel impelled to explain what we 
have in mind. Uppermost in our mind is the reason why this case is of particular interest to legal and financial 
scholars, namely because it has highlighted what it would be highly important to realize: our uncertainty about 
the type of criteria for financing public services. 
2 In respect to higher education, for which the drafters of the Bill sought to formulate an objective criterion 
of finance (number of students), the Finance Ministry's observation is justified: if the criterion for budgetary 
subsidy cannot be planned, expenditure may increase steeply, ruling out provision of sufficient finance for the 
subsystem. Cf. 1197/1992. MKM, Előterjesztés a felsőoktatásról szóló törvényjavaslatról (Submission 
concerning the Bill on Higher Education), p. 67; Altalános és Részletes Indoklás (General and Detailed 
Motivation), p. 18; and Emlékeztető a Tudománypolitikai Bizottság 1992. IX. 23-án tartott üléséről 
(Memorandum on the 23 September 1992 Meeting of the Committee on Science Policy), p. 30, with noteworthy 
observations to be found especially on the last [tage. 
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the police5 as well. Still, returning to the case of Hungarian Television, let us point out 
how clear an indication it is, from a theoretical aspect, that the problems of public service 
media fall—unfortunately for them, as it were—between the domains of administrative 
sciences and public finances, meaning that state-financed radio and television broadcast-
ing remains within the domain of public finances even though the radio and television 
become self-governing public corporations and thereby fall outside the scope of public 
services in the strict sense. This brief digression is justified by the need to make the point 
that, often, science makes a wry facer even in cases where subtle theoretical questions 
present themselves. Thus, for instance, is an organization qualified by the extent to which 
it is financed from taxes; can its status be decided by claiming it would be unable to 
function without state support, etc.; or can qualitative expectations be raised in return for 
state finance? 
Quality in general can of course, and indeed should, be a consideration in public 
administration. There are two prevalent views we have encountered in connection with 
public or professional control over public administrative activity. One is that the State 
should make funds available, but it should then refrain from intervention (in the activity 
3 In the Bill worded by us we proposed quadrennial and annual negotiations and contracts, practically on 
the model of the French contract administratif, with regard to research, wliich is indeed too delicate an area to 
be financed according to normatives (e.g. number of researchers). This does not, however, preclude (lie 
possibility for the State and public bodies to agree in goals and areas, with the resultant solution ensuring die 
transparency of the former and autonomy for the latter. 1991. évi Törvény (Tervezet) a Magyar Tudományos 
Akadémiáról. Kézirat (Act [Bill] of 1991 on the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Manuscript), MTA ÁJI, 1991. 
p. 12; 1. sz. Melléklet (a törzs vagyonról) és Indoklás (Annex I [on Original Stock] and Motivation), p. 16. 
4 In wording die Bill concerning communal development, wliich we prepared for the competent ministry, 
we were confronted with the problem of whether it was proper to propose compensating mechanisms, without 
which it is more difficult to prevent the decline of certain regions, but it is equally true that methods provide 
by themselves no safeguard against inefficient utilization of public funds. Cf. Elmélkedés és szakirodalom a 
területfejlesztésre vonatkozó törvényhozási tárgykörről. Kézirat (Reflections and Relevant Liter at tue on die 
Subject-Matter of Legislation concerning Communal Development. Manuscript), MTA ÁJI, 1992, p. 54; and 
Szövegjavaslat a területfejlesztésről szóló törvény tervezetére (Proposed Wording of the Bill on Communal 
Development), MTA ÁJI, 1992, p. 5. The concept of regulation approved by the departments was published 
in the journal Magyar Közigazgatás. 
5 According to sources available to us, considerations providing a financial underpinning for the performance 
of functions—apart from legal aspects, the significance of which cannot be emphasized strongly enough—received 
scant attention during the debate on tlie Police Act. We hoped to find in the latest literature on the subject at 
least one study estimating the costs of public safety, a question we regard of great importance. Although the 
technical term, i.e. price of the service, had been used in an interview, the respondent wandered from the point 
and began to describe the difficulties of securing appropriate income, ignoring an earlier question of the reporter 
about controllable norms required to govern the utilization of public funds. Cf. DANY1, József: Az állam-
háztartási törvényről és a költségvetésről. Interjú Bencze Miklóssal (On the Finances Act and the Budget. An 
Interview with Miklós Bencze), Rendészeti Szemle, No. 2 of 1991, pp. 48-54. Basic information concerning 
the substantive (and, for us, financial) aspects of the police service may be gained from the writings of NYIRI, 
Sándor and TÚRÓS, András: A bűnözés és bűnüldözés helyzete 1990-ben (Situation with Regard to Crime and 
Crime Control in 1990), Rendészeti Szemle, No. 3 of 1991, pp. 3-7; and A közrendvédelem aktuális feladatai 
(Current Tasks of Maintaining Public Order), Rendészeti Szemle, No. 8 of 1992, pp. 3-8. 
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or profession itself). On the other view, however, public administration is under 
obligation to examine utilization of funds and its results upon their merits too. The main 
argument of the first view is that professional control (e.g. over financial matters) is 
superfluous, because the law of the market, namely that better performance is bound to 
increase demand,6 operates everywhere (in culture, e.g. theatres, or in education, 
concretely in the change in curricula). On the other hand, the second view has it that the 
supplier of public money has the same rights as the owner: he has to be careful about the 
recipients of funds and has to ponder what he gets in return.7 
On solving the dilemma 
It is a fact that central administration and even local self-governments (public bodies in 
general) are not skilled in everything as, given their composition, their staffs may 
eventually consist only of laymen on the one hand and, on the other—even if such is not 
the case—many observers would, in their subconscious, kick against appointed or elected 
persons having the grab on all categories of matters. The former case may be called the 
dictatorship of bureaucracy and the letter an excess of democracy. Is there a happy 
medium? We think there is, and one called self-constraint. No doubt, a kindergarten, a 
police office, a primary school, a clinic, a university department, etc. need independence 
for professional reasons, namely to perform their tasks, while the users of public services 
and public goods (citizens and public institutions) need equivalence (or, in case of 
differences in quality, their indication) and predictability of services. Conversely, it is a 
duty of supervisory bodies to see to it that these two criteria are met. 
Contrary views are oblivious to the fact ihat control (i.e. internal control) alone may 
cause eventually necessary intervention to come too late, not to mention that if the 
supervisory bodies are not in a position to obtain information on a particular organ, there 
comes about a black hole of information in the social cosmos. Precisely for this 
reason—not questioning the significance of internal mechanisms of a particular public 
service institution, even if their existence can be verified sociometrically—we find no 
ground for objection to external control, be it professional or financial in nature. 
The other question put is whether the supplier of money or, frivolously, the patron 
can want anything in exchange. There is but a single answer, a bit rabbinical one: if the 
supplier of money (provider of finance or remitter voting for allocations) is ignorant of 
what he will get, how does he know the quantity of money he should give? If the answer 
is that he has no way of knowing it, the first question can be answered in the affirmative, 
6 Tlie Subsection of the Board of Trustees of Project V for Renewal of the Teaching Profession held 
discussions that provided useful lessons. 
7 Without knowing the details, we refer to the supposed introduction by the Australian Government of a 
system of financing public administration that is governed by entrepreneurial criteria for provision of finance 
for budget-dependent organs. 
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from which follows (can be inferred) the need to state the justifications for all expend-
itures. 
If we now say that such is not always the case, we feel we do not offend the 
administrators of public revenue. While, from the point of view of financial law, it would 
be desirable that the general and special motivations to draft laws should indicate the 
nature of expenditures or, horribile dictu, each item of appropriation should correspond 
to a particular clause (i.e. the law-maker's or a minister's will), we are mainly concerned 
now, not with this, but with the question of whether public administration can be 
expected to produce in return for provision of finance some record of performance 
measurable by an indicator. 
Performance—financing 
In principle, at least in view of the foregoing, the expectation that the activity of a public 
administrative (public service) organ should be transparent is not without any basis. If 
transparency is a requirement, the demand for the performance (not the shortfall in 
financial performance) of an institution (a group of institutions) or a chapter of the budget 
to be traceable cannot be said to be too much out of touch with reality. 
It is extremely important to see that competence to determine the content of 
performance—and here we refer neither to financial performance, namely to eventual 
shortfalls in discharging tasks, nor merely to quantums of revenues and outlays (in 
respect of which the parliamentary committees cannot but voice surprise every years, 
because planned revenues are recurrently far below the actual figures)—is allotted not to 
the Parliament or the State Audit Office alone. If on this score (i.e. the content of public 
service performance) someone, e.g. the present author, were to mention the competence 
of the Finance Ministry as well—the forum for which are provided by negotiations about 
budget chapters and the documents of which are the minutes taken of those negoti-
ations—he would promptly incur the charge of financial terror. 
Is that charge true? According to Anatole France (in "Island of Penguins"), the best 
charge is that which has no proof, so it cannot be rebutted. If we are very partial and 
want to expose the problem too sharply, we should say that the accusers in this case 
practically follow the same course of action, albeit not necessarily in bad faith, yet in 
keeping with their perceived interests. On the other hand, they call into question the right 
of financial organs (which do not but fulfill their duties) to ask questions of a 
professional nature about the performance of some public service (consumption of 
medicine, passenger traffic, teacher/student ration, etc.) and, on the other, they themselves 
believe that the financial organs cast doubts on the autonomy of departments or budget 
chapters by demanding or recommending reforms of an organizational nature. 
It is a fact that the stalemate, presenting as it does a typical problem between chapters 
and the financial cabinet has also arisen and come into the focus of professional and 
public-law debates in other countries (e.g. in Italy), in short in every country where the 
prime minister has no sufficiendy strong power to decide disputes between departments 
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and finances, and/or where the finance minister does not play a hegemonic role in die 
budgetary procedure (e.g. planning, preparation, decision, implementation), the problem 
is bound to emerge. In our own judgement, there has arisen in Hungary a specific 
situation in which, although the prime minister's position is strong, the finance minister 
is unable, at least in our view, to push through his own conception about a reform of the 
large distributive systems, because he has no hold on the budgetary process and does not 
have the necessary means to perform his classical function (i.e. keeping the budget in a 
state of equilibrium), or, put otherwise, his legal status is not defined clearly enough to 
ensure enforcement of the Government Decree on the Minister of Finance.8 
The provisions of law on nearly all organizations, if good or not blurred (e.g. the 
draft laws on the Hungarian National Bank, national defence, the police, or higher 
education), clearly specify the tasks thereof. And the more public administration takes on 
the character of public service, the related expectations and powers should be defined in 
advance the more clearly, or else appropriate financing is impossible and, in the case of 
ministries, one cannot speak seriously of ministerial responsibility. For that matter, the 
latter problem cannot be either dismissed or solved by claiming that political issues in 
Hungary cannot be raised except against the prime minister. Therefore, on the one hand, 
there is a need for a legislative enactment allowing the Government not too wide a scope 
of action—as Thatcher put it, "It would be too bad if the police had to be instructed and 
they did not do their job in accordance with law"—and, on the other, disregarding the 
prime minister's primacy, the law should allot to the members of government 
independent spheres of competence vis-à-vis the "first minister" and chiefly the other 
members of government, or else there is no resistance to granting demands for credit 
(allocations, subsidies) represented by departments, the finance minister acting as a lonely 
cowboy and becoming a target of the 13 little Indians (at best he may count on the Great 
White Chief to deny demands that are excessive or impossible to finance. The paradox 
is that tlie system (public administration and, with it, public services) does function for 
all rightful irony. The only question concerns the degree of efficiency, adequacy to the 
purpose of what is called a social market economy. After all, if the answer is negative, 
the problem can be settled by saying that in a situation marked by a shortage of funds 
the possibility of improving public services is ruled out, and even the mere result of 
keeping them in proper trim is a miracle. 
True, one may retort, but while other branches of the national economy (industry, 
agriculture, the tertiary sector) pay a heavy toll for the period of transformation, the 
public services sector, including the large distributive systems, is yet to fight its way 
through the big change. 
8 The prime minister's decision-making power between the finance minister's hegemony and competing 
departments is, in our modest judgement, a private-law pillar of, e.g., the modern Italian and French States. 
ZALMA, G.: L'hegémonie du ministre des finances dans le droit budgétaire de l'État, Revue du Droit Fublic, 
1985, pp. 1653-1658; PEREZ, R.: La riforma del bilanco dello Stato e la legge, n. 468 del 1978, Rivista 
Trimestrale de Diritto Publico, No. 1 of 1979. 
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On the other hand, this statement may be countered by claiming that society's 
response to the opening of yet another new front (namely after industry, agriculture and 
commerce) would have been predictably incalculable. At the same time, one should not 
overlook the possible occurrence of events (e.g. referendum on the dissolution of 
Parliament)9 the outcome of which is, in spite of everything, equally impossible to 
foresee at present. Hence the financing of public administration is, contrary to all 
appearances, no professional question, because the events of the 1990s in Central Europe 
have shown that security is a value ranking right after change. 
On national defence 
If such is the case, it is equally true that a certain order of priorities among the 
departments should be recognized. It will not naturally solve the very important problem 
of financing public administration, for the big issue is not this, as politicians and MPs 
should be aware, but the type of challenges (refugees?, terrorism?, nationalism?) to be 
met. There appears to be an end to concentrating finance on the former armed services, 
where privileges were accorded to troops of great fire-power. The principal emphasis has 
shifted from them to the so-called rapid deployment forces, with the obvious implication 
that two armies will emerge, the classical one being able to provide no more than some 
sort of logistic support. Strategy will consequently be not a concentric, but a random-
oriented one, defensive and focusing mainly on weak points. It stands to reason that, in 
the current situation when none of die departments can expect more funds, the conceptual 
question concerns the types of expenditure (allocations) to be reduced. From this it would 
follow that any equipment difficult to deliver or transport is to lose its function. 
At the same time it is evident that adoption of so far-reaching decisions involves a 
risk of restructuring tasks. The effort should nevertheless be undertaken, with assistance 
by the so-called zero-base budget, which is apt to give a clear picture concerning the 
financial implications of this new approach to national defence.10 
9 The Constitutional Court award of 19 January 1993 (handed down after the writing of litis manuscript) has 
settled the legal aspect of the dispute, but he problems concerning state responsibility (and the tasks of public 
administration) towards persons living below the poverty line are still at issue. As regards modalities of 
financing, we would not underplay the established European customs by which the vulnerable groups are 
refinanced from time to time. For a fuller discussion, see LOVAS, Margit: A franciaországi szakmai egészség-
pénztárak kialakulásának és működésének leírása. Kézirat (A Description of the Establishment and Operation 
of Occupational Health Societies in France. Manuscript), Paris, P, Ltd., 1990, p. 36. 
10 The present author does not naturally consider himself qualified to make competent statements on questions 
before the Military Committee. (The best he can suggest is reading the professional literature properly so called. 
See, e.g., BOGNÁR, Károly: A biztonság és biztonságpolitika hazánkban (Security and Security Policy in 
Hungary), Társadalmi Szemle, No. 1 of 1993, pp. 39^18). All we wish to indicate is that for sufficient finance 
to be secured for a branch of public administration (such as national defence), it is necessary to formulate very 
clear and, in given cases, very moderate objectives. In order to give some cause for self-congratulation, let us 
quote two ideas. First, "...However, for objective reasons like the capabilities of the existing defence potential 
and (lie absence of external security guarantees, we are a mile short of possessing such an effective defence 
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On the police 
The internal security forces (police, national security) cannot be expected to call for so 
profound a change in approach. As is commonly known, reinforcement of the front-line 
has been recommended by foreign experts as well. For one thing, this implies a need to 
devise a system of financial incentives to taking charge of conflict management. 
We believe that the present economic situation does not permit setting too ambitious 
goals and that up to 1996 one cannot aim at more than combating primitive crime. 
(Perhaps I am not too mistaken in pointing out the existence of social demand for such 
effort.) The kind of financial planning and reallocation of resources needed for 
campaigning against refined structures present a different question. Just as in (lie case of 
national defence it would amount to over-confidence to presuppose the absence of 
contrary views, it would be a mistake to think that option for a new budgeting will not 
encounter opposition. If arguments have any role to play in such a dispute, one cannot 
but claim that the illegal market has a capacity for absorbing labour. 
To sum up, public administration functioning in the field of personal safety and 
material security has no alternative but open confrontation with direct crime and seeking 
out and uncovering hidden crime. This dual goal calls for dual financing: while in the 
first case one should proceed from the degree of infection, in the latter one should be 
equipped to cope with crime likely to burst to the surface in the second part of this 
decade, producing results by that time, which presents the need to prepare a cost-benefit 
analysis concerning the former and to draw up a programme budget for the latter task. 
On labour questions 
Unemployment is a new phenomenon, just as the emergence of small states along our 
borders (which have lost their potential aggressivity militarily, i.e. their capacity for 
offensive military operation) and the appearance of organized crime are. It will be 
stressed once more that, with tendencies to continuing scarcity of funds prevailing, one 
cannot entertain dynamic concepts or, in financial terms, nothing but passive (defensive) 
techniques have any reality. In other words, during the period up to 1996, when no 
meaningful increase in GDP can be expected, active (preventive and generally financial) 
methods have no reality, not even in the blueprint stage, although only schemes of the 
system...", and second, "It is necessary to work out defensive measures suited to the different forms of threat..." 
(PERJÉS, Gábor: A parlament Honvédelmi Bizottsága kétéves működésének tapasztalatai és a továbbképzés 
lehetőségei (Experience Emerging from Two Years of Functioning of the Parliamentary Committee on National 
Defence and Possibilities of Further Training), in: Special Issue No. 1 of Akadémiai Közlemények és Rendészeti 
Tanulmányok: A fegyveres erők és a társadalom (The Armed Forces and Society), pp. 53 and 55). It is to be 
noted that, in our view, nothing can be said of the capabilities of our existing defence potential until after the 
costs incurred by different forms of threat have been estimated. 
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latter type can be efficient in respect to either labour questions or communal develop-
ment, industrial policy and the like. 
Politically motivated terrorism, primitive and organized crime, and unemployment 
(particularly its sudden growth) involve so-called risks which (especially when emerging 
simultaneously) cannot be staved off except by a change of concept, formulation of new 
programmes, revamp of organizations, and personnel with new attitudes of mind in public 
administration. These cures are necessary, but—it is no great wisdom to say—ineffective 
without new arrangements for financing. 
Let us begin by making two statements in passing. Firstly, the peak of unemployment 
affecting 900.000 people corresponds to the country's level of economic development. 
Secondly and consequently, one must accept the fact that this figure may be modified or 
reduced by certain manoeuvres, but cannot be done away with. Efforts should therefore 
be concentrated in areas promising results, e.g. on higher education, which may serve 
transitorily to absorb young labour. The foregoing makes it also clear, however, that the 
next 2 or 3 years cannot be expected to witness any profound shift in financing 
techniques in the province of any department because the reform itself (the financial one 
too) will cost money. 
On education 
Subject to the above restraints, we may now enter upon the problems of financing the 
educational sector. Well, as is becoming a matter of common knowledge, higher 
education has an excellent absorbing capacity regarding unemployment but due again 
to shortages of funds, unfortunately this will not by itself allow a modernization by 
European standards of graduate and postgraduate training within a system consisting of 
some 80 institutions to take place during 2 or 3 years. Nevertheless, the intervening 
period will perhaps make it possible to assign clearly defined responsibilities to the 
department involved (e.g. in increasing student numbers), with particular emphasis on the 
young unemployed. The need for financial support to future efforts by universities and 
colleges is clearly in evidence: what is needed is for the financial system practically to 
incorporate a set of incentives that will recover the extra costs incurred by a larger 
number of students and perhaps even those of improving the quality of education. 
Unfortunately, however, this will not help tackle all problems of finance. 
In dealing with state subsidies for higher education (not with maintenance of the 
sphere of university, college and postgraduate training) one may note two striking 
differences in the situation of institutions, namely disparities in the teacher/student ratios 
and in the infrastructure itself. Improving the first, i.e. raising the nationwide ratio of 1:5 
to 1:10, would obviously be a goal of the State which may be expected to face resistance 
by certain autonomous organizations in spite of such government responsibility tending 
to work against unjustifiable differences in performance. For that matter, it is appropriate 
to point out on this score that budget finance for any public service achieving a status 
independent of the State will impose an insoluble task on the financial planning apparatus 
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if the institutions required to furnish data, i.e. the organs eligible for state support, have 
unlimited freedom regarding certain cost items (e.g. number of teachers or change in their 
classification)." Such arrangement will of necessity be conducive to a cost explosion, 
namely formulation of demands for credit that cannot be granted. This leads us to state 
our view that the sectoral ministries—whatever the public service (e.g. higher education, 
research, public health, local matters), which is ultimately organized by the self-
governments—must not tum away from the Ministry of Finance, but, on the contrary, 
must devise a very elaborate system of performance measurement highly sensitive, on the 
one hand, to what autonomous organizations give in return for public funds and, on the 
other, to secure finance for a particular public service, i.e. keeping its development in 
step with sources of revenue that can realistically be expected to be available from time 
to time. 
For this very reason, a new approach is needed to reducing differences between 
institutions and maintaining the operation of the infrastructure. The obvious problem in 
tiiis respect is that, as regards provision of budgetary finance, we have rather ineffective 
devices for measuring the depreciation of buildings, equipment, etc. Under conditions of 
scarce funds the management of every budget-dependent institution and even die organs 
of supervision lay emphasis on operation as a matter of course, and this often leads to 
die phenomenon that buildings, students' hostels, machinery, school equipment, etc. are, 
to use a rather crude phrase, reduced to tatters. This nationwide state of affairs could only 
be changed by separating compensation for depreciation of infrastructural facilities (e.g. 
renovation of water- and gas-pipes) from provision of performance-related finance for a 
particular institution, because there is no strong correlation between the two. 
More specifically, the first aspect involves mere adequacy to functions determined 
by deeds of foundation (legislative provisions) and the second is simply a matter of 
protecting property (initial capital). Such a cardinal settlement of the problem would 
necessitate appraisal of operation as per invoice 011 the one hand and, on the other, 
inventory of property and survey of technical conditions, evidendy with a view to 
assessing real financial needs.12 Everyone is aware that this is a massive and cosdy 
undertaking and that, to make a commonplace remark, the large distribudve systems cope 
widi scarcides of funds and exhibit wasteful spending behaviour at the same lime. This 
phenomenon can only be kept in check by Hungarian public administration adopting the 
systems established in other countries for dealing widi the problem." 
11 Cf. fn 2. 
12 A felsőoktatás jövedelemnövelése és költségfedezete. Kézirat (Increasing the Income and Covering the 
Expenditure of Higher Education. Manuscript), MTA ÁJI, Budapest, 1990, p. 74. 
13 BÉTHUNE, Emmanuel: Etude relative à la détermination de critères objectifs pouvant servir à la répartition 
du Fonds des Communes. Manuscript, Bruxelles, 1962, p. 26, and Annexes, p. 82. 
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On public health 
Of course, from the point of view of financing, the really sizable item in state subsidies 
is not represented by higher education or research, which need not more than an annual 
amount of 100 billion forints, calculated with a wide margin. For that matter, the volume 
of spending for the police and armed forces is about as high, while unemployment is 
estimated by some to cost not more than 120 billion forints in 1993. The really large 
items, several times the above figures, include outlays for health services and pensions.14 
There is not much to be done about the latter, which may be reduced or kept within 
manageable limits, the only course open being extension of the retirement age limit by 
claiming it is higher in western countries, an argument which, however, may be opposed 
on the ground that, by contrast, average age is lower in Hungary. If we are to keep 
strictly to our subject of financing public administration and public services, we cannot 
enter into either this or other debate, chiefly because, in our way of looking at it, the 
basic goal should be today (and will remain up to about 1996) to prevent through 
budgetary finance the emergence of unstable situations on a nationwide scale (national 
defence) or on a regional scale (unemployment, crime, growth of territorial inequalities, 
drastic deterioration in the national health service) and also to ensure that provision of 
finance will not result in an unmanageable volume of deficit. 
It must be spelled out that the latter goal cannot be achieved expect through very 
radical schemes, and let me add that such future series of measures, which are likely 
to provoke a social shock, will make their beneficial effects felt with a long delay after 
their introduction. What we have here is simply the need for public administration to 
choose the last of its means (penalty, reward, persuasion) to drive home to users of 
social insurance benefits that in future it will have to make continuing delivery of the 
same services subject to satisfaction of certain additional conditions. In the simplest 
terms, it should envisage payment of added contribution to the Social Insurance Fund 
in certain cases of health-impairing behaviour, that is to say that prophylactic care 
should be enhanced even if the toll to pay is higher initial costs. The other option is to 
reduce the range of cost-free services rather than to have health care wrecked 
completely.15 This option would naturally call for encouragement to the voluntary form 
14 A résumé of literature on problems relating to social insurance: Fraternité-jelentés a társadalombiztosítás 
reformjáról (Fraternité Report on the Social Insurance Reform), Fraternité Corp., Budapest, 1991, p. 359. 
15 We too have it clearly on mind that he who proposes today cutbacks in government spending is meddling 
with the no small fire of recession. Evidently, a reform of state finances can only be sustained by a stable 
economic structure, as it appears to have been demonstrated by events in the Western Europe of the 1970s, 
when overspending by public administration entailed harsh restrictive measures. The research worker outlined 
the facts and professional literature concerning the ways and means by which the situation was dealt with [A 
közpénzek modernizációja és a közigazgatás finanszírozásának reformja (Modernization of Public Funds 
Management and Reform of Financing Public Administration), in: A pénzügyi kormányzatról. Kézirat (On the 
Finance Cabinet. Manuscript), MTA ÁJI, 1990, pp. 349-442], but he had to rely on private predictions of trends 
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of supplementary insurance as a basic condition, just as it would be a basic requirement 
in our view, one that should apply to any arrangements, to introduce at last a scale of 
health-care charges for all medical interventions, naturally governed by the principle of 
accountability. 
Summary 
Space forbids discussion of questions concerning finance for all branches of public 
administration, but I may perhaps be permitted to make a few concluding remarks. 
As becomes clearly evident from the foregoing, the internal problems of financing 
the different branches of public administration need analyzing in much greater depth than 
is permitted by an article in ajournai. They are nevertheless preceded by the question of 
whether there exist some general principles deserving consideration prior to allocation 
of funds for any ministry, central state-financed organ, self-government, public body or 
public institution. Put otherwise, are there any standing criteria which the Parliament, the 
Government and the Ministry of Finance should take into account before deciding on the 
utilization of public funds? (I should note that problems regarding the practicability, 
legality and efficiency of financing public administration are inevitably of concent to the 
heads of the state audit office and even the central bank in any country.) 
1. Provision of finance for public administration is always related to some record of 
performance, or output, whether the substance of activity is constituted by exercise of 
administrative functions or by delivery of some public service. 2. Without measurement 
of results concerning the substance of activity, such measurement to be entrusted only to 
an organ of control external to the organization receiving finance (State Audit Office, 
Ministry of Finance, Central Statistical Office), real budgetary subsidies cannot be 
established as the "self-control" of organizational systems cannot be based on anything 
but supplementary data. 3. Such data are practically worthless without international 
comparison, so expenditure on wages, operation, investment, etc. should always be cross-
checked and the main figures for a homologous foreign organization should be presented 
at least to the appropriate parliamentary committee. 4. The output of the large distributive 
systems should be compared to the country's level of economic development. Compari-
sons with countries producing volumes of GDP several times that of Hungary will lead 
to unrealistic demands. 5. While it is true that budgetary revenues are spent in advance, 
decision-makers have their hand tied strongly, but this phenomenon, which we have lived 
with for decades, would necessitate a review of the legal system in the context of finance 
(expenditure). 6. Neither the MPs nor the Finance Ministry personnel may act as agents 
of public servants and public services once it should be taken for granted that the 
departments will never throw up a barricade to claims for finance from the budget. What 
in decision-making concerning the question of when [Szakértők és politikusok, avagy Magyarország '94. Kézirat 
(Experts and Politicians, or Hungary '94. Manuscript), MTA ÁJI, 1992, p. 22]. It will be noted that the Finance 
Ministry's calculations regarding the future pattern of GDP were also published in the daily press. 
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is therefore needed is primarily a change in approach under which the Ministry of 
Finance is seen, not as simply an organ existing to plan the spending of public revenues, 
but as one of the State responsible to Parliament for the utilization of public taxes, 
receipts from customs duties, public charges, fees, etc. 7. As can be seen, the problem 
is not a mere technical one, albeit it seems to be certain that a reform of the state 
accounting system, a strict regulation of public procurements, and revival of the auditing 
system would operate in a direction we believe to be desirable. 
On financial constraints on public administration in general 
As we have seen, the financing of public administration is, in principle, governed by 
quality and output as well as by the importance of the goal pursued. (Of course, these 
categories are not always relied upon for allocation of funds, but are indeed used as 
arguments, for example during debates on the budget.) Whatever the technique of 
financing public administration, certain it is that the operation of the aforementioned 
principle is checked by some factors, even on the plane of abstraction. A grouping of 
these factors will reveal that the constraints in question are either raised by interest 
groups active in the bureaucracy or by representatives of economic and financial sciences 
or by facts of the past, or have their source in international relations or in national law. 
Let us look at each of them. 
Interest control groups acting as constraints 
Interest control groups (parties, trade unions, associations, public bodies, etc.) formulate 
certain goals mainly in their programmes, but also in their by-laws, goals that may 
exercise decisive influence on different state responsibilities or state-aided tasks, thus 
shifting the main thrust of financing, even at the expense of the classical functions of 
public administration. (Such shifts of emphasis may be "positive" or "negative" in the 
case of a particular department and from its point of view.) A government is therefore 
"captive" to a given programme before it takes office, so an analysis of party pro-
grammes even tdlows predictions of trends to cuts in separate appropriations for particular 
sectors. (The extent to which the government will then actually implement the party 
programme is a question apart, often depending 011 the influence of the international 
organization affiliating similar parties, inter-party cohesion, etc.) Tendencies for extra-
bureaucracy interest groups to "enhance" certain goals (including ones with eventually 
negative financial implications) can also be forecast, thus permitting us to register further 
constraints 011 the government's future utilization of resources. 
A no less important role is played by interest groups within the bureaucracy, which 
are interested in planning die smallest possible revenues, but obtaining as much support 
as they can for their respective appropriation lines. 
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Constraints emanating from economic and financial sciences, 
or facts of the past 
The government's freedom of action is far too limited, not only on the side of public 
expenditure, by the working of the above factors, but also on the side of revenues on 
account of, if you like, certain economic observations and considerations of state 
finances. It is a rather widely held view, for instance, that cutbacks in government 
spending "release sizable resources" for inducing economic growth. As against this, 
several cases have been registered in which such cuts led to continuing shrinkage of the 
economy.16 As the same time, another observation suggests the impossibility of easing 
the fiscal pressure as one wishes. The fact that state expenditure is an unflexible variable 
relative to GDP for a particular economic era may obviously be regarded as an added 
constraint emanating from state finances, since the volume of GDP, the country's export 
performance, and debt servicing burdens may put a further constraint on any government. 
One might as well say, in effect, that governance rests on respect for or recognition of 
certain proportions, as it can hardly be disputed that there exists a strong correlation 
between GDP and unemployment, export performance and credit-worthiness, budgetary 
deficit and social insurance outlays, inflation and unemployment. (At a later stage we 
shall illustrate that, in view of such correlations, the law explicitly operates with figures.) 
There are also views that making a fetish of these correlations is a political error. (A 
Hungarian opposition party which does not consider it impracticable to increase the 
volume of debt for the sake of economic re-expansion is after all of this same position.) 
Early in the 1970s, when accused of having placed Austria in debt, Chancellor Kreisky 
retorted that "True, we have a debt of 200 billion shillings, but my generation has rebuilt 
the country. It is fair that the debt should be paid by them". So there is no doubt that a 
government may take any step, but its timing is not a matter of indifference. As for 
Hungary, this country began running into debt nearly 20 years ago. Backbiters have it 
that it did so deliberately in order to steal out of the camp. Regardless of whether or not 
that was the ulterior motive, the country has by now developed a kind of state finances 
in which social insurance, welfare, housing, educational, health-care and economic 
expenditures surpass those of Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom in terms of 
their respective shares of GDP. Consequently this is a constraint emanating from state 
finances and hard to remove, for which creditor can be supposed to finance efforts at 
continuing to increase that share? 
16 In Hungarian literature addressing the problem at the comparative level, see LÁSZLÓ, Csaba: Mekkora 
valójában az államháztartás szerepe az újraelosztásban? (What Is the Real Role of State Finances in 
Redistribution?), Közgazdasági Szemle, No. 1 of 1993, pp. 63-79; RUBICSEK, Sándor: Fiskális diktatúra 
(Fiscal Dictatorship), Pénzügyi Szemle, No. 12 of 1990, pp. 922-949; VÍGVÁRI, András: Az államháztartás 
helyzetéről (On the Situation of State Finances), Bankszemle, No. 9 of 1992, pp. 10-35.4 
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Constraints emanating from international law 
It is a matter of public record that the prime rationale of agreements with the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund lied in its serving as a signal for commercial banks, or, more 
specifically, lack or suspension of a country's agreement with IMF is not a good portent 
for links with other foreign banks. Therefore question of whether or not a government 
manages state finances in the spirit of such an agreement is not of marginal interest. I 
should stress that it is not the Bank that needs Hungary, but conversely. The agreement 
consequently means voluntary limitation, one that is of international significance, or is 
from without. The fact of governments facing external constraints (emanating from an 
international treaty) is not some sort of East European bad luck. By signing the Treaty 
of Maastricht, West European governments have also undertaken, inter alia, to reduce 
their budget deficits, to check inflation, etc., or, in one word, to place restrictions on 
government spending.17 
Constraints emanating from national law 
The most important statutory constraint on government spending is virtually imposed by 
laws which the Parliament had passed before the Government took office. Let me refer 
here to the Social Insurance Act, which, in the last analysis, undertakes a guarantee for 
paying social insurance deficit.18 Such constraints may also be imposed by regulations 
adopted after a government takes office, since the latter "create state responsibilities 
which tire Finance Bill, to be submitted by the government after all, cannot avoid 
covering".'5 One could enumerate a total of some 200 legislative enactments laying 
down state commitments, or special tasks. Enactments of this type incur expenditures 
and, if need K% public debt.20 
As against this, one may rightly argue that there exist techniques to "restrain" 
government spending already in the planning stage. Indeed, there do, such as those 
17 The Treaty of Maastricht contains figures as well: the rate of inflation in any member state must not 
surpass the best average rate in three member states by more than 1.5%; the budgetary deficit must not exceed 
3% of GDP, and the debt servicing ration must be lower than 60% of GDP. Le Traité de Maastricht. EIS 
Bruxelles, April 1992, p. 24. 
18 Art. 5 of Act II of 1975: "A contribution shall be payable to cover social insurances outlays. The State 
shall guarantee payment of benefits as determined by tliis Act even in cases where outlays outstrip revenues." 
19 E.g. Act XXII of 1992 on the Status of Public Servants; Act XXIII of 1992 on the Status of Public 
Employees; Act XXIV of 1992 on Partial Compensation, Aimed at Settlement of Property Relations, for 
Damage to Citizens' Property Unjustly Caused by the State on the Basis of Legislation Adopted in the Period 
from 1 May 1939 to 8 June 1949; Act IV of 1991 on Employment Promotion and Provision for the 
Unemployed. 
20 Such is exactly the case today. Hungary's public debt is supposed to have increased by Ft 400 billion in 
1993. 
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designed by Art 115 of the German Basic Law21 and the American Gramm—Rud-
mann—Hollings Act (as amended by Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control 
Reaffirmation Act in 1987).22 To arrest the so-called incremental budget is a great 
ambition of conservative politicians as well as of those focusing on the private sector, but 
it has so far been impossible to devise an automatism to regulate the trends of 
expenditure in keeping with the changing pattern of GNP.23 
Also known is an institutional constraint which similarly begins to operate in the 
period of planning (prior to parliamentary decision). Such is the State Audit Office itself, 
if empowered by law to examine the soundness of the budget.24 
However, such an arrangement carries high risks, for if an organ external to the 
executive power states its views on the budget, it may easily incur the charge of 
"ambition to co-governance". Such charge can be refuted, but the problem involved is not 
a pseudo one, as a great many governments are averse even to Parliament inserting 
amendments in the annual Finance Bill. It is a fact that both the State Audit Office and 
MPs may place certain limits on government ambitions. 
With the annual budget adopted, the government finds itself in a different, post-
decision period, in which it has authorization to act, but faces fresh "obstacles" in the 
course of action. Hungarian law, just as the Belgian, made it a responsibility of the State 
Audit Office to guard against government overspending under any item of budgetary 
appropriation. In 1990 the opposition noticed such endeavours, and its leader submitted 
an application to the Constitutional Court in the matter. 
The Government acted under an authorization by Act II of 1979.25 The application 
substantiated the illegality of such action by invoking the principle of lex posteriori 
derogat priori,26 and the Constitutional Court was requested to repeal the statutory 
authorization because it allowed overspending as against the relevant enactment of later 
date. 
Obviously, the Government did not observe the provision of subsequent legislation, 
violating the spirit of law by acting on a legal bases created by the statutory authorization 
of earlier date. 
21 "Receipts from credit shall not exceed budgetary appropriations for investment, exceptions to lie allowed 
only for the purpose of eliminating imbalances in the economy as a whole." 
22 STANFORD, Karen: State Budget Deliberations: Do Legislators Have a Strategy? Public Administration 
Review, No. 1 of 1992, pp. 16-25. 
23 The present author has also attempted to draft such a bill, but the professional world was, to put it mildly, 
cool on his effort. Törvénytervezet az ország társadalmi-gazdasági tervéről. Kézirat (Bill on the Country's 
Socio-Economic Plan. Manuscript), MTA AJI, Section of Public Administration, 1993, p. 8. 
24 In Hungary it is so empowered by Art. 2 (1) of Act XXVII of 1989. 
25 Acting on that authorization (Art. 17 of Act II of 1979), the Government issued a decree [Decree No. 
23/1979. (VI.28.) MR] enabling it (Sect. 15) to resort to cost overruns. 
26 Decision No. 386/B/1990 of the Constitutional Court. 
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It was equally indisputable, however, that if the expert opinion and the ensuing award 
of the Constitutional Court were to go against the Government, namely the enabling 
clause and die government decree involved were to be repealed, state finances would 
become paralyzed for a long period of time. (A clause granting reallocative powers is 
urgently needed for the conduct of state affairs, but it should be embodied in a law, not 
a decree. It should be added that, as was to be foreseen, foot-dragging caused the State 
Finances Act to be adopted long after the incident.27 
Why do we deem it important to deal with this point? We do so because it carries 
a very useful lesson for government spending. The lesson is not that "expenditures must 
be kept within budget". This is a general rule, a statutory constraint imposed by national 
laws, or, if you like, an axiom of law concerning implementation of the budget. The 
lesson is that neither "hamstringing" the government nor restricting government spending 
may ever be an end in itself for any segment of the opposition, of the reasonable elite. 
Bismarck is supposed to have said that representatives had no right not to vote the 
budget. One may ponder the message of that saying for a good while. Evidently enough, 
the message cannot suggest that representatives should adopt the version submitted by 
the government, but that they should state some view some time, for they have no 
authorization to cripple the State. 
A government should therefore be allowed a relative measure of manoeuvre, or else 
the helm of the State's vessel cannot be turned. What, on the other hand, should be open 
to debate is the measure, the possibility of turning the steering wheel. We maintain that 
in 1989 the Hungarian Parliament took a wrong decision by agreeing that public servants 
should be subject to control subsequent to authorization of expenditures rather than on 
a pennanent basis. That decision did not serve to change the system, as it neither 
provided for strict accounting by public servants nor established any set of requirements 
for the carec system in public administration, the promotion of public servants thus 
depending on the will of their patrons alone. We believe that during the period of 
transition a more useful purpose would be served in all East European countries by 
introducing a system similar to the French Cour des Comptes under which the auditor 
and the public servant bear responsibility separately. Continuous and prior control is 
badly needed for the territorial self-governments as well, where the shape of things will 
give the penny press ample food for raking up past events after a change of government. 
(We know full well that the cost of setting up regional audit offices would run to billions 
of forints, just as introduction of control over self-govenunent spending by private 
auditing fmns would.) 
There can be no reform of state finances without screening the organs performing 
public functions.28 Indeed, in the absence of such screening, the provisions of the State 
27 Act XXXVIII of 1992 on Stale Finances. 
28 László Muraközi's words are highly instructive in this respect: "Sidestepping the question (i.e. those 
relating to the situation of state finances) is unacceptable, since failure to make analyses and decisions is itself 
a hard economic policy decision fraught with consequences". Also, he points out on this score: "The heated 
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Finances Act restricting government spending are of no avail. Among its numerous 
provisions, Art. 24 (1) states that the central budget must show, by specified lines of 
appropriation, budgeted costs under separate headings for wages, transfer of social 
insurance contributions, materials, special-interest programmes, and certain special 
investment and renovation projects. 
Art. 26 places a ceiling on the amount of general reserve, which must not exceed 3% 
of the sum total of expenditure of the central budget. The Act limits utilization by the 
government of the general reserve fund by providing that not more than 40% thereof may 
be used in the first part of the year 
Again, government spending is restricted by the provision that, with certain 
exceptions, transfer of funds between lines of appropriation must be subject to 
parliamentary decision, the government having no absolute freedom to reallocate funds 
even within chapters, because the Parliament may reserve itself the right to modify 
certain lines of appropriation. 
We shall conclude the listing of constraints on government spending by referring to 
ill-famed Art. 108, under which assets connected with the subsystems of state finances 
(i.e. central government, separate state funds, local self-governments, social insurance) 
must not be transferred without valuable consideration and claims by subsystems must 
not be renounced except in the manner and cases defined by law. 
Conclusion 
In connection with financing the various branches of public administration there arises 
a basic question, that of whether there are at all priority areas within the system, which 
faces all rationalizers. Some claim that there are none, namely that if, for instance, 
expenditure on the public sector should be reduced, cuts in budgeted costs should be by 
equal percentage points for all items.29 
debates of the Hungarian Parliament on the budget in December 1991 and the soaring deficit in 1992 signalled 
also for the wider public—not for the first time and supposedly not for the last—that the system of state finances 
as a cornerstone of a new economic order on the road to a market economy was utterly unstable. It proved true 
that transformation of state finances was a most difficult socio-economic problem of the entire transitional 
period, first and foremost because the enormous scales of stale expenditure and redistribution, burdening the 
country over the past decades, had been organically built into the workings of the Hungarian economy and 
society, and any significant change, including its ripple effects, was likely to provoke chain reactions hard to 
predict. Secondly, and closely related to the former, each item in the budget is linked up with a network of 
complex interest relations, constancy on the surface conceals a complicated balance of forces between social 
segments and groups in a stronger or weaker position to control their interests, and any intervention tends to 
cause a 'nuisance' to a significant part of Hungarian society". MURAKÖZY, László: Az államháztartás a 
kilencvenes évek Magyarországán (State Finance in Hungary during the 1990s), Közgazdasági Szemle, No. 11 
of 1992. 
29 The Hungarian Government has set up a committee to rationalize public administration. The Committee 
has to present its report by mid-1994, so its findings can be expected to be considered for the first time in the 
course of preparing the budget for 1996. 
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For our part, we are of the view that there certainly are priority areas. We think this 
view is defensible in spite of knowing that no discrimination may be made among norms 
marking out specific tasks since, for instance, metrology is just as important to state life 
as the question of refugees is. Still, governance, or exercise of the art of the moment, 
demands means of attaining its short-term goals. Therefore the first level of conflict is 
between parliament and government, because the latter always seeks to undertake 
commitments for a term longer than that of its mandate and allotted powers; hence, and 
secondarily, because the government tends to shift emphasis (through spending), which 
operates to change the complexion of the State, it is necessary to place restrictions on 
government spending. The second level of conflict is between interest groups, lobbyists 
and the finance ministry, the first wanting more support and less taxes, and the latter 
striving for just the opposite. On these pints, bargains are naturally struck with the green 
lobby, state enterprises, the tobacco industry, professors, and trade unions. The modem 
concept of law no longer rejects bargains within the State and between the State and 
private entities,30 the only condition being that such deals must be fair. This, however, 
will be the subject of another study. 
30 Bargaining, or conclusion of agreement between the authority and private undertakings, as a legal 
institution was established by slow degrees in Western Europe as well. Its application is now being learnt in 
Eastern Europe. 
Akadémiai Kiadó, 
Budapest 
KALEIDOSCOPE 
Some Reflections on the History of 
Private International Law 
/ 
1. Whether we can speak about private international law in Imperium Romanum is one 
of the questions, qualified as the "crux interpretum". It is not surprising that the 
Romanists' viewpoints on this issue fall into two camps. According to Romanists of the 
first camp, the Roman law—and this applies to the law of die ancient peoples in the 
Mediterraneum generally—private international law, taken in the modem sense of the 
word, is not recognized. 
This is the standpoint of Savigny,1 Jörs,2 Theodor Kipp,3 Jolowicz,4 Buckland,s 
Fritz Schulz,6 Schönbauer,7 Liibtow,8 Schwind,9 and Hans Julius Wolff.10 Adherents 
1 SAVIGNY, C. F.: System des heutigen Römischen Rechts, vol. VIII. 1. Berlin, 1849. p. 29. 
2 JÖRS, P.: Römische Rechtswissenschaft zur Zeit der Republik, vol. 1. Berlin, 1888. p. 141. 
3 KIPP, Iii.: Das Römische Recht. In: R. STAMMLER: Das gesamte deutsche Recht in systematischer 
Darstellung. Berlin. 1930. p. 130. 
4 JOLOWICZ, M. F.: Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law. 2nd ed. Cambridge, 1952. p. 101. 
5 BUCKLAND, W.-McNAIR, A. D.: Roman Law and Common Law. 2nd ed. Ed. by LAWSON, F. H.: 
Cambridge, 1952. p. 25. 
6 SCHULZ, F.: Classical Roman Law. Oxford, 1951. pp. 78 ff. 
7 SHÖNBAUER, F: Studien zum Personalitätsprinzip im antiken Rechte. ZSS (Rom. Abt.) 49/1929/ 
pp. 372 ff. 
8 LÜBTOW, U: Das römische Volk, sein Staat und sein Recht. Frankfurt a. M., 1955. p. 491. 
9 SCHWIND, F.: Internationales Privatrecht und römisches Recht. Labeo 11/1965/ pp. 311 ff. 
10 WOLFF, H. J.: Das Problem der Konkurrenz von Rechtsordnungen in der Antike. Heidelberg, 1979. 
pp. 7 ff. 
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of this rejecting opinion refer to the fact that in Rome, the mental and more importantly 
the political conditions of the law of collision were absent. Apart from Roman law, the 
knowledge of the law of ancient peoples has namely been, from the beginning, very 
imperfect. In addition, the particular politic-administrative structure of the Imperium 
Romanum has always excluded the assumption of the law of peoples equal in rank. The 
opinion of Maridakis is worth mentioning, as well, in this relation. According to this, 
private international law, again in the modem sense of the word, is not known in mutual 
connection with the Greek poleis, either. Perhaps the best explanation for this lies in the 
fact that the ancient Greek legal koine—excluding the essential differences between the 
law of the single city-States—hardly enables the norms of collision to be created. 
2. The line of thought ignoring the existence of ancient private international law rests 
fundamentally upon three pillars. The first presupposes the more or less complete 
isolation of the law of the single ancient peoples from one other. On the other hand, it 
also emphasizes the lack of the necessary political conditions. Finally—though this is only 
valid for the world of Greek poleis—it emphasizes the considerable similarity of the legal 
norms of the single ancient peoples to one another. 
3. The number of scholars recognizing private international law in Antiquity is also 
considerable. Adherents to this school include: G. Beseler," Siber,12 Volterra,13  
Wesenberg,'4 Triantaphyllopoulos,15 Käser,'6 Santana,17 Lewald18 and Sturm.19 
The scholars mentioned, refer to the possibility that the conflict of norms of law or 
systems of law of different peoples was known in Greco-Roman Antiquity. Lewald 
treates the problems of private international law in greatest detail, not restricting his 
investigations solely to the field of Roman law. According to his supposition, in the 
world of the Greek poleis, in Ptolemaic Egypt and in the Imperium Romanum, the claim 
and requirement of using the foreign law presents itself in a much too concrete form. In 
a particular way, however, none of these theorists analyse the causes which led to the 
11 BESELER, G.: Beiträge zur Kritik der römischen Rechtsquellen. IV. Tübingen, 1920. pp. 82 ff. 
12 SIBER, H.: Römisches Recht. II. Römisches Privatrecht. Berlin, 1928. p. 9. 
13 VOLTERRA, E.: Quelques problèmes concernant le conflict des lois dans l'Antiquité. In: Travaux et 
Conférences. Université Libre de Bruxelles. Faculté de Droit. Vol. III. 1955. 
14 WESENBERG, G: Zur Frage eines römischen Internationalen Privatrechts. Labeo 3/1957/ pp. 22 ff. 
15 TRIANTAPHYLLOPOULOS, J.: Lex Cicereia. Engyettka. Vol. I. Athenai, 1957. pp. 13 ff. 
16 KÄSER, M.: Das römische Pnvatrecht. Erster Abschnitt. Das altrömische, das vorklassische und klassische 
Recht. 2nd ed. München, 1971. pp. 202 and 214 ff. 
17 RUILOBA SANTANA, E.: Conflicto de leyes y "ius gentium" en el mundo juridico romano. Vision 
retrospectiva desde la dogmatica permanente de Derecho internacional privado. In: Estudios juridicos en 
homenaje al profesor Santa Cruz Teijeira. Valencia, 1974. Vol. II. pp. 341 ff. 
18 LEWALD, H.: Gesetzeskollisionen in der griechischen und römischen Welt. In: Zur griechischen 
Rechtsgeschichte. Hrsg. von. E. Berneker, Darmstadt, 1968. pp. 666 ff. 
19 STURM, F.: Unerkannte Zeugnisse römischen Kollisionsrechts. In: Festschrift Schwind. Wien, 1978. pp. 
323 ff. and Idem: Gaius I 77 und das römische Kollisionsrecht. In: Maior Viginti quinque annis. Essays in 
Commemoration of the sixth lustrum of the Institute for Legal History of the University of Utrecht. 
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formational law. While the representatives of the negative standpoint emphasize those 
international factors which prevent the formation of private international law, the 
partisans of the positive opinion ignore these economic, social and political preconditions, 
which unquestionably are important factors. 
II 
4. The condition creating modem private international law, according to the prevailing 
viewpoint in literature,20 is the formation of a well developed international exchange of 
commodities; that is to mean transferal of goods and persons, presenting itself in the 
relations of States based upon different private law systems, mutually recognizing the law 
of one another as co-equal. 
According to our assumption, in Graeco-Roman Antiquity the aforementioned 
fundamental premises of private international law do exist and are to be found. The 
existence of the international economic-political connections is, namely, an irrebuttable 
fact. On the odier hand, there are considerable signs of the recognition of the equality of 
rank of different States (political units). And finally, owing to the fact that the concept 
of private law is not exclusively connected with Romans, the different nature of the 
private-law systems of the various ancient States is also a given fact. It is, further on, 
our task to investigate also some questions from which—though possibly in an embryonic 
fonn—the conclusion can be drawn that theirs was a private international law (law of 
collisions). 
5. The signs of a Roman law of collisions can be demonstrated by more than one 
source. One of the fields where the so-called law of collisions presents itself is seen in 
the scope of the role held by personal and real securities. Particularly a few sources, 
taken from Ulpian's work, entitled "Fragmenta disputationum", give valuable information 
concerning this question.21 In the fragments, edited and commented upon by Lenel,22 
the matter in question is whether the sponsor the holder of a pledge may refer to the 
exceptio annalis Italici contractus, later revoked by Justinian and replaced by the exceptio 
longae possessionis, known in the Provinzialrecht which took into consideration the 
local particularities.23 
The question is, concretely, who is entided to refer to the exceptio. As it became 
clear on the basis of the analyses of the D. 44,3,5,1 (Ulpian), it is by no means the 
20 MÁDL, F.—VÉKÁS, L.: Tlie Law of Conflicts and Foreign Trade. Budapest, 1987. p. 28. Cf. more recently 
HAMZA, G.: Comparative 1 .aw and Antiquity. Budapest. 1991. pp. 116 ff. and 128 ff 
21 Cf. Ulpiani Fragmenta disputationum III, 3; III, 4; and 111, 6. Cf. in the recent literature, summarily: 
STURM, F.: Unerkannte Zeugnisse, pp. 325 ff. 
22 LENEL, О.: Weitere Bruchstücke aus Ulpians disputationen ZSS (Rom. Abt.) 25/1904/ pp. 368 ff. and 
Idem: Zur exceptio annalis Italici contractus. ZSS (Rom. Abt.) 27/1906/ pp. 71 ff. 
23 Tlie atitutlis exceptio is quashed by Justinian, with attention to tlie several "moles altercationum". Cf. CJ. 
7, 40, 1. 
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pledger himself who has the active legitimation. The situation is different if the exceptio 
is referred to by the successor in right (heir) of the pledger. Owing to the exceptio, the 
exception from the prescription of the seizure of something as a pledge becomes possible. 
The problem of collision presents itself only in connection with the duration of exceptio. 
In Italy, the legal successor could, namely, acquire an exemption from a pledge already 
after tlie passing of one year (this is the so-called exceptio annalis) and—on the basis of 
lex Furia—he could also be exempted from the obligation of security, as well. 
Now, it is questionable, 011 the basis of which criteria it can be decided whether the 
right of pledge was created in Italy or in a province (in provinces). 
On the basis of Ulpian we may conclude that the lex loci solutionis as a 
link—principle of the law of collision—does not come into consideration. The lex loci 
actus—and, in the case of sponsio, the lex loci sponsoris accepli, and in cases of pignus 
the lex loci pignoris contracti applies in the fonn of exceptio, as an enforceable 
exemption. It is worth mentioning, as well, that if the right of pledge is renewed, the 
effective connecting principle is, consistently, the lex loci renovatae pignerationis. It is, 
therefore, decisive in the sphere of the personal and real guarantees of obligation equally, 
where the law of security or pledge came into being at first, in Italy or in the provinciáé. 
It is, therefore, obvious that, from the point of view of referring to the exceptio, the place 
where the basic obligation came into being is of no concern. 
6. On die basis of the above facts, it can be established that Ulpian connects the 
effectiveness of the norms of law and their point of origins with particular emphasis. In 
this way, it is not the site of making the basic obligation or just that of the lex loci 
solutionis which comes into consideration but the site where the securities of the obligatio 
have been created. 
This solution, even measured by the standards of modem private international law, 
establishes a norm of collisions. It is, of course, another question—as it follows from the 
particular constitutional structure of tlie Imperium Romanum that this is a norm of 
"interprovincial" character rather than of international one. 
7. It is to be noted here that, as in the recent literature referred to by Sturm24 as a 
result of the Justinian's conception what was, as a matter of fact, in a number of regards 
intolerant, forcing at any price the uniformity of law—several norms of collisional nature 
fell very probably victim to tlie codifying activity of Compilers of the Justinian's 
Codification. 
8. The conflictus legum also plays a role in the law of inheritance, having a personal 
law background. A place of the Institute of Gaius is, in this respect particularly 
noteworthy:25 
"Itaque si civis Romana peregrino, cum quo ei conubium est, nupserit, peregrinus 
sane procreatur et is iustus paths filius est, tamquam si ex peregrina cum procreasset. 
24 STURM, F.: Unerkannte Zeugnisse, pp. 327 ff. 
25 Tlie detailed analysis of this source cf. STURM, F.: Gaius I 77 und das römische Kollisionsrecht. pp. 155 
ff. 
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Hoc tamen tempore e senatusconsulto quod auctore divo Hadriane sacratissimo factum 
est, etiamsi non fuerit conubium inter civem Romanam et peregrinum, qui nascitur iustus 
patrisßlius est." (Gai. Inst. 1, 77) 
This source contains two facts. In one of the cases the matter in question is that a 
civis Romana contracts a marriage with such a civis Romanus who has ius conubii. The 
child, originating from this marriage does, namely, not obtain the civitas Romana but he 
is legitimate and is to be considered as a child whose mother is a peregrina. But what 
is the situation—Gaius continues—if the peregrinus father has no ius conubii?! Hadrian 
decided in the way that, apart from the necessity of conubium, the child is, of legitimate 
birth in this case as well. This senatusconsultum, originating from the emperor himself, 
is something particular because the marriage, seen stricto iure, is null and void (non-
marriage or an apparent marriage) due to the lack of the conubium.26 
9. The novelty of Hadrian's disposition is in the fact that, ignoring die principle of 
personalitas entirely and regardless of the ius conubii, it considers as valid every 
conubium. 
For Hadrian to which ethnic group the partner in marriage (having no civitas 
Romana) belonged and which Volksrecht applied to her was of no concern. The emperor 
created, in this way, a kind of "supra-national" law. The lex originis, ius civitatis of the 
wife had no part at all. 
It is true that this regulation—as distinguished from die Ulpian-fragment, investigated 
above—fundamentally does not have die nature of collisional law. 
This senatusconsultum has contents of collisional law only in so far as dial by 
leaving a limine out of consideradon of the reguladons by die many-coloured Volks-
rechte, differing from one another. 
It created a uniform rule of law which was diametrically opposed to die norm 
(norms) of the local law. Creating this uniform rule which broke with the principle of 
personality and obtained such a great in Antiquity (in whose legal-polidcal background 
support for hereditary laws favouring children concealed itself), Hadrian renders 
unnecessary the law of collisions itself. 
Ill 
10. It cannot be our task here, to analyse the very complex problem of the ancient 
(Roman) private international law comprehensively. The aim of these reflecdons is to 
refer to the facts which serve or can serve, in principle, as the basis in the Mediterranean 
26 As to the specifics of Hadrian's policy of law, motivated by Iiis method of exercizing power cf. HÜBNER, 
H.: Zur Rechtspolitik Kaiser Hadrians. In: Festschrift Seidl. Köln, 1975. pp. 61 ff. and JUST, M.: 
Rechtspolitische und rechtsphilosophische Grundsätze der kaiserlichen Rechtsfortbildung in der römischen 
Klassik. In: Recht und Staat. Festschrift Küchenhoff. Vol. I. Berlin, 1972. pp. 71 ff. 
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world for the appearance of the private international law on a certain level.27 It is to be 
established on the basis of the sources cited that, within the Imperium Romanum, having 
a heterogeneous structure of public law, the outlines of a private "interprovincial" law 
developed. As it can be traced to the striving of the Compilers of the Justinaian's 
Codification to establish a unity of law, the number of useful sources at our disposal is 
unfortunately very limited. 
The well-developed interchange of commodities, the almost entirely undisturbed 
symbiosis of ius civile and of the local Volksrechte which manifested itself within the 
Imperium Romanum—and from which the heterogeneous structure of law originated—at 
any rate needed a supranational regulation, with collisions of larger volume, and 
exceptionally without any collision. However, the dearth of sources prevents an extensive, 
or even limited, reconstruction of this regulation today. 
Gábor Hamza 
27 Wc do agree willi Cheshire who states: "The state of things which necessitates a system of private 
international law, namely, a number of conflicting territorial laws, certainly existed in the Roman Empire, but 
the texts do not throw a great deal of light upon the manner in which the law of Rome resolved the conflicts." 
CHESHIRE G. C.: Private International Law. 6th ed. Oxford, 1961. p. 18. 
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L. W. SUMNER: The Moral Foundation of Rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1993. 224 pp. 
The arguments brought forth in this 
study begin by setting out a moral concept 
and with a moral theory formulated, the 
relationship between the two being the main 
subject of the book. The author claims that 
rights have, after their own fashion, gained 
international currency as a means of pay-
ment in terms of morals and have a particu-
larly important role to play in political 
debates. In liberal and democratic societies 
these fundamental rights keep increasing in 
value, each of them having proved to be of 
imperishable value both in politics and in 
philosophy. 
In his introduction to the book the 
author refers to a considerable spread of 
rhetoric on rights, while emphasizing that, 
practically speaking, there is no single area 
of these rights without heated and one-sided 
debates going on about which rights are to 
enjoy priority over others, which rights 
come into collision with others, and what 
type of social conflicts and even tragedies 
may be precipitated by the process of 
achieving this or that right in the political 
field. He points out that in the international 
arena the right to national sovereignty is in 
conflict with the rights of oppressed minor-
ities, and the right to protection of domestic 
industry. The economy is in conflict with 
that of free trade. And "the rights" of 
maritime nations is in conflict those of 
landlocked countries. In his view, even the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
which he considers to be the best-known 
international catalogue of human rights, is 
attended by contradictions and tends to give 
rise to additional problems to be addressed. 
The author maintains that the different lists 
of rights are perforce incomplete and give 
preference to certain rights and certain 
groups of human beings, which leads the 
nihilists to the straight conclusion that there 
exist no such rights in reality. These rights 
come under attack from many sides and are 
made the subject of reservations. Also, in 
parallel with the emphasis laid on funda-
mental rights, which have been brought into 
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vogue in political and public life, it has 
become fashionable, as it were, to question 
and discredit these rights or at least with 
respect to narrow their range. There is no 
doubt that the "proliferation" of rights has 
an inflationary effect of its own in that 
rights tend to lose their argumentative force. 
In like manner, the complexity of concepts 
about personality or interests is a significant 
contributory factor to devaluing those 
concepts or at least with respect to the 
current versus previous status of these rights 
appearing as a loss of value in the public 
mind. The present-day philosophical litera-
ture likewise offers astonishing examples 
of an enormously expanding yet fading 
notion of rights. In the debate on abortion, 
for instance, both sides agree in that the 
centra] issue of the debate concerns the 
moral status of the embryo, the interpreta-
tion of its existence. Yet, at the same time, 
the debate is increasingly confined to the 
question of whether or not the embryo has 
any rights, namely the right to accept or 
reject a concept of some sort. 
The author of the book attempts an 
analysis of rights and the conditions for their 
implementation, trying to find, in the maze 
of what is prohibited and permitted, a mond 
"happy medium" where rights prevail within 
die bounds or reason. He analyzes Hohfeld's 
views, in which the basic concept is virtual-
ly constituted by interpreted, nor even 
imagined. Along this line of reasoning he 
cites examples to illustrate conflicts of rights 
and aspects of their enjoyment in society. 
According to the author, rights mean 
unlimited freedom of choice and unlimited 
possibilities, with the added need for respect 
for die interests of others. 
Rather interesting is the discussion of 
differences existing between conventional 
rights and those not recognized by legisla-
tion. The author offers possible models of 
protected interests and protected choices, 
pointing out that the modern law-governed 
state is trying to find the conditions for the 
existence and application of laws and 
regulations and that, in general, some sort 
of enumeration of "primary rules" is an 
indispensable concomitant of a legal order. 
However, the unity, the internal coherence 
of a legal system cannot be judged by the 
values of the so-called primary rules. On 
this score, the author deals briefly with 
diverse law enforcement patterns and related 
social traditions by country and region. 
The next chapter 011 contractual rights 
may provoke debates. According to the 
author, the prime motive of contractual 
rights is convenience rather than morality 
and it is even questionable whether those 
rights reveal the presence of morality in one 
form or another. In this connection he 
discusses John Stuart Mill's ideas about the 
relationships between morals and rights and 
about the relationships between morals and 
rights and about the collection of "moral 
rights". Unlike him, Bentham makes 110 
distinction between moral and natural rights 
and, moreover, virtually claims that all that 
is involved are terms as applied in political 
rhetoric. According to Hobbes, judging the 
value of diese rights is a matter of approach. 
His follower, Buchanan, is of the view that 
there exists a hypothedcal agreement which 
is applied to the formulation of fundamental 
moral rights mid that bodi can be relied 
upon later for the establishment of addidonal 
rights. Buchanan calls this "natural dis-
tribution", which can never be egalitarian 
in character. 
In the next chapter the author addresses 
the so-called "consequentialist rights". He 
contends that the infladon of rhetoric about 
rights results in various formuladons of 
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fundamental rights on the one hand and also 
in the emergence of a related apologetic on 
the other. 
Last but not least, the author deals with 
aspects of legal theory, warning of the 
limitations of rights-related methodology and 
discussing in this vein, changes in the orders 
of social values and changing systems of 
social institutions. He states that the ultimate 
and determinative dimension of 
rights is constituted by their force, durability 
and respect in society. 
The volume is complete with abundant 
bibliographical notes. The author's reason-
ing, train of thought, and explanations are 
suggestive and holds much of interest for 
those taking concern with topical issues of 
legal theory. 
Miklós UDVAROS 
Alexander VIDA: La preuve par sondage en matière de signes distinctifs, Paris, 1992, 
Librairies Techniques, 191 pp. 
This study has been published, in col-
laboration with the Centre of Education in 
the International Protection of Industrial 
Property (C.E.I.P.I.) based in Strasbourg, as 
p;irt of a series of books dealing with topical 
issues of industrial property protection. 
The preface to the book begins with a 
commendation by Professor J. J. Burst, a 
renown French jurist and the Director of 
C.E.I.P.I., who notes with pleasure that the 
work in question will, in his view, be a 
worthy addition to the aforementioned series 
of books. 
Although the study covers the American, 
German and French legal practices, its 
subject can also be said to be well-chosen 
and of current interest to Hungary, as it 
includes judgments of Hungarian relevance 
(Ungarische Salami) on the one hand, and 
on the other, techniques of evidence little 
known in Hungary. 
The book consists of two main parts, 
describing the American and then the 
Gertnan methods and practices of public 
opinion research. 
Both parts follow the same structural 
pattern, discussing the conditions for taking 
evidence by public opinion polls and then 
the areas in which the findings, thus pro-
duced, can be criticized. 
With respect to the conditions for taking 
evidence by public opinion polls, the study 
shows signs of parallelism in its treaunent 
of both aspects, and is arranged under the 
following subject headings: 
— terms used in the procedure; 
— section of the population ("mass") to 
be covered by public opinion polls; 
— criteria for population sample selec-
tion; and 
— the technique of public opinion polls. 
The main part entitled "Areas of Evi-
dence Produced by Public Opinion Polls" 
embraces the following types of legal cases; 
with respect to America: 
— assessing the danger of misleading the 
customers; 
— evidencing the degree of trademark 
familiarity to customers; and 
— inquiring into the transformation of 
trademarks into indications of brand; and 
with respect to Germany: 
— assessing the degree of customers' 
familiarity with unregistered trademarks; 
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— evidencing the degree of customers' 
familiarity with well-known and highly 
valued trademarks; 
— producing evidence of misleading the 
customers; and finally, 
— assessing the danger of misleading the 
customers. 
The study is complete with an expo-
sition of the legal situation in France and 
a presentation of notable American and 
German judgments ("Beefater", "National 
Football League", "Exxon", "Maggi", 
"Pralinenumhüllung"). 
On die whole, the study may be said to 
be marked by a logical arrangement of 
subjects, which helps the reader to find the 
theoretical questions discussed and the legal 
cases of practical relevance. 
The treaünent of each separate subject 
starts with a theoretical approach followed 
by a discussion of practical aspects. 
In point of fact, the book can be divided 
into "logically separate sections", describing 
the theoretical and methodological aspects 
of public opinion research in the field of 
trademarks on the one hand and, on the 
other, featuring practical cases in which 
public opinion research has produced 
conclusive evidence concerning the degree 
of familiarity with a particular trademark, 
its misleading nature or other characteristics. 
Although public opinion research is not 
an element of judicial proceedings in Hun-
gary, it can be imagined that, with the gready 
enhanced significance of trademarks, persons 
with legal title to trademarks will find it 
worthy to have access to such research. 
Public opinion research in the highly 
industrialized countries is a means of 
evidence applicable under the rules of civil 
procedure. 
The costs of public opinion polls in the 
United States of America are estimated to 
be between, 5,000 and 100,000 dollars per 
survey and are to be advanced by the trade-
mark owner instituting proceedings for the 
purpose of producing evidence, ultimately 
such costs are payable by the losing party. 
The provisions of law on public opinion 
polls contain numerous statutory safeguards 
to die effect that: 
— the section of the population to be 
covered by a survey must be subjected to 
preliminary pilot inquiry and the appropriate 
sample must be selected in such a way as 
to ensure that the interrogation of persons 
may give correct results; 
— the representative sample of interviews 
and the substance of questions put them 
must be determined without the involvement 
of die lawyers acting in the lawsuit and 
— the interviewers must not be familiar 
with the given legal dispute or the objectives 
of the public opinion poll ordered. 
It is practicable to include 100 to 1,500 
persons in the population sample to be 
selected for a public opinion poll. 
A major role in sample selection is 
played chiefly by practical rules like the 
following: 
— investigators should keep in view the 
section of the population affected by a 
trademarked product and then contact the 
public opinion poll contrast those individuals 
e.g., housewives or young girls or boys; 
— the public opinion poll may cover 
potential customers, but it is more appro-
priate to question a group of persons who 
have already purchased the particular 
product; 
— it is important to have regard for the 
geographical (territorial) conditions under 
which the public opinion poll is conducted; 
— the section of the population or the 
area to be selected for a poll should be 
determined according to whether to trade-
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mark involved is generally known or is of 
local interest; 
— with regard to the selection of popula-
tion sample in the case of trademarks of 
local interest, it appears sufficient for public 
opinion polls to cover an area not larger 
than a few square kilometres; 
— interestingly, it is held practicable to 
exclude from public opinion polls, groups 
of dealers with above-average knowledge 
of goods; 
— the sample may be selected in a 
variety of ways. Great importance is 
attached to proportionality, that is to the 
need for the persons selected and inter-
viewed to adequately represent the popu-
lation's average stratification by age, 
education, interest and other criteria; and 
— selection may be random, with inter-
views chosen from the telephone directory 
or by computer on the basis of a predeter-
mined principle, with their range limited to 
average individuals. This is possible in cases 
where interest for a particular product (e.g. 
toys) is shown by persons other than 
specific age cohorts. 
Given the technical facilities of public 
opinion research, the following aspects 
should be given paramount importance: 
— formulation of questions; 
— education of interviewers; 
— reproduction of circumstances in 
which goods are purchased; and 
— checking of survey results. 
Special significance should be attached 
to those of the legal cases studied which are 
of the greatest relevance to evolving the 
Hungarian legal approach, streamlining the 
methods of inquiring into trademarks, and 
establishing rules prohibitive of misleading 
to customers and of unfair conduct in the 
market. 
The analysis of the danger of misleading 
the customers has furnished a body of 
experience and knowledge that can be used 
with great advantage. 
Specifically, experts on public opinion 
polls know the danger of misleading the 
customers in the narrow sense, including 
that of direct acts of misleading. 
Provided in this study is a case of two 
similar trademarks which the average buyer 
may think to be one and the same despite 
an insubstantial difference between them. 
The author describes related legal disputes 
in which the danger of directly misleading 
die customers was supported by evidence 
disclosed by public opinion polls. A case in 
point is the conflict between the protec ed 
mark "Eveready" and the registered on 
"Ever-Ready", both put on incandescent 
lamps. 
The author makes the pertinent remark 
that buyers are under a delusion (i.e. falsely 
believe that both products are made by the 
same manufacturer) because they have no 
opportunity to have a parallel view of two 
such products one with a registered trade-
mark and the other with its counterpart. 
Another instance of the danger of 
misleading the customers in the narrow 
sense (indirect danger) is that in which the 
buyers concerned do not confuse the two 
marks, but rather the common elements 
thereof give rise to such a danger with 
respect to the trademark owner. In such 
cases the buyer misguidedly believes that 
the products involved are those of one and 
the same manufacturer. 
In this regard, even the indication 
"Rheumalind" used on blankets and the one 
"Frencolind" used on sheets are easily 
assumed to both contain the element "Lind". 
The similar label on bed-clothes may lead 
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the buyer to believe that both products are 
made by tlie same manufacturer. 
Public opinion research has disclosed 
that in this particular case buyers believed 
the products to belong to a single trademark 
family (Rheumalind, Thermalind, Dornlind, 
Porolind, Klimalind, Frencolind). Actually 
such trademark family was non-existent and 
was only coined for purposes of public 
opinion research, but was toward to exist 
because of tlie use of the word "Lind". 
Additionally the author discusses tlie 
interpretation of the danger of misleading 
die customers in the referring to cases in 
which two trademarks have two different 
owners, but the similarity of the two indica-
tions may lead the buyer to conclude that 
diere is an economic or an organizational 
link between the persons with legal title to 
the registered trademark and its counterpart. 
It was also found by public opinion 
research that, with respect to trademarks 
widi the registered word and symbol "Son-
ne" (the German for sun) 011 canned fruits 
and vegetables, die fact that die common 
compound-forming element of the indication 
"Sunpearl" was a word of the same meaning 
(sun as the English for Sonne) carried no 
danger of confusion despite the coincidence 
of labels. 
The work under review is a study of 
seiend fie standards primarily on trademarks, 
one that offers a great deal of new informa-
tion for patent agents, persons concerned 
with trademark protecdon, and other special-
ists. 
The study inquires into the set of relation-
ships prevailing in the domain of sharp 
economic competition between countries with 
an advanced market economy. The consider-
able amount of productive capacity and 
property represented by trademark owners 
allows and even calls for public opinion 
polls to be conducted in questions of 
trademark control involving fine distinctions. 
Within a few years, trademark fraudulent 
imitators and forgers will probably fell 
compelled to resort to public opinion polls 
in Hungary as well. 
The book is written in French, under an 
exacting approach, but it also contains a list 
of the relevant American and German terms. 
An added strength of the study is the har-
monization of various modern terms used 
in three world languages. Thus, for instance, 
the fact that a trademark has obtained a 
wide celebrity has different renderings in 
the world languages: 
— French: Le fait que la marque se soit 
imposee dans le commerce; 
— English: secondary meaning; 
— German: Verkehrsgeltung. 
In commending the merits of this work 
one should not overlook the fact that the 
preparation of a subject-specialized study 
by a Hungarian author with competent 
knowledge of the native language of a 
French-speaking country deserves recogni-
tion as an impressive accomplishment. 
Finally, mention is perhaps deserved by 
the not unimportant fact that the series of 
36 volumes on industrial property protection 
published by C.E.I.P.I. includes a single 
Hungarian author, that of the present study, 
whose second work has now been found 
worthy of publication. 
Levente TATTAY 
Book review 207 
J. SCHWARZE and E. SCHMIDT-ASSMANN: Das Ausmass der gerichtlichen Kon-
trolle im Wirtschaftsverwaltungs- und Umweltrecht, Edited by Nomos, Baden-Baden, 
1992. 281 pp. 
In Hungary, as in other countries, the 
legal community has become inreasingly 
interested in the juridical review of adminis-
trative decisions, which go back nearly 25 
years, concerning patents granted and trade-
marks registered by the National Patent 
Office. Recently, juridical review of deci-
sions passed by the Office for Economic 
Competition in cases involving cartels and 
abuse of economic superiority has attracted 
the attention of members of the legal pro-
fession. Similar cases, calling for complex 
examination, present a new task for the 
courts as well. 
It cannot be seen as accidental that, 
following the entry of Act LXXXVI of 1990 
relating to unfair practices in the market, there 
occurred changes in the competent jurisdiction 
of courts in such matters. Unfair practices 
with market were formally addressed by 
economic divisions. Now however they add-
ressed by administrative divisions, presumably 
on the basis of foreign experience. 
Against this Hungarian background, it 
would be noted that the two renowned 
German authors have offered a cooperative 
essay, jointly with the co-authors J. C. Hélin 
(of France) and P. M. Efstartiou (of 
Greece), in the analysis of four sets of 
problems indicated in the title of their book. 
The subject areas covered are not complete-
ly identical of course, but the resultant com-
parison of law is nonetheless worthy of 
attention. 
This review will not follow the order 
of exposition of the subjects in the book 
(German, French, Greek and EC laws), but 
rather will begin by giving an account of 
the study on the law of the European 
Community, by Prof. J. Schwarze, on of the 
most prominent German scholars in Euro-
pean law. This topic is becoming increasing-
ly important for Hungary. 
With respect to EC law, court review 
means reexamination by the European Court 
of Luxembourg of measures and decisions 
of the Common Market Committee based 
in Brussels. The jurisdiction of the European 
Court derives from Arts. 164 and 169 to 178 
of the Treaty of Rome and may, in individ-
ual cases, result in overturning measures of 
the Common Market Committee (para. 2, 
Art. 173). 
J. Schwarze discusses the legal practice 
of the European Court in five of the follow-
ing special fields: the laws of the European 
Coal and Steel Community; the Customs 
Union: the law of anti-dumping procedures; 
the law of the agricultural market; and the 
law restrictive of competition. 
Because the relevant provisions of 
Hungarian substantive law conform to, or 
literally agree with those of Arts. 85 and 86 
of the Treaty of Rome. 
The establishment of guidelines for 
judicial practice concerning the restriction 
of competition is of particular interest to 
Hungary. 
Therefore, questions relating to court 
review similarly arise in Hungarian law as 
well. 
According to Schwarze, whenever the 
European Court reviews measures violative 
of the prohibition of cartels (Art. 85 of the 
Treaty of Rome), it examines whether the 
Common Market Committee has observed 
the relevant rules of procedure in adopting 
its measures. Thus, for instance, in the 
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Papier Peints case, the European Court 
overturned the Committee's decision be-
cause the latter confined itself by referring 
to an earlier decision instead of giving a 
detailed statement of reasons. In the AEG-
Telefunken case, the Court pointed out that 
the Committee had errect in basing its 
decision on documents the existence of 
which had not been made known to a party 
in due time. This omission resulted in the 
party not being in a position to state its 
views on such documents. 
The standing practice of the European 
Court requires the Committee to support its 
decisions with reasons of substance that will 
make their review by the Court possible. 
(Carm and Hoeckst cases.) 
Of course, this implies no obligation to 
carry statements of reasons to excess. In its 
decisions in the Ford an Remia cases, the 
European Court argued that "the Commit-
tee...is not obliged to amply explain all 
advantages and disadvantages of a selective 
marketing system if there is reasonable 
ground to assume that the manufacturer used 
that system '< • impede exports, thereby 
artificially dividing the Common Market". 
An especially noteworthy aspect of 
judicial practice concerning the prohibition 
of abuse of economic superiority (Art. 86 
of the Treaty of Rome) is presented by the 
proceedings in the Hoffmann-La Roche 
case. In this case, the European Court, after 
a careful examination of 30 contracts, based 
its decision on a comprehensive review of 
the Committee's findings. In like manner, 
the European Court made a thorough review 
of facts in the Continental Can case. These 
and similar examples consequently lead to 
the conclusion that in matters involving 
restriction of competition, the European 
Court will subject the Committee's decisions 
to a full-scale review. 
This prompts Schwarze to draw the 
conclusion, which we also consider to be 
valid, that with respect to the law restrictive 
of competition, the European Court resorts 
to comprehensive review. This review 
embraces the aspects of both the establish-
ment of pertinent facts and the correctness 
of their appraisal. 
Let us now proceed to examining and 
how these same matters arise in German 
law, as is discussed very briefly (on one 
and a half pages) by Prof. Schmidt-Ass-
mann. 
As early as 1968, in its decision in the 
Fensterglass case, the Supreme Court of the 
Federal Republic of Germany took the view 
that the court review of decisions of the 
cartel authority should be more intensive 
than that of other administrative decisions. 
That authoritative ruling then resulted in the 
handing down of lower court (Kammer-
gericht) decisions in which those courts 
even permitted the examination of circum-
stances that had not been considered by the 
Cartel Office (Computer case). 
At the same time Schmidt-Assmann's 
study, which makes so short work of 
antitrust law, gives the reader a helpful 
guide by providing a detailed and dogmati-
cally well-grounded exposition of the so-
called general part (contesting administra-
tive decisions in court). 
Within this framework, the analysis of 
the substance of the law of court review 
(.Kontrolldichte) is of particular interest 
despite the fact that its focus is not on 
controlling the practicability of administra-
tive decisions, but rather on reviewing their 
lawfulness. It is nevertheless of fundamental 
importance, as it amounts to a full-scale 
review of administrative decisions (Dogma 
vollständiger Überprüfung). In the dog-
matics (juristische Methodenlehre) evolved 
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under Art. 19, para. 4, of the FRG Constitu-
tion (Grundgesetz), this means that: 
— the court itself interprets the provi-
sions of law, while correcting eventual 
misinterpretations by administrative author-
ities; 
— the court itself determines the perti-
nent facts when contested by the plaintiff 
or when the court has doubts about the 
Findings of the administrative authority and, 
— the court draws its own conclusions 
and decides the legal norms that govern the 
facts determined by itself (subsumtio). 
A different court review, one of a 
narrower scope than is outlined here, is 
exceptional (Dogma ausnahmsweiser 
Letztentscheidung der Exekutive), i.e., is 
resorted to when provided by law. Even so, 
court review extends to cases in which the 
administrative authority went beyond its 
discretionary powers, misused them, or 
failed to exercise discretion. 
Recent years have seen the incursion of 
the German concept of law into the practice 
of the European Court and the displacement 
of the hitherto dominant French concept of 
administrative law (Conseil d'Etat). Accord-
ingly the two authors state in the closing 
section of their book, what of just for the 
absolve reason only the expositions on 
German administrative law, deserves 
attention. 
In conclusion, and independently, as it 
were, of this book review, the reader needs 
to be reminded that the study reviewed here 
represents Volume 155 of the Nomos series 
edited by Prof. Schwarze (Europäisches 
Recht, Politik und Wirtschaft). This series 
of publications has already made a signifi-
cant contribution to the study of theoretical 
questions relating to EC law. It can be 
supposed that their contribution will con-
tinue growing in importance as well as in 
readership, owing partly to Maastricht, and 
partly to the association of the Central and 
Eastern European countries within the 
European Community. 
Alexander VIDA 
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author tries to provide a definition of this world phenomenon, free 
from ideological bias. 
The real question is, however, whether law can be used to promote 
successful modernization; if so, under what conditions, and if not, 
for what reasons. The author investigates the modernization 
process in Eastern Europe from this point of view, particularly with 
regard to the recent decades of so-called „socialist" society, 
comparing it with the societies which originally had a traditional, 
sacral legal system, such as India, and those with traditional tribal 
systems, such as the former British colonies in East Africa. 
Finally, the author considers Ethiopia which had both sacral and 
tribal elements in its traditional legal system. Having analysed the 
effect of modem law during the colonial period and after 
independence, and the use of law in „socialist" political systems, the 
author draws some conclusions about the problems of legal 
pluralism, and the effect of successful or fms t ra ted law-making, 
which have appeared in these societies, and their legal systems. The 
book ends with some theoretical conclusions. 
Readership: researchers of jurisprudence and sociology, historians 
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Essays in Memory of Proifessor István Kovács 
This volume of essays pays tribute to Professor István Koyács, the 
internationally acknowledged scholar of constitutional law, and mem-
ber of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The authors, honouring 
Professor Kovács, are his colleagues in Hungary and abroad, with 
whom he collaborated for decades at the Institute, for Legal and 
Administrative Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, in 
several leading bodies of international scicntific organizations, and in 
directing numerous research projects. 
The essays published are concerned with the basic issues of the 
governmental system, and the defence of human rights from the 
aspect of constitutional and administrative law, and in general, from 
that of public law. This book also deserves special attention, because 
it provides a good survey of the legal problems of constitutional law 
concerning the recent democratic changes in different Central and 
Eastern European countries. 
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by T. Sárközy 
This book presents and elaborates on the histoiy of the oldest privati-
zation in Eastern Europe, illuminating the principal regulatory frame-
work provided by today's law in Hungary. The successes a n d failures 
are presented objectively, the resuts ofwhich provide excellent material 
for western researchers and experts as well a s interested parties from 
other Eastern European countries. 
A basic overview of the fundamental problems and limitations of pri-
vatization (and reprivatization) are presented as are the various issues 
associated with shareholding by former enterprise leaders and em-
ployee participation in the privatization process. 
The possibilities and limitations of foreign investment are also dis-
cussed not only in terms of the various accomplishments to date, but 
also in terms of the expectations and potential for private foreign in-
vestment. Finally, the most recent Hungarian legislation regarding 
privatization is presented and analysed in detail. The supplement of 
the book contains the Hungarian Rules of Law in Force from 1992 on 
privatization. 
Readership: economists, historians, political scientists, bus iness and 
governmental leaders, undergraduate s tudents 
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